In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: media: atomisp: Disallow all private IOCTLs
Disallow all private IOCTLs. These aren't quite as safe as one could
assume of IOCTL handlers; disable them for now. Instead of removing the
code, return in the beginning of the function if cmd is non-zero in order
to keep static checkers happy.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: reject new tp_meter sessions during teardown
Prevent tp_meter from starting new sender or receiver sessions after
mesh_state has left BATADV_MESH_ACTIVE.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: fix empty payload in tap skb for non-linear buffers
For non-linear skbs, virtio_transport_build_skb() goes through
virtio_transport_copy_nonlinear_skb() to copy the original payload
in the new skb to be delivered to the vsockmon tap device.
This manually initializes an iov_iter but does not set iov_iter.count.
Since the iov_iter is zero-initialized, the copy length is zero and no
payload is actually copied to the monitor interface, leaving data
un-initialized.
Fix this by removing the linear vs non-linear split and using
skb_copy_datagram_iter() with iov_iter_kvec() for all cases, as
vhost-vsock already does. This handles both linear and non-linear skbs,
properly initializes the iov_iter, and removes the now unused
virtio_transport_copy_nonlinear_skb().
While touching this code, let's also check the return value of
skb_copy_datagram_iter(), even though it's unlikely to fail.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: stop tp_meter sessions during mesh teardown
TP meter sessions remain linked on bat_priv->tp_list after the netlink
request has already finished. When the mesh interface is removed,
batadv_mesh_free() currently tears down the mesh without first draining
these sessions.
A running sender thread or a late incoming tp_meter packet can then keep
processing against a mesh instance which is already shutting down.
Synchronize tp_meter with the mesh lifetime by stopping all active
sessions from batadv_mesh_free() and waiting for sender threads to exit
before teardown continues.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gem: Fix inconsistent plane dimension calculation in drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs()
drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs() computes sub-sampled plane dimensions
using plain integer division:
unsigned int width = mode_cmd->width / (i ? info->hsub : 1);
unsigned int height = mode_cmd->height / (i ? info->vsub : 1);
However, the ioctl-level framebuffer_check() in drm_framebuffer.c uses
drm_format_info_plane_width/height() which round up dimensions via
DIV_ROUND_UP(). This inconsistency corrupts the subsequent GEM object
size check for certain pixel format and dimension combinations.
For example, with NV12 (vsub=2) and a 1-pixel-tall framebuffer the
GEM size validation path sees height=0 instead of height=1. The
expression (height - 1) then wraps to UINT_MAX as an unsigned int,
causing min_size to overflow and wrap back to a small value. A tiny
GEM object therefore passes the size guard, yet when the GPU accesses
the chroma plane it will read or write memory beyond the object's
bounds.
Fix by replacing the open-coded divisions with drm_format_info_plane_width()
and drm_format_info_plane_height(), which use DIV_ROUND_UP() and match
the calculation already used in framebuffer_check().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: iris: fix use-after-free of fmt_src during MBPF check
During concurrency testing, multiple instances can run in parallel, and
each instance uses its own inst->lock while the core->lock protects the
list of active instances. The race happens because these locks cover
different scopes, inst->lock protects only the internals of a single
instance, while the Macro Blocks Per Frame (MBPF) checker walks the
core list under core->lock and reads fields like fmt_src->width and
fmt_src->height. At the same time, iris_close() may free fmt_src and
fmt_dst under inst->lock while the instance is still present in the core
list. This allows a situation where the MBPF checker, still iterating
through the core list, reaches an instance whose fmt_src was already
freed by another thread and ends up dereferencing a dangling pointer,
resulting in a use-after-free. This happens because the MBPF checker
assumes that any instance in the core list is fully valid, but the
freeing of fmt_src and fmt_dst without removing the instance from the
core list is not correct.
The correct ordering is to defer freeing fmt_src and fmt_dst until after
the instance has been removed from the core list and all teardown under
the core lock has completed, ensuring that no dangling pointers are ever
exposed during MBPF checks.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/gem: fix error handling in msm_ioctl_gem_info_get_metadata()
msm_ioctl_gem_info_get_metadata() always returns 0 regardless of
errors. When copy_to_user() fails or the user buffer is too small,
the error code stored in ret is ignored because the function
unconditionally returns 0. This causes userspace to believe the
ioctl succeeded when it did not.
Additionally, kmemdup() can return NULL on allocation failure, but
the return value is not checked. This leads to a NULL pointer
dereference in the subsequent copy_to_user() call.
Add the missing NULL check for kmemdup() and return ret instead of 0.
Note that the SET counterpart (msm_ioctl_gem_info_set_metadata)
correctly returns ret.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/714478/
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: bla: prevent use-after-free when deleting claims
When batadv_bla_del_backbone_claims() removes all claims for a backbone, it
does this by dropping the link entry in the hash list. This list entry
itself was one of the references which need to be dropped at the same time
via batadv_claim_put().
But the batadv_claim_put() must not be done before the last access to the
claim object in this function. Otherwise the claim might be freed already
by the batadv_claim_release() function before the list entry was dropped.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: appletb-kbd: fix UAF in inactivity-timer cleanup path
Commit 38224c472a03 ("HID: appletb-kbd: fix slab use-after-free bug in
appletb_kbd_probe") added timer_delete_sync(&kbd->inactivity_timer) to
both the probe close_hw error path and appletb_kbd_remove(), but the
way it was wired in left the inactivity timer reachable during driver
tear-down via two distinct windows.
Window A -- put_device() before timer_delete_sync():
put_device(&kbd->backlight_dev->dev);
timer_delete_sync(&kbd->inactivity_timer);
The inactivity_timer softirq reads kbd->backlight_dev and calls
backlight_device_set_brightness() -> mutex_lock(&ops_lock). If a
concurrent hid_appletb_bl unbind drops the last devm reference
between these two calls, the backlight_device is freed and the
mutex_lock() touches freed memory.
Window B -- backlight cleanup before hid_hw_stop():
if (kbd->backlight_dev) {
timer_delete_sync(...);
put_device(...);
}
hid_hw_close(hdev);
hid_hw_stop(hdev);
Even after Window A is closed, hid_hw_close()/hid_hw_stop() still run
afterwards, so a late ".event" callback from the HID core (USB URB
completion on real Apple hardware) can arrive after
timer_delete_sync() drained the softirq but before put_device() drops
the reference. That callback reaches reset_inactivity_timer(), which
calls mod_timer() and re-arms the timer. The freshly re-armed timer
can then fire on the about-to-be-freed backlight_device.
Both windows produce the same KASAN slab-use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_lock+0x1aab/0x21c0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88803ee9a108 by task swapper/0/0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__mutex_lock
backlight_device_set_brightness
appletb_inactivity_timer
call_timer_fn
run_timer_softirq
handle_softirqs
Allocated by task N:
devm_backlight_device_register
appletb_bl_probe
Freed by task M:
(concurrent hid_appletb_bl unbind path)
Close both windows at once by reworking the tear-down in
appletb_kbd_remove() and in the probe close_hw error path so that
1) hid_hw_close()/hid_hw_stop() run before the backlight cleanup,
guaranteeing no further .event callback can fire and re-arm the
timer, and
2) inside the "if (kbd->backlight_dev)" block, timer_delete_sync()
runs before put_device(), so the softirq is drained before the
final reference is dropped.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix node_cnt race between extent node destroy and writeback
f2fs_destroy_extent_node() does not set FI_NO_EXTENT before clearing
extent nodes. When called from f2fs_drop_inode() with I_SYNC set,
concurrent kworker writeback can insert new extent nodes into the same
extent tree, racing with the destroy and triggering f2fs_bug_on() in
__destroy_extent_node(). The scenario is as follows:
drop inode writeback
- iput
- f2fs_drop_inode // I_SYNC set
- f2fs_destroy_extent_node
- __destroy_extent_node
- while (node_cnt) {
write_lock(&et->lock)
__free_extent_tree
write_unlock(&et->lock)
- __writeback_single_inode
- f2fs_outplace_write_data
- f2fs_update_read_extent_cache
- __update_extent_tree_range
// FI_NO_EXTENT not set,
// insert new extent node
} // node_cnt == 0, exit while
- f2fs_bug_on(node_cnt) // node_cnt > 0
Additionally, __update_extent_tree_range() only checks FI_NO_EXTENT for
EX_READ type, leaving EX_BLOCK_AGE updates completely unprotected.
This patch set FI_NO_EXTENT under et->lock in __destroy_extent_node(),
consistent with other callers (__update_extent_tree_range and
__drop_extent_tree) and check FI_NO_EXTENT for both EX_READ and
EX_BLOCK_AGE tree.