An invalid authentication sequence could result in the hostapd process terminating due to missing state validation steps when processing the SAE confirm message when in hostapd/AP mode. All version of hostapd with SAE support are vulnerable. An attacker may force the hostapd process to terminate, performing a denial of service attack. Both hostapd with SAE support and wpa_supplicant with SAE support prior to and including version 2.7 are affected.
The implementations of EAP-PWD in hostapd EAP Server and wpa_supplicant EAP Peer do not validate the scalar and element values in EAP-pwd-Commit. This vulnerability may allow an attacker to complete EAP-PWD authentication without knowing the password. However, unless the crypto library does not implement additional checks for the EC point, the attacker will not be able to derive the session key or complete the key exchange. Both hostapd with SAE support and wpa_supplicant with SAE support prior to and including version 2.4 are affected. Both hostapd with EAP-pwd support and wpa_supplicant with EAP-pwd support prior to and including version 2.7 are affected.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11r allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the fast BSS transmission (FT) handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Station-To-Station-Link (STSL) Transient Key (STK) during the PeerKey handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) Peer Key (TPK) during the TDLS handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.