Bluetooth Mesh Provisioning in the Bluetooth Mesh profile 1.0 and 1.0.1 may permit a nearby device (participating in the provisioning protocol) to identify the AuthValue used given the Provisioner’s public key, and the confirmation number and nonce provided by the provisioning device. This could permit a device without the AuthValue to complete provisioning without brute-forcing the AuthValue.
Bluetooth Mesh Provisioning in the Bluetooth Mesh profile 1.0 and 1.0.1 may permit a nearby device, reflecting the authentication evidence from a Provisioner, to complete authentication without possessing the AuthValue, and potentially acquire a NetKey and AppKey.
Devices supporting Bluetooth before 5.1 may allow man-in-the-middle attacks, aka BLURtooth. Cross Transport Key Derivation in Bluetooth Core Specification v4.2 and v5.0 may permit an unauthenticated user to establish a bonding with one transport, either LE or BR/EDR, and replace a bonding already established on the opposing transport, BR/EDR or LE, potentially overwriting an authenticated key with an unauthenticated key, or a key with greater entropy with one with less.
Legacy pairing and secure-connections pairing authentication in Bluetooth BR/EDR Core Specification v5.2 and earlier may allow an unauthenticated user to complete authentication without pairing credentials via adjacent access. An unauthenticated, adjacent attacker could impersonate a Bluetooth BR/EDR master or slave to pair with a previously paired remote device to successfully complete the authentication procedure without knowing the link key.
Pairing in Bluetooth® Core v5.2 and earlier may permit an unauthenticated attacker to acquire credentials with two pairing devices via adjacent access when the unauthenticated user initiates different pairing methods in each peer device and an end-user erroneously completes both pairing procedures with the MITM using the confirmation number of one peer as the passkey of the other. An adjacent, unauthenticated attacker could be able to initiate any Bluetooth operation on either attacked device exposed by the enabled Bluetooth profiles. This exposure may be limited when the user must authorize certain access explicitly, but so long as a user assumes that it is the intended remote device requesting permissions, device-local protections may be weakened.
The Bluetooth Stack 2.1 in Microsoft Windows Vista SP1 and SP2 and Windows 7 Gold and SP1 does not prevent access to objects in memory that (1) were not properly initialized or (2) have been deleted, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted Bluetooth packets, aka "Bluetooth Stack Vulnerability."