Issue summary: Checking excessively long DH keys or parameters may be very slow.
Impact summary: Applications that use the functions DH_check(), DH_check_ex()
or EVP_PKEY_param_check() to check a DH key or DH parameters may experience long
delays. Where the key or parameters that are being checked have been obtained
from an untrusted source this may lead to a Denial of Service.
The function DH_check() performs various checks on DH parameters. After fixing
CVE-2023-3446 it was discovered that a large q parameter value can also trigger
an overly long computation during some of these checks. A correct q value,
if present, cannot be larger than the modulus p parameter, thus it is
unnecessary to perform these checks if q is larger than p.
An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters obtained
from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack.
The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL functions.
An application calling any of those other functions may similarly be affected.
The other functions affected by this are DH_check_ex() and
EVP_PKEY_param_check().
Also vulnerable are the OpenSSL dhparam and pkeyparam command line applications
when using the "-check" option.
The OpenSSL SSL/TLS implementation is not affected by this issue.
The OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1 FIPS providers are not affected by this issue.
Issue summary: Processing some specially crafted ASN.1 object identifiers or
data containing them may be very slow.
Impact summary: Applications that use OBJ_obj2txt() directly, or use any of
the OpenSSL subsystems OCSP, PKCS7/SMIME, CMS, CMP/CRMF or TS with no message
size limit may experience notable to very long delays when processing those
messages, which may lead to a Denial of Service.
An OBJECT IDENTIFIER is composed of a series of numbers - sub-identifiers -
most of which have no size limit. OBJ_obj2txt() may be used to translate
an ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER given in DER encoding form (using the OpenSSL
type ASN1_OBJECT) to its canonical numeric text form, which are the
sub-identifiers of the OBJECT IDENTIFIER in decimal form, separated by
periods.
When one of the sub-identifiers in the OBJECT IDENTIFIER is very large
(these are sizes that are seen as absurdly large, taking up tens or hundreds
of KiBs), the translation to a decimal number in text may take a very long
time. The time complexity is O(n^2) with 'n' being the size of the
sub-identifiers in bytes (*).
With OpenSSL 3.0, support to fetch cryptographic algorithms using names /
identifiers in string form was introduced. This includes using OBJECT
IDENTIFIERs in canonical numeric text form as identifiers for fetching
algorithms.
Such OBJECT IDENTIFIERs may be received through the ASN.1 structure
AlgorithmIdentifier, which is commonly used in multiple protocols to specify
what cryptographic algorithm should be used to sign or verify, encrypt or
decrypt, or digest passed data.
Applications that call OBJ_obj2txt() directly with untrusted data are
affected, with any version of OpenSSL. If the use is for the mere purpose
of display, the severity is considered low.
In OpenSSL 3.0 and newer, this affects the subsystems OCSP, PKCS7/SMIME,
CMS, CMP/CRMF or TS. It also impacts anything that processes X.509
certificates, including simple things like verifying its signature.
The impact on TLS is relatively low, because all versions of OpenSSL have a
100KiB limit on the peer's certificate chain. Additionally, this only
impacts clients, or servers that have explicitly enabled client
authentication.
In OpenSSL 1.1.1 and 1.0.2, this only affects displaying diverse objects,
such as X.509 certificates. This is assumed to not happen in such a way
that it would cause a Denial of Service, so these versions are considered
not affected by this issue in such a way that it would be cause for concern,
and the severity is therefore considered low.
Applications that use a non-default option when verifying certificates may be
vulnerable to an attack from a malicious CA to circumvent certain checks.
Invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates are silently ignored by
OpenSSL and other certificate policy checks are skipped for that certificate.
A malicious CA could use this to deliberately assert invalid certificate policies
in order to circumvent policy checking on the certificate altogether.
Policy processing is disabled by default but can be enabled by passing
the `-policy' argument to the command line utilities or by calling the
`X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies()' function.
The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() is documented to
implicitly enable the certificate policy check when doing certificate
verification. However the implementation of the function does not
enable the check which allows certificates with invalid or incorrect
policies to pass the certificate verification.
As suddenly enabling the policy check could break existing deployments it was
decided to keep the existing behavior of the X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()
function.
Instead the applications that require OpenSSL to perform certificate
policy check need to use X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() or explicitly
enable the policy check by calling X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags() with
the X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK flag argument.
Certificate policy checks are disabled by default in OpenSSL and are not
commonly used by applications.
A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this
vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers
exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service
(DoS) attack on affected systems.
Policy processing is disabled by default but can be enabled by passing
the `-policy' argument to the command line utilities or by calling the
`X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies()' function.
The public API function BIO_new_NDEF is a helper function used for streaming
ASN.1 data via a BIO. It is primarily used internally to OpenSSL to support the
SMIME, CMS and PKCS7 streaming capabilities, but may also be called directly by
end user applications.
The function receives a BIO from the caller, prepends a new BIO_f_asn1 filter
BIO onto the front of it to form a BIO chain, and then returns the new head of
the BIO chain to the caller. Under certain conditions, for example if a CMS
recipient public key is invalid, the new filter BIO is freed and the function
returns a NULL result indicating a failure. However, in this case, the BIO chain
is not properly cleaned up and the BIO passed by the caller still retains
internal pointers to the previously freed filter BIO. If the caller then goes on
to call BIO_pop() on the BIO then a use-after-free will occur. This will most
likely result in a crash.
This scenario occurs directly in the internal function B64_write_ASN1() which
may cause BIO_new_NDEF() to be called and will subsequently call BIO_pop() on
the BIO. This internal function is in turn called by the public API functions
PEM_write_bio_ASN1_stream, PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream, PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream,
SMIME_write_ASN1, SMIME_write_CMS and SMIME_write_PKCS7.
Other public API functions that may be impacted by this include
i2d_ASN1_bio_stream, BIO_new_CMS, BIO_new_PKCS7, i2d_CMS_bio_stream and
i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream.
The OpenSSL cms and smime command line applications are similarly affected.
There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
inside an X.509 GeneralName. X.400 addresses were parsed as an ASN1_STRING but
the public structure definition for GENERAL_NAME incorrectly specified the type
of the x400Address field as ASN1_TYPE. This field is subsequently interpreted by
the OpenSSL function GENERAL_NAME_cmp as an ASN1_TYPE rather than an
ASN1_STRING.
When CRL checking is enabled (i.e. the application sets the
X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK flag), this vulnerability may allow an attacker to pass
arbitrary pointers to a memcmp call, enabling them to read memory contents or
enact a denial of service. In most cases, the attack requires the attacker to
provide both the certificate chain and CRL, neither of which need to have a
valid signature. If the attacker only controls one of these inputs, the other
input must already contain an X.400 address as a CRL distribution point, which
is uncommon. As such, this vulnerability is most likely to only affect
applications which have implemented their own functionality for retrieving CRLs
over a network.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation
which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a
Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker
would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for
decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,
RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an
encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a
genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send
trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a
sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master
secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the
application data sent over that connection.
The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and
decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload data.
If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data" arguments are
populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant decoded data. The
caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is possible to construct a
PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data. In this case PEM_read_bio_ex()
will return a failure code but will populate the header argument with a pointer
to a buffer that has already been freed. If the caller also frees this buffer
then a double free will occur. This will most likely lead to a crash. This
could be exploited by an attacker who has the ability to supply malicious PEM
files for parsing to achieve a denial of service attack.
The functions PEM_read_bio() and PEM_read() are simple wrappers around
PEM_read_bio_ex() and therefore these functions are also directly affected.
These functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL
functions including PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and
SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL internal
uses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does not free the
header argument if PEM_read_bio_ex() returns a failure code. These locations
include the PEM_read_bio_TYPE() functions as well as the decoders introduced in
OpenSSL 3.0.
The OpenSSL asn1parse command line application is also impacted by this issue.
AES OCB mode for 32-bit x86 platforms using the AES-NI assembly optimised implementation will not encrypt the entirety of the data under some circumstances. This could reveal sixteen bytes of data that was preexisting in the memory that wasn't written. In the special case of "in place" encryption, sixteen bytes of the plaintext would be revealed. Since OpenSSL does not support OCB based cipher suites for TLS and DTLS, they are both unaffected. Fixed in OpenSSL 3.0.5 (Affected 3.0.0-3.0.4). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1q (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1p).