RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18, JWKS Fetch Ignores HTTP Response Status Code - Signing Key Destruction Causes Authentication DoS (CWE-252). the JWKS key fetching mechanism in uaajwt.erl does not validate the HTTP response status code when downloading signing keys from the OAuth2 provider's JWKS endpoint. Non-200 responses (including 4xx and 5xx errors) are processed identically to successful responses. When the JWKS endpoint returns an error response with a valid-JSON body that lacks a keys field, all previously cached signing keys are destroyed, causing a persistent authentication denial of Files: deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwt.erl, lines 50-63 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwks.erl, lines 5-7 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/rabbitoauth2provider.erl, lines 98-107 Bug 1: HTTP status code ignored (uaajwt.erl:50-63): The Erlang httpc module returns {ok, {{HttpVersion, StatusCode, ReasonPhrase}, Headers, Body}}. The pattern {ok, {, , JwksBody}} matches ANY successful HTTP transaction Persistent authentication DoS: Once keys are destroyed, ALL OAuth2/JWT authentication fails for all users until a new successful JWKS refresh occurs Amplification: A single attacker can deny access to all legitimate OAuth2 users across the entire RabbitMQ. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.0.0 until 4.0.22 and 4.1.14 and 4.2.7, Admin-only atom exhaustion: PUT /api/users tags list. settags/2 maps rabbitdatacoercion:toatom/1 over the user's tags list. The 20 MB management body limit fits ~3-4M short tag strings. An administrator can crash the node in a single request by creating a user (or importing definitions) with ~1M unique tag administrator. This issue is fixed in versions 4.0.22 and 4.1.14 and 4.2.7.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.0.0 until 4.0.22 and 4.1.14 and 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, Atom exhaustion: toatom on global-parameter :name. resourceexists/2 (and the PUT/DELETE handlers) call rabbitdatacoercion:toatom/1 on the :name URL path segment. toatom/1 uses binarytoatom/2 (unsafe). The endpoint requires policymaker (not management, but below A user with the policymaker tag can crash the node by exhausting the atom table via repeated requests to /api/global-parameters/:name with unique :name Management plugin enabled policymaker tag ~1M HTTP. This issue is fixed in versions 4.0.22 and 4.1.14 and 4.2.7 and 4.3.1.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, the Web STOMP WebSocket handler enforced neither max_frame_size nor login_timeout before authentication, allowing an unauthenticated client to keep a connection alive with a slow stream of small frames and accumulate unbounded pre-authentication state. The rabbitmq_web_stomp plugin must be enabled, and no authentication is required to reach the vulnerable path. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.2.0 until 4.2.8 and 4.3.2, get_auth_mechanism/1 used term_to_binary/1 on the strict_auth_mechanism or preferred_auth_mechanism atom when clearing the corresponding cookie, producing a non-ASCII cookie name that violates RFC 6265 and can prevent the browser from deleting the preference. The issue is not directly exploitable for code execution or data exfiltration; its security relevance is limited to stale authentication-mechanism preferences persisting across logout and login cycles. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.8 and 4.3.2.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.2.0 until 4.2.8 and 4.3.2, set_token_auth/2 inserted a bearer token from the Authorization header or access_token cookie into OAuth bootstrap JavaScript without escaping, allowing attacker-controlled token content to execute JavaScript in the management UI origin. The endpoint is exposed before authentication only when management.oauth_enabled is true, and exploitation through the cookie path additionally requires the attacker to plant an access_token cookie on the management host. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.8 and 4.3.2.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6, Atom table exhaustion via management API node field. pUT /api/queues/:vhost/:name (and the exchanges and bindings endpoints) accepts a node JSON field. The value goes through rabbitnodes:make → listtoatom with no cluster membership check first. Each unique value permanently leaks one atom. A March 2026 refactoring (ea61ce2563) introduced safe helpers in rabbitmgmtnodes.erl (parsenodename, safeatom, and requirenodename, using binarytoexistingatom) and fixed several callers (QQ replica ops, wmauthattempts, wmnodememoryets, getsortreverse, and rabbitfederationmgmt), but getnode/1 in rabbitmgmtutil.erl:880-885, the primary vector used by directrequest/6, was not Roughly 900K requests crash the VM via systemlimit, and all tenants lose Any user with the management tag and one vhost, the lowest privilege This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6, protected tag bypass via bulk-delete. dELETE /api/users/:name refuses to delete users tagged protected (rabbitmgmtwmuser:deleteresource/2 checks isprotecteduser). POST /api/users/bulk-delete iterates the supplied username list and calls rabbitauthbackendinternal:deleteuser/2 directly , that function has no protected-tag check , so the guard is silently An administrator can delete protected-tagged service accounts via the bulk endpoint, bypassing a safeguard the test suite confirms is rabbitmqmanagement enabled Attacker has the administrator tag A protected-tagged user. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, mechanisms/1 applied list_to_atom/1 to every colon-delimited token in an attacker-controlled auth_mechanism value, permanently consuming Erlang VM atoms and allowing the node to be crashed with a large request. Exploitation requires the Shovel or Federation plugin to be in use, and setting auth_mechanism requires the policymaker tag. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. The advisory establishes affected 3.13, 4.0, 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 maintenance lines but contains conflicting first-fixed versions for the 3.13, 4.0, and 4.1 lines. fill/2 substitutes ${username} into user_dn_pattern without RFC 4514 DN escaping, allowing a crafted username to alter the LDAP bind DN and potentially select a different directory entry. Exploitation requires rabbitmq_auth_backend_ldap with a user_dn_pattern containing ${username}, a directory layout in which the injected suffix resolves usefully, and a password valid for the resulting DN. The advisory body identifies 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3 as fixed, while structured metadata identifies 3.13.18, 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3. No fixed-version assertion is certifiable until a curator resolves this conflict.