Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.3, his advisory tracks a regression of the original Excel-preview XSS (CVE-2026-44549). The same root cause — XLSX.utils.sheet_to_html() output rendered via {@html excelHtml} without DOMPurify — was reintroduced sometime after v0.8.0 and is exploitable again This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.3.
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in _process_picture_url() in backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py (line ~1338). The function fetches arbitrary URLs from OAuth picture claims without applying validate_url(), allowing an attacker to force the server to make HTTP requests to internal resources and exfiltrate the full response. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.8.6, in standard channels (i.e., channels whose channel.type is neither group nor dm), the endpoint POST /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages/{message_id}/update can be accessed with read permission only. When access_control is set to None, the authorization check has_access(..., type="read") evaluates to True, allowing users who are not the message owner to update messages. As a result, unauthorized modification of other users’ messages is possible. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.6.
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.8.0, the profile_image_url field on the user profile update form accepted arbitrary data: URI values without MIME-type validation, resulting in a XSS vulnerability. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.0.
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.8.0, Excel file attachments are previewed in an unsafe way. A crafted XLSX file payload can be used to cause the sheetjs function sheet_to_html to embed an XSS payload into the generated HTML. This is subsequently added to the DOM unsanitized via @html causing the payload to trigger. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.0.
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, a parsing difference between the urlparse and requests libraries led to an SSRF bypass vulnerability. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, the validate_url() function in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py only validates the initial URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync requests, async aiohttp, langchain's WebBaseLoader) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do not re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint, the /api/v1/images/... endpoints, the /api/chat/completions endpoint with an image_url content part, and any other route that calls these helpers. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, multiple endpoints accept a user-supplied file_id and attach the referenced file to a resource the caller controls (folder knowledge, knowledge-base contents) without verifying that the caller owns or has been granted access to the file. The file's content then becomes reachable through the downstream RAG / file-content paths, allowing any authenticated user to exfiltrate any other user's private file — and on the knowledge-base path, also to overwrite it — given knowledge of the file's UUID. This affects backend/open_webui/routers/folders.py (POST /api/v1/folders/{id}/update), backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py (add_file_to_knowledge_by_id), and backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py (add_files_to_knowledge_by_id_batch). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.8.12, the /api/v1/utils/code/execute endpoint executes arbitrary Python code via Jupyter for any verified user, even when the admin has set ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false. The feature gate is not enforced on the API endpoint — the configuration says "disabled" but code still executes. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.12.
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, Pin/Unpin is a write operation (modifies the message's is_pinned , pinned_by, pinned_at fields), but in standard channels it only checks read permission, allowing users with read-only access to pin/unpin any message. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.