In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: Fix use of uninitialized memory in do_insn_ioctl() and do_insnlist_ioctl()
syzbot reports a KMSAN kernel-infoleak in `do_insn_ioctl()`. A kernel
buffer is allocated to hold `insn->n` samples (each of which is an
`unsigned int`). For some instruction types, `insn->n` samples are
copied back to user-space, unless an error code is being returned. The
problem is that not all the instruction handlers that need to return
data to userspace fill in the whole `insn->n` samples, so that there is
an information leak. There is a similar syzbot report for
`do_insnlist_ioctl()`, although it does not have a reproducer for it at
the time of writing.
One culprit is `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` which is used as the handler for
`INSN_READ` or `INSN_WRITE` instructions for subdevices that do not have
a specific handler for that instruction, but do have an `INSN_BITS`
handler. For `INSN_READ` it only fills in at most 1 sample, so if
`insn->n` is greater than 1, the remaining `insn->n - 1` samples copied
to userspace will be uninitialized kernel data.
Another culprit is `vm80xx_ai_insn_read()` in the "vm80xx" driver. It
never returns an error, even if it fails to fill the buffer.
Fix it in `do_insn_ioctl()` and `do_insnlist_ioctl()` by making sure
that uninitialized parts of the allocated buffer are zeroed before
handling each instruction.
Thanks to Arnaud Lecomte for their fix to `do_insn_ioctl()`. That fix
replaced the call to `kmalloc_array()` with `kcalloc()`, but it is not
always necessary to clear the whole buffer.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: pcl726: Prevent invalid irq number
The reproducer passed in an irq number(0x80008000) that was too large,
which triggered the oob.
Added an interrupt number check to prevent users from passing in an irq
number that was too large.
If `it->options[1]` is 31, then `1 << it->options[1]` is still invalid
because it shifts a 1-bit into the sign bit (which is UB in C).
Possible solutions include reducing the upper bound on the
`it->options[1]` value to 30 or lower, or using `1U << it->options[1]`.
The old code would just not attempt to request the IRQ if the
`options[1]` value were invalid. And it would still configure the
device without interrupts even if the call to `request_irq` returned an
error. So it would be better to combine this test with the test below.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: Make insn_rw_emulate_bits() do insn->n samples
The `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` function is used as a default handler for
`INSN_READ` instructions for subdevices that have a handler for
`INSN_BITS` but not for `INSN_READ`. Similarly, it is used as a default
handler for `INSN_WRITE` instructions for subdevices that have a handler
for `INSN_BITS` but not for `INSN_WRITE`. It works by emulating the
`INSN_READ` or `INSN_WRITE` instruction handling with a constructed
`INSN_BITS` instruction. However, `INSN_READ` and `INSN_WRITE`
instructions are supposed to be able read or write multiple samples,
indicated by the `insn->n` value, but `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` currently
only handles a single sample. For `INSN_READ`, the comedi core will
copy `insn->n` samples back to user-space. (That triggered KASAN
kernel-infoleak errors when `insn->n` was greater than 1, but that is
being fixed more generally elsewhere in the comedi core.)
Make `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` either handle `insn->n` samples, or return
an error, to conform to the general expectation for `INSN_READ` and
`INSN_WRITE` handlers.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: Fix backlog accounting in qdisc_dequeue_internal
This issue applies for the following qdiscs: hhf, fq, fq_codel, and
fq_pie, and occurs in their change handlers when adjusting to the new
limit. The problem is the following in the values passed to the
subsequent qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog call given a tbf parent:
When the tbf parent runs out of tokens, skbs of these qdiscs will
be placed in gso_skb. Their peek handlers are qdisc_peek_dequeued,
which accounts for both qlen and backlog. However, in the case of
qdisc_dequeue_internal, ONLY qlen is accounted for when pulling
from gso_skb. This means that these qdiscs are missing a
qdisc_qstats_backlog_dec when dropping packets to satisfy the
new limit in their change handlers.
One can observe this issue with the following (with tc patched to
support a limit of 0):
export TARGET=fq
tc qdisc del dev lo root
tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: tbf rate 8bit burst 100b latency 1ms
tc qdisc replace dev lo handle 3: parent 1:1 $TARGET limit 1000
echo ''; echo 'add child'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
ping -I lo -f -c2 -s32 -W0.001 127.0.0.1 2>&1 >/dev/null
echo ''; echo 'after ping'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
tc qdisc change dev lo handle 3: parent 1:1 $TARGET limit 0
echo ''; echo 'after limit drop'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
tc qdisc replace dev lo handle 2: parent 1:1 sfq
echo ''; echo 'post graft'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
The second to last show command shows 0 packets but a positive
number (74) of backlog bytes. The problem becomes clearer in the
last show command, where qdisc_purge_queue triggers
qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog with the positive backlog and causes an
underflow in the tbf parent's backlog (4096 Mb instead of 0).
To fix this issue, the codepath for all clients of qdisc_dequeue_internal
has been simplified: codel, pie, hhf, fq, fq_pie, and fq_codel.
qdisc_dequeue_internal handles the backlog adjustments for all cases that
do not directly use the dequeue handler.
The old fq_codel_change limit adjustment loop accumulated the arguments to
the subsequent qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog call through the cstats field.
However, this is confusing and error prone as fq_codel_dequeue could also
potentially mutate this field (which qdisc_dequeue_internal calls in the
non gso_skb case), so we have unified the code here with other qdiscs.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Add null pointer check in mod_hdcp_hdcp1_create_session()
The function mod_hdcp_hdcp1_create_session() calls the function
get_first_active_display(), but does not check its return value.
The return value is a null pointer if the display list is empty.
This will lead to a null pointer dereference.
Add a null pointer check for get_first_active_display() and return
MOD_HDCP_STATUS_DISPLAY_NOT_FOUND if the function return null.
This is similar to the commit c3e9826a2202
("drm/amd/display: Add null pointer check for get_first_active_display()").
(cherry picked from commit 5e43eb3cd731649c4f8b9134f857be62a416c893)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb3: fix for slab out of bounds on mount to ksmbd
With KASAN enabled, it is possible to get a slab out of bounds
during mount to ksmbd due to missing check in parse_server_interfaces()
(see below):
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in
parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881433dba98 by task mount/9827
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 9827 Comm: mount Tainted: G
OE 6.16.0-rc2-kasan #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision Tower 3620/0MWYPT,
BIOS 2.13.1 06/14/2019
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x9f/0xf0
print_report+0xd1/0x670
__virt_addr_valid+0x22c/0x430
? parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs]
? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x2a/0x1f0
? parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs]
kasan_report+0xd6/0x110
parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs]
__asan_report_load_n_noabort+0x13/0x20
parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs]
? __pfx_parse_server_interfaces+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x51/0x60
SMB3_request_interfaces+0x1ad/0x3f0 [cifs]
? __pfx_SMB3_request_interfaces+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? SMB2_tcon+0x23c/0x15d0 [cifs]
smb3_qfs_tcon+0x173/0x2b0 [cifs]
? __pfx_smb3_qfs_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? cifs_get_tcon+0x105d/0x2120 [cifs]
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x5d/0x200
? cifs_get_tcon+0x105d/0x2120 [cifs]
? __pfx_smb3_qfs_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
cifs_mount_get_tcon+0x369/0xb90 [cifs]
? dfs_cache_find+0xe7/0x150 [cifs]
dfs_mount_share+0x985/0x2970 [cifs]
? check_path.constprop.0+0x28/0x50
? save_trace+0x54/0x370
? __pfx_dfs_mount_share+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? __lock_acquire+0xb82/0x2ba0
? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20
cifs_mount+0xbc/0x9e0 [cifs]
? __pfx_cifs_mount+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x5d/0x200
? cifs_setup_cifs_sb+0x29d/0x810 [cifs]
cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x263/0x1990 [cifs]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: kcm: Fix race condition in kcm_unattach()
syzbot found a race condition when kcm_unattach(psock)
and kcm_release(kcm) are executed at the same time.
kcm_unattach() is missing a check of the flag
kcm->tx_stopped before calling queue_work().
If the kcm has a reserved psock, kcm_unattach() might get executed
between cancel_work_sync() and unreserve_psock() in kcm_release(),
requeuing kcm->tx_work right before kcm gets freed in kcm_done().
Remove kcm->tx_stopped and replace it by the less
error-prone disable_work_sync().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Validate i_depth for exhash directories
A fuzzer test introduced corruption that ends up with a depth of 0 in
dir_e_read(), causing an undefined shift by 32 at:
index = hash >> (32 - dip->i_depth);
As calculated in an open-coded way in dir_make_exhash(), the minimum
depth for an exhash directory is ilog2(sdp->sd_hash_ptrs) and 0 is
invalid as sdp->sd_hash_ptrs is fixed as sdp->bsize / 16 at mount time.
So we can avoid the undefined behaviour by checking for depth values
lower than the minimum in gfs2_dinode_in(). Values greater than the
maximum are already being checked for there.
Also switch the calculation in dir_make_exhash() to use ilog2() to
clarify how the depth is calculated.
Tested with the syzkaller repro.c and xfstests '-g quick'.