In Eclipse Mosquitto 1.5.0 to 1.6.5 inclusive, if a malicious MQTT client sends a SUBSCRIBE packet containing a topic that consists of approximately 65400 or more '/' characters, i.e. the topic hierarchy separator, then a stack overflow will occur.
If an MQTT v5 client connects to Eclipse Mosquitto versions 1.6.0 to 1.6.4 inclusive, sets a last will and testament, sets a will delay interval, sets a session expiry interval, and the will delay interval is set longer than the session expiry interval, then a use after free error occurs, which has the potential to cause a crash in some situations.
Prior to 0.1, all builds of Eclipse OMR contain a bug where the loop versioner may fail to privatize a value that is pulled out of the loop by versioning - for example if there is a condition that is moved out of the loop that reads a field we may not privatize the value of that field in the modified copy of the loop allowing the test to see one value of the field and subsequently the loop to see a modified field value without retesting the condition moved out of the loop. This can lead to a variety of different issues but read out of array bounds is one major consequence of these problems.
In the Eclipse Paho Java client library version 1.2.0, when connecting to an MQTT server using TLS and setting a host name verifier, the result of that verification is not checked. This could allow one MQTT server to impersonate another and provide the client library with incorrect information.
In Eclipse BIRT versions 1.0 to 4.7, the Report Viewer allows Reflected XSS in URL parameter. Attacker can execute the payload in victim's browser context.
All builds of Eclipse OpenJ9 prior to 0.15 contain a bug where the loop versioner may fail to privatize a value that is pulled out of the loop by versioning - for example if there is a condition that is moved out of the loop that reads a field we may not privatize the value of that field in the modified copy of the loop allowing the test to see one value of the field and subsequently the loop to see a modified field value without retesting the condition moved out of the loop. This can lead to a variety of different issues but read out of array bounds is one major consequence of these problems.
In Eclipse OpenJ9 prior to 0.15, the String.getBytes(int, int, byte[], int) method does not verify that the provided byte array is non-null nor that the provided index is in bounds when compiled by the JIT. This allows arbitrary writes to any 32-bit address or beyond the end of a byte array within Java code run under a SecurityManager.
In Eclipse Buildship versions prior to 3.1.1, the build files indicate that this project is resolving dependencies over HTTP instead of HTTPS. Any of these artifacts could have been MITM to maliciously compromise them and infect the build artifacts that were produced. Additionally, if any of these JARs or other dependencies were compromised, any developers using these could continue to be infected past updating to fix this.