In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: Fix handling of offline queues in blk_mq_alloc_request_hctx()
This patch prevents that test nvme/004 triggers the following:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in block/blk-mq.h:135:9
index 512 is out of range for type 'long unsigned int [512]'
Call Trace:
show_stack+0x52/0x58
dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x5e
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3b
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49
blk_mq_alloc_request_hctx+0x304/0x310
__nvme_submit_sync_cmd+0x70/0x200 [nvme_core]
nvmf_connect_io_queue+0x23e/0x2a0 [nvme_fabrics]
nvme_loop_connect_io_queues+0x8d/0xb0 [nvme_loop]
nvme_loop_create_ctrl+0x58e/0x7d0 [nvme_loop]
nvmf_create_ctrl+0x1d7/0x4d0 [nvme_fabrics]
nvmf_dev_write+0xae/0x111 [nvme_fabrics]
vfs_write+0x144/0x560
ksys_write+0xb7/0x140
__x64_sys_write+0x42/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: ftrace: consistently handle PLTs.
Sometimes it is necessary to use a PLT entry to call an ftrace
trampoline. This is handled by ftrace_make_call() and ftrace_make_nop(),
with each having *almost* identical logic, but this is not handled by
ftrace_modify_call() since its introduction in commit:
3b23e4991fb66f6d ("arm64: implement ftrace with regs")
Due to this, if we ever were to call ftrace_modify_call() for a callsite
which requires a PLT entry for a trampoline, then either:
a) If the old addr requires a trampoline, ftrace_modify_call() will use
an out-of-range address to generate the 'old' branch instruction.
This will result in warnings from aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm() and
ftrace_modify_code(), and no instructions will be modified. As
ftrace_modify_call() will return an error, this will result in
subsequent internal ftrace errors.
b) If the old addr does not require a trampoline, but the new addr does,
ftrace_modify_call() will use an out-of-range address to generate the
'new' branch instruction. This will result in warnings from
aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm(), and ftrace_modify_code() will replace
the 'old' branch with a BRK. This will result in a kernel panic when
this BRK is later executed.
Practically speaking, case (a) is vastly more likely than case (b), and
typically this will result in internal ftrace errors that don't
necessarily affect the rest of the system. This can be demonstrated with
an out-of-tree test module which triggers ftrace_modify_call(), e.g.
| # insmod test_ftrace.ko
| test_ftrace: Function test_function raw=0xffffb3749399201c, callsite=0xffffb37493992024
| branch_imm_common: offset out of range
| branch_imm_common: offset out of range
| ------------[ ftrace bug ]------------
| ftrace failed to modify
| [<ffffb37493992024>] test_function+0x8/0x38 [test_ftrace]
| actual: 1d:00:00:94
| Updating ftrace call site to call a different ftrace function
| ftrace record flags: e0000002
| (2) R
| expected tramp: ffffb374ae42ed54
| ------------[ cut here ]------------
| WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 165 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:2085 ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| Modules linked in: test_ftrace(+)
| CPU: 0 PID: 165 Comm: insmod Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-00002-g4d9ead8b45ce #13
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| lr : ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| sp : ffff80000839ba00
| x29: ffff80000839ba00 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff80000839bcf0
| x26: ffffb37493994180 x25: ffffb374b0991c28 x24: ffffb374b0d70000
| x23: 00000000ffffffea x22: ffffb374afcc33b0 x21: ffffb374b08f9cc8
| x20: ffff572b8462c000 x19: ffffb374b08f9000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
| x17: 6c6c6163202c6331 x16: ffffb374ae5ad110 x15: ffffb374b0d51ee4
| x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 3435646532346561 x12: 3437336266666666
| x11: 203a706d61727420 x10: 6465746365707865 x9 : ffffb374ae5149e8
| x8 : 336266666666203a x7 : 706d617274206465 x6 : 00000000fffff167
| x5 : ffff572bffbc4a08 x4 : 00000000fffff167 x3 : 0000000000000000
| x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff572b84461e00 x0 : 0000000000000022
| Call trace:
| ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| ftrace_replace_code+0x98/0xa0
| ftrace_modify_all_code+0xe0/0x144
| arch_ftrace_update_code+0x14/0x20
| ftrace_startup+0xf8/0x1b0
| register_ftrace_function+0x38/0x90
| test_ftrace_init+0xd0/0x1000 [test_ftrace]
| do_one_initcall+0x50/0x2b0
| do_init_module+0x50/0x1f0
| load_module+0x17c8/0x1d64
| __do_sys_finit_module+0xa8/0x100
| __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x2c/0x3c
| invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
| el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xdc/0x100
| do_el0_svc+0x3c/0xd0
| el0_svc+0x34/0xb0
| el0t_64_sync_handler+0xbc/0x140
| el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190
| ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
We can solve this by consistently determining whether to use a PLT entry
for an address.
Note that since (the earlier) commit:
f1a54ae9
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
zonefs: fix zonefs_iomap_begin() for reads
If a readahead is issued to a sequential zone file with an offset
exactly equal to the current file size, the iomap type is set to
IOMAP_UNWRITTEN, which will prevent an IO, but the iomap length is
calculated as 0. This causes a WARN_ON() in iomap_iter():
[17309.548939] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2137 at fs/iomap/iter.c:34 iomap_iter+0x9cf/0xe80
[...]
[17309.650907] RIP: 0010:iomap_iter+0x9cf/0xe80
[...]
[17309.754560] Call Trace:
[17309.757078] <TASK>
[17309.759240] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130
[17309.763531] iomap_readahead+0x1a8/0x870
[17309.767550] ? iomap_read_folio+0x4c0/0x4c0
[17309.771817] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400
[17309.778848] ? lock_release+0x370/0x750
[17309.784462] ? folio_add_lru+0x217/0x3f0
[17309.790220] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4e0/0x4e0
[17309.796543] read_pages+0x17d/0xb60
[17309.801854] ? folio_add_lru+0x238/0x3f0
[17309.807573] ? readahead_expand+0x5f0/0x5f0
[17309.813554] ? policy_node+0xb5/0x140
[17309.819018] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x27d/0x450
[17309.825439] filemap_get_pages+0x500/0x1450
[17309.831444] ? filemap_add_folio+0x140/0x140
[17309.837519] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130
[17309.843509] filemap_read+0x28c/0x9f0
[17309.848953] ? zonefs_file_read_iter+0x1ea/0x4d0 [zonefs]
[17309.856162] ? trace_contention_end+0xd6/0x130
[17309.862416] ? __mutex_lock+0x221/0x1480
[17309.868151] ? zonefs_file_read_iter+0x166/0x4d0 [zonefs]
[17309.875364] ? filemap_get_pages+0x1450/0x1450
[17309.881647] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x15e/0x620
[17309.888248] ? wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x20/0x20
[17309.895231] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130
[17309.901115] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130
[17309.906934] zonefs_file_read_iter+0x356/0x4d0 [zonefs]
[17309.913750] new_sync_read+0x2d8/0x520
[17309.919035] ? __x64_sys_lseek+0x1d0/0x1d0
Furthermore, this causes iomap_readahead() to loop forever as
iomap_readahead_iter() always returns 0, making no progress.
Fix this by treating reads after the file size as access to holes,
setting the iomap type to IOMAP_HOLE, the iomap addr to IOMAP_NULL_ADDR
and using the length argument as is for the iomap length. To simplify
the code with this change, zonefs_iomap_begin() is split into the read
variant, zonefs_read_iomap_begin() and zonefs_read_iomap_ops, and the
write variant, zonefs_write_iomap_begin() and zonefs_write_iomap_ops.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: add reserved GDT blocks check
We capture a NULL pointer issue when resizing a corrupt ext4 image which
is freshly clear resize_inode feature (not run e2fsck). It could be
simply reproduced by following steps. The problem is because of the
resize_inode feature was cleared, and it will convert the filesystem to
meta_bg mode in ext4_resize_fs(), but the es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks was
not reduced to zero, so could we mistakenly call reserve_backup_gdb()
and passing an uninitialized resize_inode to it when adding new group
descriptors.
mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda 3G
tune2fs -O ^resize_inode /dev/sda #forget to run requested e2fsck
mount /dev/sda /mnt
resize2fs /dev/sda 8G
========
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
CPU: 19 PID: 3243 Comm: resize2fs Not tainted 5.18.0-rc7-00001-gfde086c5ebfd #748
...
RIP: 0010:ext4_flex_group_add+0xe08/0x2570
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ext4_resize_fs+0xbec/0x1660
__ext4_ioctl+0x1749/0x24e0
ext4_ioctl+0x12/0x20
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xa6/0x110
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f2dd739617b
========
The fix is simple, add a check in ext4_resize_begin() to make sure that
the es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks is zero when the resize_inode feature is
disabled.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix bug_on ext4_mb_use_inode_pa
Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON:
==================================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/mballoc.c:3211!
[...]
RIP: 0010:ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used.cold+0x85/0x136f
[...]
Call Trace:
ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x9df/0x5d30
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x1803/0x4d80
ext4_map_blocks+0x3a4/0x1a10
ext4_writepages+0x126d/0x2c30
do_writepages+0x7f/0x1b0
__filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x285/0x3b0
file_write_and_wait_range+0xb1/0x140
ext4_sync_file+0x1aa/0xca0
vfs_fsync_range+0xfb/0x260
do_fsync+0x48/0xa0
[...]
==================================================================
Above issue may happen as follows:
-------------------------------------
do_fsync
vfs_fsync_range
ext4_sync_file
file_write_and_wait_range
__filemap_fdatawrite_range
do_writepages
ext4_writepages
mpage_map_and_submit_extent
mpage_map_one_extent
ext4_map_blocks
ext4_mb_new_blocks
ext4_mb_normalize_request
>>> start + size <= ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical
ext4_mb_regular_allocator
ext4_mb_simple_scan_group
ext4_mb_use_best_found
ext4_mb_new_preallocation
ext4_mb_new_inode_pa
ext4_mb_use_inode_pa
>>> set ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0
ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used
>>> BUG_ON(ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0);
we can easily reproduce this problem with the following commands:
`fallocate -l100M disk`
`mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 -g 256 disk`
`mount disk /mnt`
`fsstress -d /mnt -l 0 -n 1000 -p 1`
The size must be smaller than or equal to EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP.
Therefore, "start + size <= ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical" may occur
when the size is truncated. So start should be the start position of
the group where ac_o_ex.fe_logical is located after alignment.
In addition, when the value of fe_logical or EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP
is very large, the value calculated by start_off is more accurate.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm mirror log: round up region bitmap size to BITS_PER_LONG
The code in dm-log rounds up bitset_size to 32 bits. It then uses
find_next_zero_bit_le on the allocated region. find_next_zero_bit_le
accesses the bitmap using unsigned long pointers. So, on 64-bit
architectures, it may access 4 bytes beyond the allocated size.
Fix this bug by rounding up bitset_size to BITS_PER_LONG.
This bug was found by running the lvm2 testsuite with kasan.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bus: fsl-mc-bus: fix KASAN use-after-free in fsl_mc_bus_remove()
In fsl_mc_bus_remove(), mc->root_mc_bus_dev->mc_io is passed to
fsl_destroy_mc_io(). However, mc->root_mc_bus_dev is already freed in
fsl_mc_device_remove(). Then reference to mc->root_mc_bus_dev->mc_io
triggers KASAN use-after-free. To avoid the use-after-free, keep the
reference to mc->root_mc_bus_dev->mc_io in a local variable and pass to
fsl_destroy_mc_io().
This patch needs rework to apply to kernels older than v5.15.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: lpc32xx_udc: Fix refcount leak in lpc32xx_udc_probe
of_parse_phandle() returns a node pointer with refcount
incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore.
Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak.
of_node_put() will check NULL pointer.