IBM WebSphere Application Server - Liberty 22.0.0.11 through 26.0.0.5 IBM WebSphere Application Server Liberty could allow a remote attacker to bypass security under limited conditions by exploiting a specific timing window.
IBM Db2 11.5.0 through 11.5.9, and 12.1.0 through 12.1.4 is vulnerable to a denial of service when executing a specially crafted query with a small statement heap.
IBM Db2 11.5.0 through 11.5.9, and 12.1.0 through 12.1.4 is vulnerable to a denial of service when a specially crafted query is run with range partitioned tables.
IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 s vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack due to uncontrolled recursion in the Integrated Language Environment (ILE) compiler. An authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability by compiling specially crafted source code containing a specific combination of statements.
IBM WebSphere Application Server - Liberty 19.0.0.7 through 26.0.0.5 and IBM WebSphere Application Server 9.0, and 8.5 and WebSphere Application Server Liberty are vulnerable to a denial of service, caused by sending a specially-crafted request. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause the server to consume memory resources.
IBM Controller 11.0.1, 11.1.0, 11.1.1, and 11.1.2 contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key, which it uses for its own inbound authentication, outbound communication to external components, or encryption of internal data.
libusb before version 1.0.30 contains a one-byte out-of-bounds read vulnerability in parse_iad_array() in descriptor.c that allows attackers to trigger a denial of service by supplying a malformed USB descriptor whose bLength equals size minus one, causing the bounds check to use the original buffer size instead of the remaining size. Attackers in virtualized environments with USB passthrough can supply crafted descriptors through libusb_get_active_interface_association_descriptors or libusb_get_interface_association_descriptors to read one byte past the end of the malloc allocation, resulting in a denial of service.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: fix integer overflow in run_unpack() volume boundary check
The volume boundary check `lcn + len > sbi->used.bitmap.nbits` uses raw
addition which can wrap around for large lcn and len values, bypassing
the validation. Use check_add_overflow() as is already done for the
adjacent prev_lcn + dlcn and vcn64 + len checks added by commit
3ac37e100385 ("ntfs3: Fix integer overflow in run_unpack()").
Found by fuzzing with a source-patched harness (LibAFL + QEMU).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/shstk: Prevent deadlock during shstk sigreturn
During sigreturn the shadow stack signal frame is popped. The kernel does
this by reading the shadow stack using normal read accesses. When it can't
assume the memory is shadow stack, it takes extra steps to makes sure it is
reading actual shadow stack memory and not other normal readable memory. It
does this by holding the mmap read lock while doing the access and checking
the flags of the VMA.
Unfortunately that is not safe. If the read of the shadow stack sigframe
hits a page fault, the fault handler will try to recursively grab another
mmap read lock. This normally works ok, but if a writer on another CPU is
also waiting, the second read lock could fail and cause a deadlock.
Fix this by not holding mmap lock during the read access to userspace.
Instead use mmap_lock_speculate_...() to watch for changes between dropping
mmap lock and the userspace access. Retry if anything grabbed an mmap write
lock in between and could have changed the VMA.
These mmap_lock_speculate_...() helpers use mm::mm_lock_seq, which is only
available when PER_VMA_LOCK is configured. So make X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
depend on it. On x86, PER_VMA_LOCK is a default configuration for SMP
kernels. So drop support for the other configs under the assumption that
the !SMP shadow stack user base does not exist.
Currently there is a check that skips the lookup work when the SSP can be
assumed to be on a shadow stack. While reorganizing the function, remove
the optimization to make the tricky code flows more common, such that
issues like this cannot escape detection for so long.