In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: fix out-of-bounds read in symlink_data()
Since smb2_check_message() returns success without length validation for
the symlink error response, in symlink_data() it is possible for
iov->iov_len to be smaller than sizeof(struct smb2_err_rsp). If the buffer
only contains the base SMB2 header (64 bytes), accessing
err->ErrorContextCount (at offset 66) or err->ByteCount later in
symlink_data() will cause an out-of-bounds read.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: virtio_bt: validate rx pkt_type header length
virtbt_rx_handle() reads the leading pkt_type byte from the RX skb
and forwards the remainder to hci_recv_frame() for every
event/ACL/SCO/ISO type, without checking that the remaining payload
is at least the fixed HCI header for that type.
After the preceding patch bounds the backend-supplied used.len to
[1, VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE], a one-byte completion still reaches
hci_recv_frame() with skb->len already pulled to 0. If the byte
happened to be HCI_ACLDATA_PKT, the ACL-vs-ISO classification
fast-path in hci_dev_classify_pkt_type() dereferences
hci_acl_hdr(skb)->handle whenever the HCI device has an active
CIS_LINK, BIS_LINK, or PA_LINK connection, reading two bytes of
uninitialized RX-buffer data. The same hazard exists for every
packet type the driver accepts because none of the switch cases in
virtbt_rx_handle() check skb->len against the per-type minimum HCI
header size before handing the frame to the core.
After stripping pkt_type, require skb->len to cover the fixed
header size for the selected type (event 2, ACL 4, SCO 3, ISO 4)
before calling hci_recv_frame(); drop ratelimited otherwise.
Unknown pkt_type values still take the original kfree_skb() default
path.
Use bt_dev_err_ratelimited() because both the length and pkt_type
values come from an untrusted backend that can otherwise flood the
kernel log.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rsi: fix kthread lifetime race between self-exit and external-stop
RSI driver use both self-exit(kthread_complete_and_exit) and external-stop
(kthread_stop) when killing a kthread. Generally, kthread_stop() is called
first, and in this case, no particular issues occur.
However, in rare instances where kthread_complete_and_exit() is called
first and then kthread_stop() is called, a UAF occurs because the kthread
object, which has already exited and been freed, is accessed again.
Therefore, to prevent this with minimal modification, you must remove
kthread_stop() and change the code to wait until the self-exit operation
is completed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeon_ep_vf: add NULL check for napi_build_skb()
napi_build_skb() can return NULL on allocation failure. In
__octep_vf_oq_process_rx(), the result is used directly without a NULL
check in both the single-buffer and multi-fragment paths, leading to a
NULL pointer dereference.
Add NULL checks after both napi_build_skb() calls, properly advancing
descriptors and consuming remaining fragments on failure.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Fix double free on pvrdma_alloc_ucontext() error path
Sashiko points out that pvrdma_uar_free() is already called within
pvrdma_dealloc_ucontext(), so calling it before triggers a double free.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: spi-nor: debugfs: fix out-of-bounds read in spi_nor_params_show()
Sashiko noticed an out-of-bounds read [1].
In spi_nor_params_show(), the snor_f_names array is passed to
spi_nor_print_flags() using sizeof(snor_f_names).
Since snor_f_names is an array of pointers, sizeof() returns the total
number of bytes occupied by the pointers
(element_count * sizeof(void *))
rather than the element count itself. On 64-bit systems, this makes the
passed length 8x larger than intended.
Inside spi_nor_print_flags(), the 'names_len' argument is used to
bounds-check the 'names' array access. An out-of-bounds read occurs
if a flag bit is set that exceeds the array's actual element count
but is within the inflated byte-size count.
Correct this by using ARRAY_SIZE() to pass the actual number of
string pointers in the array.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbcon: Avoid OOB font access if console rotation fails
Clear the font buffer if the reallocation during console rotation fails
in fbcon_rotate_font(). The putcs implementations for the rotated buffer
will return early in this case. See [1] for an example.
Currently, fbcon_rotate_font() keeps the old buffer, which is too small
for the rotated font. Printing to the rotated console with a high-enough
character code will overflow the font buffer.
v2:
- fix typos in commit message
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: microchip-core-qspi: don't attempt to transmit during emulated read-only dual/quad operations
The core will deal with reads by creating clock cycles itself, there's
no need to generate clock cycles by transmitting garbage data at the
driver level. Further, transmitting garbage data just bricks the transfer
since QSPI doesn't have a dedicated master-out line like MOSI in regular
SPI. I'm not entirely sure if the transfer is bricked because of the
garbage data being transmitted on the bus or because the core loses
track of whether it is supposed to be sending or receiving data.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: ah: account for ESN high bits in async callbacks
AH allocates its temporary auth/ICV layout differently when ESN is enabled:
the async ahash setup appends a 4-byte seqhi slot before the ICV or
auth_data area, but the async completion callbacks still reconstruct the
temporary layout as if seqhi were absent.
With an async AH implementation selected, that makes AH copy or compare
the wrong bytes on both the IPv4 and IPv6 paths. In UML repro on IPv4 AH
with ESN and forced async hmac(sha1), ping fails with 100% packet loss,
and the callback logs show the pre-fix drift:
ah4 output_done: esn=1 err=0 icv_off=20 expected_off=24
ah4 input_done: esn=1 auth_off=20 expected_auth_off=24 icv_off=32 expected_icv_off=36
Reconstruct the callback-side layout the same way the setup path built it
by skipping the ESN seqhi slot before locating the saved auth_data or ICV.
Per RFC 4302, the ESN high-order 32 bits participate in the AH ICV
computation, so the async callbacks must account for the seqhi slot.
Post-fix, the same IPv4 AH+ESN+forced-async-hmac(sha1) UML repro shows
the corrected offset (ah4 output_done: esn=1 err=0 icv_off=24
expected_off=24) and ping succeeds; net/ipv4/ah4.o and net/ipv6/ah6.o
build clean at W=1. IPv6 AH+ESN was not exercised at runtime, and the
change has not been tested against a real async hardware AH engine.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/CPU/AMD: Prevent improper isolation of shared resources in Zen2's op cache
Make sure resources are not improperly shared in the op cache and
cause instruction corruption this way.