Spring Security versions 5.5.x prior to 5.5.1, 5.4.x prior to 5.4.7, 5.3.x prior to 5.3.10 and 5.2.x prior to 5.2.11 are susceptible to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack via the initiation of the Authorization Request in an OAuth 2.0 Client Web and WebFlux application. A malicious user or attacker can send multiple requests initiating the Authorization Request for the Authorization Code Grant, which has the potential of exhausting system resources using a single session or multiple sessions.
Spring Security 5.4.x prior to 5.4.4, 5.3.x prior to 5.3.8.RELEASE, 5.2.x prior to 5.2.9.RELEASE, and older unsupported versions can fail to save the SecurityContext if it is changed more than once in a single request.A malicious user cannot cause the bug to happen (it must be programmed in). However, if the application's intent is to only allow the user to run with elevated privileges in a small portion of the application, the bug can be leveraged to extend those privileges to the rest of the application.
Spring Security versions 5.3.x prior to 5.3.2, 5.2.x prior to 5.2.4, 5.1.x prior to 5.1.10, 5.0.x prior to 5.0.16 and 4.2.x prior to 4.2.16 use a fixed null initialization vector with CBC Mode in the implementation of the queryable text encryptor. A malicious user with access to the data that has been encrypted using such an encryptor may be able to derive the unencrypted values using a dictionary attack.
Spring Security, versions 4.2.x up to 4.2.12, and older unsupported versions support plain text passwords using PlaintextPasswordEncoder. If an application using an affected version of Spring Security is leveraging PlaintextPasswordEncoder and a user has a null encoded password, a malicious user (or attacker) can authenticate using a password of "null".
Spring Security versions 4.2.x prior to 4.2.12, 5.0.x prior to 5.0.12, and 5.1.x prior to 5.1.5 contain an insecure randomness vulnerability when using SecureRandomFactoryBean#setSeed to configure a SecureRandom instance. In order to be impacted, an honest application must provide a seed and make the resulting random material available to an attacker for inspection.
Spring Security (Spring Security 4.1.x before 4.1.5, 4.2.x before 4.2.4, and 5.0.x before 5.0.1; and Spring Framework 4.3.x before 4.3.14 and 5.0.x before 5.0.3) does not consider URL path parameters when processing security constraints. By adding a URL path parameter with special encodings, an attacker may be able to bypass a security constraint. The root cause of this issue is a lack of clarity regarding the handling of path parameters in the Servlet Specification. Some Servlet containers include path parameters in the value returned for getPathInfo() and some do not. Spring Security uses the value returned by getPathInfo() as part of the process of mapping requests to security constraints. In this particular attack, different character encodings used in path parameters allows secured Spring MVC static resource URLs to be bypassed.
An issue was discovered in Pivotal Spring Security 4.2.0.RELEASE through 4.2.2.RELEASE, and Spring Security 5.0.0.M1. When configured to enable default typing, Jackson contained a deserialization vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution. Jackson fixed this vulnerability by blacklisting known "deserialization gadgets." Spring Security configures Jackson with global default typing enabled, which means that (through the previous exploit) arbitrary code could be executed if all of the following is true: (1) Spring Security's Jackson support is being leveraged by invoking SecurityJackson2Modules.getModules(ClassLoader) or SecurityJackson2Modules.enableDefaultTyping(ObjectMapper); (2) Jackson is used to deserialize data that is not trusted (Spring Security does not perform deserialization using Jackson, so this is an explicit choice of the user); and (3) there is an unknown (Jackson is not blacklisting it already) "deserialization gadget" that allows code execution present on the classpath. Jackson provides a blacklisting approach to protecting against this type of attack, but Spring Security should be proactive against blocking unknown "deserialization gadgets" when Spring Security enables default typing.
The ActiveDirectoryLdapAuthenticator in Spring Security 3.2.0 to 3.2.1 and 3.1.0 to 3.1.5 does not check the password length. If the directory allows anonymous binds then it may incorrectly authenticate a user who supplies an empty password.
When using the CAS Proxy ticket authentication from Spring Security 3.1 to 3.2.4 a malicious CAS Service could trick another CAS Service into authenticating a proxy ticket that was not associated. This is due to the fact that the proxy ticket authentication uses the information from the HttpServletRequest which is populated based upon untrusted information within the HTTP request. This means if there are access control restrictions on which CAS services can authenticate to one another, those restrictions can be bypassed. If users are not using CAS Proxy tickets and not basing access control decisions based upon the CAS Service, then there is no impact to users.
Both Spring Security 3.2.x, 4.0.x, 4.1.0 and the Spring Framework 3.2.x, 4.0.x, 4.1.x, 4.2.x rely on URL pattern mappings for authorization and for mapping requests to controllers respectively. Differences in the strictness of the pattern matching mechanisms, for example with regards to space trimming in path segments, can lead Spring Security to not recognize certain paths as not protected that are in fact mapped to Spring MVC controllers that should be protected. The problem is compounded by the fact that the Spring Framework provides richer features with regards to pattern matching as well as by the fact that pattern matching in each Spring Security and the Spring Framework can easily be customized creating additional differences.