Linux: >> Linux Kernel >> 6.6.63 Security Vulnerabilities
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
atm: Release atm_dev_mutex after removing procfs in atm_dev_deregister().
syzbot reported a warning below during atm_dev_register(). [0]
Before creating a new device and procfs/sysfs for it, atm_dev_register()
looks up a duplicated device by __atm_dev_lookup(). These operations are
done under atm_dev_mutex.
However, when removing a device in atm_dev_deregister(), it releases the
mutex just after removing the device from the list that __atm_dev_lookup()
iterates over.
So, there will be a small race window where the device does not exist on
the device list but procfs/sysfs are still not removed, triggering the
splat.
Let's hold the mutex until procfs/sysfs are removed in
atm_dev_deregister().
[0]:
proc_dir_entry 'atm/atmtcp:0' already registered
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5919 at fs/proc/generic.c:377 proc_register+0x455/0x5f0 fs/proc/generic.c:377
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5919 Comm: syz-executor284 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc2-syzkaller-00047-g52da431bf03b #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025
RIP: 0010:proc_register+0x455/0x5f0 fs/proc/generic.c:377
Code: 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 80 3c 01 00 0f 85 a2 01 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 48 c7 c7 20 c0 c2 8b 48 8b b0 d8 00 00 00 e8 0c 02 1c ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 48 c7 c7 80 f2 82 8e e8 0b de 23 09 48 8b 4c 24 28 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000466fa30 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff817ae248
RDX: ffff888026280000 RSI: ffffffff817ae255 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff8880232bed48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888076ed2140
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888078a61340 R15: ffffed100edda444
FS: 00007f38b3b0c6c0(0000) GS:ffff888124753000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f38b3bdf953 CR3: 0000000076d58000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
proc_create_data+0xbe/0x110 fs/proc/generic.c:585
atm_proc_dev_register+0x112/0x1e0 net/atm/proc.c:361
atm_dev_register+0x46d/0x890 net/atm/resources.c:113
atmtcp_create+0x77/0x210 drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:369
atmtcp_attach drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:403 [inline]
atmtcp_ioctl+0x2f9/0xd60 drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:464
do_vcc_ioctl+0x12c/0x930 net/atm/ioctl.c:159
sock_do_ioctl+0x115/0x280 net/socket.c:1190
sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1311
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18b/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x4c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f38b3b74459
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f38b3b0c198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f38b3bfe318 RCX: 00007f38b3b74459
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000006180 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007f38b3bfe310 R08: 65732f636f72702f R09: 65732f636f72702f
R10: 65732f636f72702f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f38b3bcb0ac
R13: 00007f38b3b0c1a0 R14: 0000200000000200 R15: 00007f38b3bcb03b
</TASK>
CVSS Score
7.8
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-07-09
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt: properly flush XDP redirect lists
We encountered following crash when testing a XDP_REDIRECT feature
in production:
[56251.579676] list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffff93120dd40f30), but was ffffb301ef3a6740. (next=ffff93120dd
40f30).
[56251.601413] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[56251.611357] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29!
[56251.621082] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[56251.632073] CPU: 111 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/111 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P O 6.12.33-cloudflare-2025.6.
3 #1
[56251.653155] Tainted: [P]=PROPRIETARY_MODULE, [O]=OOT_MODULE
[56251.663877] Hardware name: MiTAC GC68B-B8032-G11P6-GPU/S8032GM-HE-CFR, BIOS V7.020.B10-sig 01/22/2025
[56251.682626] RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x4b/0xa0
[56251.693203] Code: 0e 48 c7 c7 68 e7 d9 97 e8 42 16 fe ff 0f 0b 48 8b 52 08 48 39 c2 74 14 48 89 f1 48 c7 c7 90 e7 d9 97 48
89 c6 e8 25 16 fe ff <0f> 0b 4c 8b 02 49 39 f0 74 14 48 89 d1 48 c7 c7 e8 e7 d9 97 4c 89
[56251.725811] RSP: 0018:ffff93120dd40b80 EFLAGS: 00010246
[56251.736094] RAX: 0000000000000075 RBX: ffffb301e6bba9d8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[56251.748260] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9149afda0b80 RDI: ffff9149afda0b80
[56251.760349] RBP: ffff9131e49c8000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff93120dd40a18
[56251.772382] R10: ffff9159cf2ce1a8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff911a80850000
[56251.784364] R13: ffff93120fbc7000 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: ffff9139e7510e40
[56251.796278] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9149afd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[56251.809133] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[56251.819561] CR2: 00007f5e85e6f300 CR3: 00000038b85e2006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[56251.831365] PKRU: 55555554
[56251.838653] Call Trace:
[56251.845560] <IRQ>
[56251.851943] cpu_map_enqueue.cold+0x5/0xa
[56251.860243] xdp_do_redirect+0x2d9/0x480
[56251.868388] bnxt_rx_xdp+0x1d8/0x4c0 [bnxt_en]
[56251.877028] bnxt_rx_pkt+0x5f7/0x19b0 [bnxt_en]
[56251.885665] ? cpu_max_write+0x1e/0x100
[56251.893510] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56251.902276] __bnxt_poll_work+0x190/0x340 [bnxt_en]
[56251.911058] bnxt_poll+0xab/0x1b0 [bnxt_en]
[56251.919041] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56251.927568] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56251.935958] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56251.944250] __napi_poll+0x2b/0x160
[56251.951155] bpf_trampoline_6442548651+0x79/0x123
[56251.959262] __napi_poll+0x5/0x160
[56251.966037] net_rx_action+0x3d2/0x880
[56251.973133] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56251.981265] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56251.989262] ? __hrtimer_run_queues+0x162/0x2a0
[56251.996967] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56252.004875] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[56252.012673] ? bnxt_msix+0x62/0x70 [bnxt_en]
[56252.019903] handle_softirqs+0xcf/0x270
[56252.026650] irq_exit_rcu+0x67/0x90
[56252.032933] common_interrupt+0x85/0xa0
[56252.039498] </IRQ>
[56252.044246] <TASK>
[56252.048935] asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
[56252.055727] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xb8/0x420
[56252.063305] Code: dc 01 00 00 e8 f9 79 3b ff e8 64 f7 ff ff 49 89 c5 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 ff e8 a5 32 3a ff 45 84 ff 0f 85 ae
01 00 00 fb 45 85 f6 <0f> 88 88 01 00 00 48 8b 04 24 49 63 ce 4c 89 ea 48 6b f1 68 48 29
[56252.088911] RSP: 0018:ffff93120c97fe98 EFLAGS: 00000202
[56252.096912] RAX: ffff9149afd80000 RBX: ffff9141d3a72800 RCX: 0000000000000000
[56252.106844] RDX: 00003329176c6b98 RSI: ffffffe36db3fdc7 RDI: 0000000000000000
[56252.116733] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 000000000000004e
[56252.126652] R10: ffff9149afdb30c4 R11: 071c71c71c71c71c R12: ffffffff985ff860
[56252.136637] R13: 00003329176c6b98 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000
[56252.146667] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xab/0x420
[56252.153909] cpuidle_enter+0x2d/0x40
[56252.160360] do_idle+0x176/0x1c0
[56252.166456
---truncated---
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-07-09
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: mcast: Fix use-after-free during router port configuration
The bridge maintains a global list of ports behind which a multicast
router resides. The list is consulted during forwarding to ensure
multicast packets are forwarded to these ports even if the ports are not
member in the matching MDB entry.
When per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled, the per-port multicast
context is disabled on each port and the port is removed from the global
router port list:
# ip link add name br1 up type bridge vlan_filtering 1 mcast_snooping 1
# ip link add name dummy1 up master br1 type dummy
# ip link set dev dummy1 type bridge_slave mcast_router 2
$ bridge -d mdb show | grep router
router ports on br1: dummy1
# ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_vlan_snooping 1
$ bridge -d mdb show | grep router
However, the port can be re-added to the global list even when per-VLAN
multicast snooping is enabled:
# ip link set dev dummy1 type bridge_slave mcast_router 0
# ip link set dev dummy1 type bridge_slave mcast_router 2
$ bridge -d mdb show | grep router
router ports on br1: dummy1
Since commit 4b30ae9adb04 ("net: bridge: mcast: re-implement
br_multicast_{enable, disable}_port functions"), when per-VLAN multicast
snooping is enabled, multicast disablement on a port will disable the
per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts and not the per-port one. As a
result, a port will remain in the global router port list even after it
is deleted. This will lead to a use-after-free [1] when the list is
traversed (when adding a new port to the list, for example):
# ip link del dev dummy1
# ip link add name dummy2 up master br1 type dummy
# ip link set dev dummy2 type bridge_slave mcast_router 2
Similarly, stale entries can also be found in the per-VLAN router port
list. When per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled, the per-{port, VLAN}
contexts are disabled on each port and the port is removed from the
per-VLAN router port list:
# ip link add name br1 up type bridge vlan_filtering 1 mcast_snooping 1 mcast_vlan_snooping 1
# ip link add name dummy1 up master br1 type dummy
# bridge vlan add vid 2 dev dummy1
# bridge vlan global set vid 2 dev br1 mcast_snooping 1
# bridge vlan set vid 2 dev dummy1 mcast_router 2
$ bridge vlan global show dev br1 vid 2 | grep router
router ports: dummy1
# ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_vlan_snooping 0
$ bridge vlan global show dev br1 vid 2 | grep router
However, the port can be re-added to the per-VLAN list even when
per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled:
# bridge vlan set vid 2 dev dummy1 mcast_router 0
# bridge vlan set vid 2 dev dummy1 mcast_router 2
$ bridge vlan global show dev br1 vid 2 | grep router
router ports: dummy1
When the VLAN is deleted from the port, the per-{port, VLAN} multicast
context will not be disabled since multicast snooping is not enabled
on the VLAN. As a result, the port will remain in the per-VLAN router
port list even after it is no longer member in the VLAN. This will lead
to a use-after-free [2] when the list is traversed (when adding a new
port to the list, for example):
# ip link add name dummy2 up master br1 type dummy
# bridge vlan add vid 2 dev dummy2
# bridge vlan del vid 2 dev dummy1
# bridge vlan set vid 2 dev dummy2 mcast_router 2
Fix these issues by removing the port from the relevant (global or
per-VLAN) router port list in br_multicast_port_ctx_deinit(). The
function is invoked during port deletion with the per-port multicast
context and during VLAN deletion with the per-{port, VLAN} multicast
context.
Note that deleting the multicast router timer is not enough as it only
takes care of the temporary multicast router states (1 or 3) and not the
permanent one (2).
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in br_multicast_add_router.part.0+0x3f1/0x560
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888004a67328 by task ip/384
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack
---truncated---
CVSS Score
7.8
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-07-09
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: megaraid_sas: Fix invalid node index
On a system with DRAM interleave enabled, out-of-bound access is
detected:
megaraid_sas 0000:3f:00.0: requested/available msix 128/128 poll_queue 0
------------[ cut here ]------------
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ./arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h:72:28
index -1 is out of range for type 'cpumask *[1024]'
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x2b
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x46/0x4b
megasas_alloc_irq_vectors+0x149/0x190 [megaraid_sas]
megasas_probe_one.cold+0xa4d/0x189c [megaraid_sas]
local_pci_probe+0x42/0x90
pci_device_probe+0xdc/0x290
really_probe+0xdb/0x340
__driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
__driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0
bus_for_each_dev+0x8b/0xe0
bus_add_driver+0x142/0x220
driver_register+0x72/0xd0
megasas_init+0xdf/0xff0 [megaraid_sas]
do_one_initcall+0x57/0x310
do_init_module+0x90/0x250
init_module_from_file+0x85/0xc0
idempotent_init_module+0x114/0x310
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x65/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x82/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Fix it accordingly.
CVSS Score
7.8
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-07-09
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: platform: exynos4-is: Add hardware sync wait to fimc_is_hw_change_mode()
In fimc_is_hw_change_mode(), the function changes camera modes without
waiting for hardware completion, risking corrupted data or system hangs
if subsequent operations proceed before the hardware is ready.
Add fimc_is_hw_wait_intmsr0_intmsd0() after mode configuration, ensuring
hardware state synchronization and stable interrupt handling.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-07-08
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Don't leave consecutive consumed OOB skbs.
Jann Horn reported a use-after-free in unix_stream_read_generic().
The following sequences reproduce the issue:
$ python3
from socket import *
s1, s2 = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM)
s1.send(b'x', MSG_OOB)
s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # leave a consumed OOB skb
s1.send(b'y', MSG_OOB)
s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # leave a consumed OOB skb
s1.send(b'z', MSG_OOB)
s2.recv(1) # recv 'z' illegally
s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # access 'z' skb (use-after-free)
Even though a user reads OOB data, the skb holding the data stays on
the recv queue to mark the OOB boundary and break the next recv().
After the last send() in the scenario above, the sk2's recv queue has
2 leading consumed OOB skbs and 1 real OOB skb.
Then, the following happens during the next recv() without MSG_OOB
1. unix_stream_read_generic() peeks the first consumed OOB skb
2. manage_oob() returns the next consumed OOB skb
3. unix_stream_read_generic() fetches the next not-yet-consumed OOB skb
4. unix_stream_read_generic() reads and frees the OOB skb
, and the last recv(MSG_OOB) triggers KASAN splat.
The 3. above occurs because of the SO_PEEK_OFF code, which does not
expect unix_skb_len(skb) to be 0, but this is true for such consumed
OOB skbs.
while (skip >= unix_skb_len(skb)) {
skip -= unix_skb_len(skb);
skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
...
}
In addition to this use-after-free, there is another issue that
ioctl(SIOCATMARK) does not function properly with consecutive consumed
OOB skbs.
So, nothing good comes out of such a situation.
Instead of complicating manage_oob(), ioctl() handling, and the next
ECONNRESET fix by introducing a loop for consecutive consumed OOB skbs,
let's not leave such consecutive OOB unnecessarily.
Now, while receiving an OOB skb in unix_stream_recv_urg(), if its
previous skb is a consumed OOB skb, it is freed.
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_stream_read_actor (net/unix/af_unix.c:3027)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888106ef2904 by task python3/315
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 315 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-00407-gec315832f6f9 #8 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-4.fc42 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:409 mm/kasan/report.c:521)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:636)
unix_stream_read_actor (net/unix/af_unix.c:3027)
unix_stream_read_generic (net/unix/af_unix.c:2708 net/unix/af_unix.c:2847)
unix_stream_recvmsg (net/unix/af_unix.c:3048)
sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1063 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:1085 (discriminator 20))
__sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2278)
__x64_sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2291 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1))
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1))
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
RIP: 0033:0x7f8911fcea06
Code: 5d e8 41 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 75 19 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 11 e8 26 ff ff ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <48> 8b 5d f8 c9 c3 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007fffdb0dccb0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fffdb0dcdc8 RCX: 00007f8911fcea06
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f8911a5e060 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007fffdb0dccd0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f89119a7d20
R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Allocated by task 315:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:60 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/common.c:69 (discriminator 1))
__kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:348)
kmem_cache_alloc_
---truncated---
CVSS Score
7.8
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-07-08
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/rt: Fix race in push_rt_task
Overview
========
When a CPU chooses to call push_rt_task and picks a task to push to
another CPU's runqueue then it will call find_lock_lowest_rq method
which would take a double lock on both CPUs' runqueues. If one of the
locks aren't readily available, it may lead to dropping the current
runqueue lock and reacquiring both the locks at once. During this window
it is possible that the task is already migrated and is running on some
other CPU. These cases are already handled. However, if the task is
migrated and has already been executed and another CPU is now trying to
wake it up (ttwu) such that it is queued again on the runqeue
(on_rq is 1) and also if the task was run by the same CPU, then the
current checks will pass even though the task was migrated out and is no
longer in the pushable tasks list.
Crashes
=======
This bug resulted in quite a few flavors of crashes triggering kernel
panics with various crash signatures such as assert failures, page
faults, null pointer dereferences, and queue corruption errors all
coming from scheduler itself.
Some of the crashes:
-> kernel BUG at kernel/sched/rt.c:1616! BUG_ON(idx >= MAX_RT_PRIO)
Call Trace:
? __die_body+0x1a/0x60
? die+0x2a/0x50
? do_trap+0x85/0x100
? pick_next_task_rt+0x6e/0x1d0
? do_error_trap+0x64/0xa0
? pick_next_task_rt+0x6e/0x1d0
? exc_invalid_op+0x4c/0x60
? pick_next_task_rt+0x6e/0x1d0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20
? pick_next_task_rt+0x6e/0x1d0
__schedule+0x5cb/0x790
? update_ts_time_stats+0x55/0x70
schedule_idle+0x1e/0x40
do_idle+0x15e/0x200
cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
start_secondary+0x117/0x160
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xb0/0xbb
-> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c0
Call Trace:
? __die_body+0x1a/0x60
? no_context+0x183/0x350
? __warn+0x8a/0xe0
? exc_page_fault+0x3d6/0x520
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
? pick_next_task_rt+0xb5/0x1d0
? pick_next_task_rt+0x8c/0x1d0
__schedule+0x583/0x7e0
? update_ts_time_stats+0x55/0x70
schedule_idle+0x1e/0x40
do_idle+0x15e/0x200
cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
start_secondary+0x117/0x160
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xb0/0xbb
-> BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff9464daea5900
kernel BUG at kernel/sched/rt.c:1861! BUG_ON(rq->cpu != task_cpu(p))
-> kernel BUG at kernel/sched/rt.c:1055! BUG_ON(!rq->nr_running)
Call Trace:
? __die_body+0x1a/0x60
? die+0x2a/0x50
? do_trap+0x85/0x100
? dequeue_top_rt_rq+0xa2/0xb0
? do_error_trap+0x64/0xa0
? dequeue_top_rt_rq+0xa2/0xb0
? exc_invalid_op+0x4c/0x60
? dequeue_top_rt_rq+0xa2/0xb0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20
? dequeue_top_rt_rq+0xa2/0xb0
dequeue_rt_entity+0x1f/0x70
dequeue_task_rt+0x2d/0x70
__schedule+0x1a8/0x7e0
? blk_finish_plug+0x25/0x40
schedule+0x3c/0xb0
futex_wait_queue_me+0xb6/0x120
futex_wait+0xd9/0x240
do_futex+0x344/0xa90
? get_mm_exe_file+0x30/0x60
? audit_exe_compare+0x58/0x70
? audit_filter_rules.constprop.26+0x65e/0x1220
__x64_sys_futex+0x148/0x1f0
do_syscall_64+0x30/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x62/0xc7
-> BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8cf3608bc2c0
Call Trace:
? __die_body+0x1a/0x60
? no_context+0x183/0x350
? spurious_kernel_fault+0x171/0x1c0
? exc_page_fault+0x3b6/0x520
? plist_check_list+0x15/0x40
? plist_check_list+0x2e/0x40
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
? futex_wait_queue_me+0xc8/0x120
? futex_wait+0xd9/0x240
? try_to_wake_up+0x1b8/0x490
? futex_wake+0x78/0x160
? do_futex+0xcd/0xa90
? plist_check_list+0x15/0x40
? plist_check_list+0x2e/0x40
? plist_del+0x6a/0xd0
? plist_check_list+0x15/0x40
? plist_check_list+0x2e/0x40
? dequeue_pushable_task+0x20/0x70
? __schedule+0x382/0x7e0
? asm_sysvec_reschedule_i
---truncated---
CVSS Score
4.7
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-07-04
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: vidtv: Terminating the subsequent process of initialization failure
syzbot reported a slab-use-after-free Read in vidtv_mux_init. [1]
After PSI initialization fails, the si member is accessed again, resulting
in this uaf.
After si initialization fails, the subsequent process needs to be exited.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vidtv_mux_pid_ctx_init drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:78 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vidtv_mux_init+0xac2/0xbe0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:524
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802fa42acc by task syz.2.37/6059
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6059 Comm: syz.2.37 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline]
print_report+0xc3/0x670 mm/kasan/report.c:521
kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:634
vidtv_mux_pid_ctx_init drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:78
vidtv_mux_init+0xac2/0xbe0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:524
vidtv_start_streaming drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:194
vidtv_start_feed drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:239
dmx_section_feed_start_filtering drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:973
dvb_dmxdev_feed_start drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c:508 [inline]
dvb_dmxdev_feed_restart.isra.0 drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c:537
dvb_dmxdev_filter_stop+0x2b4/0x3a0 drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c:564
dvb_dmxdev_filter_free drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c:840 [inline]
dvb_demux_release+0x92/0x550 drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c:1246
__fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464
task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline]
do_exit+0xad8/0x2d70 kernel/exit.c:938
do_group_exit+0xd3/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1087
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1098 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1096 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3e/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1096
x64_sys_call+0x151f/0x1720 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f871d58d169
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f871d58d13f.
RSP: 002b:00007fff4b19a788 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f871d58d169
RDX: 0000000000000064 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00007fff4b19a7ec R08: 0000000b4b19a87f R09: 00000000000927c0
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 00000000000927c0 R14: 000000000001d553 R15: 00007fff4b19a840
</TASK>
Allocated by task 6059:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:901 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1037 [inline]
vidtv_psi_pat_table_init drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:970
vidtv_channel_si_init drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_channel.c:423
vidtv_mux_init drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:519
vidtv_start_streaming drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:194
vidtv_start_feed drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:239
dmx_section_feed_start_filtering drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:973
dvb_dmxdev_feed_start drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c:508 [inline]
dvb_dmxdev_feed_restart.isra.0 drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c:537
dvb_dmxdev_filter_stop+0x2b4/0x3a0 drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c:564
dvb_dmxdev_filter_free drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c:840 [inline]
dvb_demux_release+0x92/0x550 drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c:1246
__fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_tabl
---truncated---
CVSS Score
7.8
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-07-04
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: cxusb: no longer judge rbuf when the write fails
syzbot reported a uninit-value in cxusb_i2c_xfer. [1]
Only when the write operation of usb_bulk_msg() in dvb_usb_generic_rw()
succeeds and rlen is greater than 0, the read operation of usb_bulk_msg()
will be executed to read rlen bytes of data from the dvb device into the
rbuf.
In this case, although rlen is 1, the write operation failed which resulted
in the dvb read operation not being executed, and ultimately variable i was
not initialized.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in cxusb_gpio_tuner drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/cxusb.c:124 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in cxusb_i2c_xfer+0x153a/0x1a60 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/cxusb.c:196
cxusb_gpio_tuner drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/cxusb.c:124 [inline]
cxusb_i2c_xfer+0x153a/0x1a60 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/cxusb.c:196
__i2c_transfer+0xe25/0x3150 drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:-1
i2c_transfer+0x317/0x4a0 drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:2315
i2c_transfer_buffer_flags+0x125/0x1e0 drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:2343
i2c_master_send include/linux/i2c.h:109 [inline]
i2cdev_write+0x210/0x280 drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:183
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:848 [inline]
vfs_writev+0x963/0x14e0 fs/read_write.c:1057
do_writev+0x247/0x5c0 fs/read_write.c:1101
__do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1169 [inline]
__se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1166 [inline]
__x64_sys_writev+0x98/0xe0 fs/read_write.c:1166
x64_sys_call+0x2229/0x3c80 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:21
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-07-04
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: validate AG parameters in dbMount() to prevent crashes
Validate db_agheight, db_agwidth, and db_agstart in dbMount to catch
corrupted metadata early and avoid undefined behavior in dbAllocAG.
Limits are derived from L2LPERCTL, LPERCTL/MAXAG, and CTLTREESIZE:
- agheight: 0 to L2LPERCTL/2 (0 to 5) ensures shift
(L2LPERCTL - 2*agheight) >= 0.
- agwidth: 1 to min(LPERCTL/MAXAG, 2^(L2LPERCTL - 2*agheight))
ensures agperlev >= 1.
- Ranges: 1-8 (agheight 0-3), 1-4 (agheight 4), 1 (agheight 5).
- LPERCTL/MAXAG = 1024/128 = 8 limits leaves per AG;
2^(10 - 2*agheight) prevents division to 0.
- agstart: 0 to CTLTREESIZE-1 - agwidth*(MAXAG-1) keeps ti within
stree (size 1365).
- Ranges: 0-1237 (agwidth 1), 0-348 (agwidth 8).
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1400:9
shift exponent -335544310 is negative
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5822 Comm: syz-executor130 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:231 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x3c8/0x420 lib/ubsan.c:468
dbAllocAG+0x1087/0x10b0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1400
dbDiscardAG+0x352/0xa20 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1613
jfs_ioc_trim+0x45a/0x6b0 fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c:105
jfs_ioctl+0x2cd/0x3e0 fs/jfs/ioctl.c:131
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
CVSS Score
7.8
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-07-04