Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ueberauth guardian allows denial of service via unbounded atom creation from attacker-influenced binary input.
Guardian.Plug.Keys derives connection and session namespace keys by passing arbitrary binaries to String.to_atom/1. base_key/1 in lib/guardian/plug/keys.ex converts any binary into the atom :"guardian_<input>", and the derived helpers claims_key/1, resource_key/1, and token_key/1 create a second atom on top of that. key_from_other/1 likewise converts a regex-captured binary through String.to_atom/1. The public specs advertise String.t() as a valid argument, so passing a string is documented usage, and higher-level entry points such as Guardian.Plug.current_token(conn, key: key) thread the caller-supplied key straight into these functions.
String.to_atom/1 creates a brand-new atom for every previously unseen binary, atoms are never garbage collected, and the BEAM atom table is fixed at roughly 1,048,576 entries by default. An application that routes attacker-influenced data (a tenant identifier, header, or other request input) into a Guardian key therefore mints one permanent atom per distinct value. A modest stream of varied, unauthenticated input permanently consumes the atom table and crashes the BEAM node, taking down every application running on it.
This issue affects guardian: from 0.1.0 before 2.4.1.
Zephyr's Bluetooth host declares a GATT characteristic as two consecutive attributes: a Characteristic Declaration whose permission is hard-coded to BT_GATT_PERM_READ, and a Characteristic Value attribute that carries the application-specified security permissions (e.g. BT_GATT_PERM_READ_ENCRYPT / READ_AUTHEN / READ_LESC). The public notify and indicate APIs explicitly accept either attribute, and passing the declaration is the documented, common idiom. Before sending each notification or indication, the host re-checks link security with bt_gatt_check_perm() against params->attr in gatt_notify(), gatt_indicate(), and gatt_notify_multiple_verify_params() (subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c).
When the application passed the Characteristic Declaration attribute, the host correctly redirected the value handle but left params->attr pointing at the declaration, so the security check evaluated the declaration's permissions (no security required) instead of the value's. As a result the encryption/authentication/LESC requirement configured on the characteristic value was skipped. The Notify-Multiple path additionally used a mask that omitted the LE Secure Connections requirement.
A remote peer triggers the disclosure by connecting (optionally without pairing or encryption) and writing the Client Characteristic Configuration descriptor to enable notifications or indications, causing the server to emit the protected value over a link that has not reached the required security level. The impact is information disclosure / access-control bypass for characteristic values the application intended to expose only over a secured link; exposure depends on the application declaring encrypt/authen-required notify/indicate characteristics and on the CCC being writable at a lower security tier. There is no memory-safety or availability impact.
The fix adds bt_gatt_attr_resolve_value(), which maps a declaration attribute to the following value attribute before the permission check, and switches the Notify-Multiple path to the full BT_GATT_PERM_READ_ENCRYPT_MASK so the LESC requirement is also enforced.
The DHCPv4 client helper net_dhcpv4_msg_type_name() in subsys/net/lib/dhcpv4/dhcpv4.c indexes a static 8-element const char * name table after a faulty bounds check. The guard used msg_type <= sizeof(name) instead of msg_type <= ARRAY_SIZE(name); sizeof returns the byte size of the pointer array (32 on 32-bit, 64 on 64-bit targets) rather than the element count of 8, so message-type values from 9 up to that byte size pass the check and cause name[msg_type - 1] to read past the end of the array.
The msg_type value originates from the DHCP MESSAGE TYPE option, which is read as an unchecked raw byte from a received packet (net_pkt_read_u8) and passed unmodified into the lookup. A DHCP server, or any host able to inject a spoofed DHCP reply onto the client's link, can therefore drive the index out of bounds. The out-of-range slot yields a garbage const char * that is then dereferenced by a %s log conversion.
The lookup is reached only from a debug log statement (NET_DBG / LOG_DBG), so the out-of-bounds read is triggerable only when the DHCPv4 log module is built at DEBUG level (CONFIG_NET_DHCPV4_LOG_LEVEL_DBG), which is not the default configuration. When that condition holds, the result is an out-of-bounds read and a wild-pointer dereference: most likely a crash of the DHCP client (denial of service) and potentially disclosure of an adjacent pointer's contents through the log output. The fix replaces sizeof with ARRAY_SIZE, restoring the correct 1..8 acceptance window.
Data::Entropy versions before 0.010 for Perl read remote entropy sources over plain HTTP.
The Data::Entropy::RawSource::RandomOrg and Data::Entropy::RawSource::RandomnumbersInfo remote sources are accessed over plain HTTP.
The Data::Entropy::RawSource::RandomOrg integrity check trivially matches any non-empty byte string.
Any on-path attacker, such as open WiFi, a compromised ISP, captive portal, or a hostile egress proxy substitutes the response and thereby chooses the bytes returned by rand_bits and rand_int for every application that selected one of these sources via with_entropy_source. The _checkbuf method response is equally attacker-controlled, so the retry/sleep behaviour is steerable too.
An OS command injection vulnerability exists in the VPN module of TP-Link AXE75 V1 routers. This vulnerability allows an adjacent, authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the device by importing a specially crafted VPN client configuration file. The issue arises from improper filtering of special characters.
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may enable an attacker to gain full control of the affected device, potentially compromising configuration integrity, network security, and service availability.
Premiere Pro is affected by an out-of-bounds write vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file.
HCL iControl v4.3.0 was affected by Security Misconfiguration vulnerabilities. It involves the public exposure of internal configuration files due to improper web server or application hardening.
HCL iControl was affected by Information Exposure Through Verbose Client-Side API Error Messages vulnerabilities. It involves application displays raw server/API error messages to users instead of generic error messages and exposes internal endpoint names, request parameters, error codes, and authentication status
HCL iControl was affected by Sensitive Data Exposure vulnerabilities. It involves the public exposure of internal configuration files due to improper web server or application hardening.
HCL iControl was affected by Auto complete Enabled vulnerabilities. It involves expose sensitive information such as: Valid usernames, Email addresses used for login, Account identifiers If the system is accessed from shared environments, attackers may enumerate valid usernames through browser suggestions.