In FreeBSD 10.x before 10.4-STABLE, 10.4-RELEASE-p3, and 10.3-RELEASE-p24 named paths are globally scoped, meaning a process located in one jail can read and modify the content of POSIX shared memory objects created by a process in another jail or the host system. As a result, a malicious user that has access to a jailed system is able to abuse shared memory by injecting malicious content in the shared memory region. This memory region might be executed by applications trusting the shared memory, like Squid. This issue could lead to a Denial of Service or local privilege escalation.
In FreeBSD before 11.1-STABLE, 11.1-RELEASE-p4, 11.0-RELEASE-p15, 10.4-STABLE, 10.4-RELEASE-p3, and 10.3-RELEASE-p24, the kernel does not properly clear the memory of the kld_file_stat structure before filling the data. Since the structure filled by the kernel is allocated on the kernel stack and copied to userspace, a leak of information from the kernel stack is possible. As a result, some bytes from the kernel stack can be observed in userspace.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11r allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the fast BSS transmission (FT) handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Station-To-Station-Link (STSL) Transient Key (STK) during the PeerKey handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) Peer Key (TPK) during the TDLS handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that support 802.11v allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.