In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nat: use kfree_rcu to release ops
Florian Westphal says:
"Historically this is not an issue, even for normal base hooks: the data
path doesn't use the original nf_hook_ops that are used to register the
callbacks.
However, in v5.14 I added the ability to dump the active netfilter
hooks from userspace.
This code will peek back into the nf_hook_ops that are available
at the tail of the pointer-array blob used by the datapath.
The nat hooks are special, because they are called indirectly from
the central nat dispatcher hook. They are currently invisible to
the nfnl hook dump subsystem though.
But once that changes the nat ops structures have to be deferred too."
Update nf_nat_register_fn() to deal with partial exposition of the hooks
from error path which can be also an issue for nfnetlink_hook.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack: remove sprintf usage
Replace it with scnprintf, the buffer sizes are expected to be large enough
to hold the result, no need for snprintf+overflow check.
Increase buffer size in mangle_content_len() while at it.
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in vsnprintf+0xea5/0x1270
Write of size 1 at addr [..]
vsnprintf+0xea5/0x1270
sprintf+0xb1/0xe0
mangle_content_len+0x1ac/0x280
nf_nat_sdp_session+0x1cc/0x240
process_sdp+0x8f8/0xb80
process_invite_request+0x108/0x2b0
process_sip_msg+0x5da/0xf50
sip_help_tcp+0x45e/0x780
nf_confirm+0x34d/0x990
[..]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix possible UAF in icmpv6_rcv()
Caching saddr and daddr before pskb_pull() is problematic
since skb->head can change.
Remove these temporary variables:
- We only access &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr and &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr
when net_dbg_ratelimited() is called in the slow path.
- Avoid potential future misuse after pskb_pull() call.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/adfs: validate nzones in adfs_validate_bblk()
Reject ADFS disc records with a zero zone count during boot block
validation, before the disc record is used.
When nzones is 0, adfs_read_map() passes it to kmalloc_array(0, ...)
which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, and adfs_map_layout() then writes to
dm[-1], causing an out-of-bounds write before the allocated buffer.
adfs_validate_dr0() already rejects nzones != 1 for old-format
images. Add the equivalent check to adfs_validate_bblk() for
new-format images so that a crafted image with nzones == 0 is
rejected at probe time.
Found by syzkaller.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix double-free in tipc_buf_append()
tipc_msg_validate() can potentially reallocate the skb it is validating,
freeing the old one. In tipc_buf_append(), it was being called with a
pointer to a local variable which was a copy of the caller's skb
pointer.
If the skb was reallocated and validation subsequently failed, the error
handling path would free the original skb pointer, which had already
been freed, leading to double-free.
Fix this by checking if head now points to a newly allocated reassembled
skb. If it does, reassign *headbuf for later freeing operations.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: fix MSG_ZEROCOPY pinned-pages accounting
virtio_transport_init_zcopy_skb() uses iter->count as the size argument
for msg_zerocopy_realloc(), which in turn passes it to
mm_account_pinned_pages() for RLIMIT_MEMLOCK accounting. However, this
function is called after virtio_transport_fill_skb() has already consumed
the iterator via __zerocopy_sg_from_iter(), so on the last skb, iter->count
will be 0, skipping the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK enforcement.
Pass pkt_len (the total bytes being sent) as an explicit parameter to
virtio_transport_init_zcopy_skb() instead of reading the already-consumed
iter->count.
This matches TCP and UDP, which both call msg_zerocopy_realloc() with
the original message size.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: zero per-item info buffer before handing it to visitors
rds_for_each_conn_info() and rds_walk_conn_path_info() both hand a
caller-allocated on-stack u64 buffer to a per-connection visitor and
then copy the full item_len bytes back to user space via
rds_info_copy() regardless of how much of the buffer the visitor
actually wrote.
rds_ib_conn_info_visitor() and rds6_ib_conn_info_visitor() only
write a subset of their output struct when the underlying
rds_connection is not in state RDS_CONN_UP (src/dst addr, tos, sl
and the two GIDs via explicit memsets). Several u32 fields
(max_send_wr, max_recv_wr, max_send_sge, rdma_mr_max, rdma_mr_size,
cache_allocs) and the 2-byte alignment hole between sl and
cache_allocs remain as whatever stack contents preceded the visitor
call and are then memcpy_to_user()'d out to user space.
struct rds_info_rdma_connection and struct rds6_info_rdma_connection
are the only rds_info_* structs in include/uapi/linux/rds.h that are
not marked __attribute__((packed)), so they have a real alignment
hole. The other info visitors (rds_conn_info_visitor,
rds6_conn_info_visitor, rds_tcp_tc_info, ...) write all fields of
their packed output struct today and are not known to be vulnerable,
but a future visitor that adds a conditional write-path would have
the same bug.
Reproduction on a kernel built without CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y:
a local unprivileged user opens AF_RDS, sets SO_RDS_TRANSPORT=IB,
binds to a local address on an RDMA-capable netdev (rxe soft-RoCE on
any netdev is sufficient), sendto()'s any peer on the same subnet
(fails cleanly but installs an rds_connection in the global hash in
RDS_CONN_CONNECTING), then calls getsockopt(SOL_RDS,
RDS_INFO_IB_CONNECTIONS). The returned 68-byte item contains 26
bytes of stack garbage including kernel text/data pointers:
0..7 0a 63 00 01 0a 63 00 02 src=10.99.0.1 dst=10.99.0.2
8..39 00 ... gids (memset-zeroed)
40..47 e0 92 a3 81 ff ff ff ff kernel pointer (max_send_wr)
48..55 7f 37 b5 81 ff ff ff ff kernel pointer (rdma_mr_max)
56..59 01 00 08 00 rdma_mr_size (garbage)
60..61 00 00 tos, sl
62..63 00 00 alignment padding
64..67 18 00 00 00 cache_allocs (garbage)
Fix by zeroing the per-item buffer in both rds_for_each_conn_info()
and rds_walk_conn_path_info() before invoking the visitor. This
covers the IPv4/IPv6 IB visitors and hardens all current and future
visitors against the same class of bug.
No functional change for visitors that fully populate their output.
Changes in v2:
- retarget at the net tree (subject prefix "[PATCH net v2]",
net/rds: prefix in the title)
- pick up Reviewed-by tags from Sharath Srinivasan and
Allison Henderson
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix durable fd leak on ClientGUID mismatch in durable v2 open
ksmbd_lookup_fd_cguid() returns a ksmbd_file with its refcount
incremented via ksmbd_fp_get(). parse_durable_handle_context() in
the DURABLE_REQ_V2 case properly releases this reference on every
path inside the ClientGUID-match branch, either by calling
ksmbd_put_durable_fd() or by transferring ownership to dh_info->fp
for a successful reconnect. However, when an entry exists in the
global file table with the same CreateGuid but a different
ClientGUID, the code simply falls through to the new-open path
without dropping the reference obtained from ksmbd_lookup_fd_cguid().
Per MS-SMB2 section 3.3.5.9.10 ("Handling the
SMB2_CREATE_DURABLE_HANDLE_REQUEST_V2 Create Context"), the server
MUST locate an Open whose Open.CreateGuid matches the request's
CreateGuid AND whose Open.ClientGuid matches the ClientGuid of the
connection that received the request. If no such Open is found, the
server MUST continue with the normal open execution phase. A
CreateGuid hit with a ClientGUID mismatch is therefore the
"Open not found" case: proceeding with a new open is correct, but
the reference obtained purely as a side effect of the lookup must
not be leaked.
Repeated requests that hit this mismatch pin global_ft entries,
prevent __ksmbd_close_fd() from ever running for the corresponding
files, and defeat the durable scavenger, leading to long-lived
resource leaks.
Release the reference in the mismatch path and clear dh_info->fp so
subsequent logic does not mistake a non-matching lookup result for
a reconnect target.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_dualpi2: drain both C-queue and L-queue in dualpi2_change()
Fix dualpi2_change() to correctly enforce updated limit and memlimit
values after a configuration change of the dualpi2 qdisc.
Before this patch, dualpi2_change() always attempted to dequeue packets
via the root qdisc (C-queue) when reducing backlog or memory usage, and
unconditionally assumed that a valid skb will be returned. When traffic
classification results in packets being queued in the L-queue while the
C-queue is empty, this leads to a NULL skb dereference during limit or
memlimit enforcement.
This is fixed by first dequeuing from the C-queue path if it is
non-empty. Once the C-queue is empty, packets are dequeued directly from
the L-queue. Return values from qdisc_dequeue_internal() are checked for
both queues. When dequeuing from the L-queue, the parent qdisc qlen and
backlog counters are updated explicitly to keep overall qdisc statistics
consistent.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: fix potential NULL dereference in ttl check
The nf_osf_ttl() function accessed skb->dev to perform a local interface
address lookup without verifying that the device pointer was valid.
Additionally, the implementation utilized an in_dev_for_each_ifa_rcu
loop to match the packet source address against local interface
addresses. It assumed that packets from the same subnet should not see a
decrement on the initial TTL. A packet might appear it is from the same
subnet but it actually isn't especially in modern environments with
containers and virtual switching.
Remove the device dereference and interface loop. Replace the logic with
a switch statement that evaluates the TTL according to the ttl_check.