In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS: Fix an Oops in nfs_d_automount()
When mounting from a NFSv4 referral, path->dentry can end up being a
negative dentry, so derive the struct nfs_server from the dentry
itself instead.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: tpm_crb: Add the missed acpi_put_table() to fix memory leak
In crb_acpi_add(), we get the TPM2 table to retrieve information
like start method, and then assign them to the priv data, so the
TPM2 table is not used after the init, should be freed, call
acpi_put_table() to fix the memory leak.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
orangefs: Fix kmemleak in orangefs_{kernel,client}_debug_init()
When insert and remove the orangefs module, there are memory leaked
as below:
unreferenced object 0xffff88816b0cc000 (size 2048):
comm "insmod", pid 783, jiffies 4294813439 (age 65.512s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
6e 6f 6e 65 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 none............
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<0000000031ab7788>] kmalloc_trace+0x27/0xa0
[<000000005b405fee>] orangefs_debugfs_init.cold+0xaf/0x17f
[<00000000e5a0085b>] 0xffffffffa02780f9
[<000000004232d9f7>] do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0
[<0000000054f22384>] do_init_module+0xdf/0x320
[<000000003263bdea>] load_module+0x2f98/0x3330
[<0000000052cd4153>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0
[<00000000250ae02b>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[<00000000f11c03c7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
Use the golbal variable as the buffer rather than dynamic allocate to
slove the problem.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix race between quota enable and quota rescan ioctl
When enabling quotas, at btrfs_quota_enable(), after committing the
transaction, we change fs_info->quota_root to point to the quota root we
created and set BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED at fs_info->flags. Then we try
to start the qgroup rescan worker, first by initializing it with a call
to qgroup_rescan_init() - however if that fails we end up freeing the
quota root but we leave fs_info->quota_root still pointing to it, this
can later result in a use-after-free somewhere else.
We have previously set the flags BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED and
BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_ON, so we can only fail with -EINPROGRESS at
btrfs_quota_enable(), which is possible if someone already called the
quota rescan ioctl, and therefore started the rescan worker.
So fix this by ignoring an -EINPROGRESS and asserting we can't get any
other error.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix race issue between cpu buffer write and swap
Warning happened in rb_end_commit() at code:
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, !local_read(&cpu_buffer->committing)))
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 139 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3142
rb_commit+0x402/0x4a0
Call Trace:
ring_buffer_unlock_commit+0x42/0x250
trace_buffer_unlock_commit_regs+0x3b/0x250
trace_event_buffer_commit+0xe5/0x440
trace_event_buffer_reserve+0x11c/0x150
trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch+0x23c/0x2c0
__traceiter_sched_switch+0x59/0x80
__schedule+0x72b/0x1580
schedule+0x92/0x120
worker_thread+0xa0/0x6f0
It is because the race between writing event into cpu buffer and swapping
cpu buffer through file per_cpu/cpu0/snapshot:
Write on CPU 0 Swap buffer by per_cpu/cpu0/snapshot on CPU 1
-------- --------
tracing_snapshot_write()
[...]
ring_buffer_lock_reserve()
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu]; // 1. Suppose find 'cpu_buffer_a';
[...]
rb_reserve_next_event()
[...]
ring_buffer_swap_cpu()
if (local_read(&cpu_buffer_a->committing))
goto out_dec;
if (local_read(&cpu_buffer_b->committing))
goto out_dec;
buffer_a->buffers[cpu] = cpu_buffer_b;
buffer_b->buffers[cpu] = cpu_buffer_a;
// 2. cpu_buffer has swapped here.
rb_start_commit(cpu_buffer);
if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer)
!= buffer)) { // 3. This check passed due to 'cpu_buffer->buffer'
[...] // has not changed here.
return NULL;
}
cpu_buffer_b->buffer = buffer_a;
cpu_buffer_a->buffer = buffer_b;
[...]
// 4. Reserve event from 'cpu_buffer_a'.
ring_buffer_unlock_commit()
[...]
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu]; // 5. Now find 'cpu_buffer_b' !!!
rb_commit(cpu_buffer)
rb_end_commit() // 6. WARN for the wrong 'committing' state !!!
Based on above analysis, we can easily reproduce by following testcase:
``` bash
#!/bin/bash
dmesg -n 7
sysctl -w kernel.panic_on_warn=1
TR=/sys/kernel/tracing
echo 7 > ${TR}/buffer_size_kb
echo "sched:sched_switch" > ${TR}/set_event
while [ true ]; do
echo 1 > ${TR}/per_cpu/cpu0/snapshot
done &
while [ true ]; do
echo 1 > ${TR}/per_cpu/cpu0/snapshot
done &
while [ true ]; do
echo 1 > ${TR}/per_cpu/cpu0/snapshot
done &
```
To fix it, IIUC, we can use smp_call_function_single() to do the swap on
the target cpu where the buffer is located, so that above race would be
avoided.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: fix memory leak with using debugfs_lookup()
When calling debugfs_lookup() the result must have dput() called on it,
otherwise the memory will leak over time. To make things simpler, just
call debugfs_lookup_and_remove() instead which handles all of the logic at
once.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6mr: Fix skb_under_panic in ip6mr_cache_report()
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff88771f69 len:56 put:-4
head:ffff88805f86a800 data:ffff887f5f86a850 tail:0x88 end:0x2c0 dev:pim6reg
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:192!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 2 PID: 22968 Comm: kworker/2:11 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3-00044-g0a8db05b571a #236
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x152/0x1d0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_push+0xc4/0xe0
ip6mr_cache_report+0xd69/0x19b0
reg_vif_xmit+0x406/0x690
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x17e/0x6e0
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2d6a/0x3d20
vlan_dev_hard_start_xmit+0x3ab/0x5c0
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x17e/0x6e0
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2d6a/0x3d20
neigh_connected_output+0x3ed/0x570
ip6_finish_output2+0x5b5/0x1950
ip6_finish_output+0x693/0x11c0
ip6_output+0x24b/0x880
NF_HOOK.constprop.0+0xfd/0x530
ndisc_send_skb+0x9db/0x1400
ndisc_send_rs+0x12a/0x6c0
addrconf_dad_completed+0x3c9/0xea0
addrconf_dad_work+0x849/0x1420
process_one_work+0xa22/0x16e0
worker_thread+0x679/0x10c0
ret_from_fork+0x28/0x60
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
When setup a vlan device on dev pim6reg, DAD ns packet may sent on reg_vif_xmit().
reg_vif_xmit()
ip6mr_cache_report()
skb_push(skb, -skb_network_offset(pkt));//skb_network_offset(pkt) is 4
And skb_push declared as:
void *skb_push(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int len);
skb->data -= len;
//0xffff88805f86a84c - 0xfffffffc = 0xffff887f5f86a850
skb->data is set to 0xffff887f5f86a850, which is invalid mem addr, lead to skb_push() fails.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid10: check slab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter
If we write a large number to md/bitmap_set_bits, md_bitmap_checkpage()
will return -EINVAL because 'page >= bitmap->pages', but the return value
was not checked immediately in md_bitmap_get_counter() in order to set
*blocks value and slab-out-of-bounds occurs.
Move check of 'page >= bitmap->pages' to md_bitmap_get_counter() and
return directly if true.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: bcm_tx_setup(): fix KMSAN uninit-value in vfs_write
Syzkaller reported the following issue:
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in aio_rw_done fs/aio.c:1520 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in aio_write+0x899/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
aio_rw_done fs/aio.c:1520 [inline]
aio_write+0x899/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
io_submit_one+0x1d1c/0x3bf0 fs/aio.c:2019
__do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2078 [inline]
__se_sys_io_submit+0x293/0x770 fs/aio.c:2048
__x64_sys_io_submit+0x92/0xd0 fs/aio.c:2048
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:766 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3452 [inline]
__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x71f/0xce0 mm/slub.c:3491
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:967 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x11d/0x3b0 mm/slab_common.c:981
kmalloc_array include/linux/slab.h:636 [inline]
bcm_tx_setup+0x80e/0x29d0 net/can/bcm.c:930
bcm_sendmsg+0x3a2/0xce0 net/can/bcm.c:1351
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x495/0x5e0 net/socket.c:1108
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2189 [inline]
aio_write+0x63a/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
io_submit_one+0x1d1c/0x3bf0 fs/aio.c:2019
__do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2078 [inline]
__se_sys_io_submit+0x293/0x770 fs/aio.c:2048
__x64_sys_io_submit+0x92/0xd0 fs/aio.c:2048
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
CPU: 1 PID: 5034 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc6-syzkaller-80422-geda666ff2276 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/12/2023
=====================================================
We can follow the call chain and find that 'bcm_tx_setup' function
calls 'memcpy_from_msg' to copy some content to the newly allocated
frame of 'op->frames'. After that the 'len' field of copied structure
being compared with some constant value (64 or 8). However, if
'memcpy_from_msg' returns an error, we will compare some uninitialized
memory. This triggers 'uninit-value' issue.
This patch will add 'memcpy_from_msg' possible errors processing to
avoid uninit-value issue.
Tested via syzkaller