In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: qcom-qmp-usb: Fix an NULL vs IS_ERR() bug
The qmp_usb_iomap() helper function currently returns the raw result of
devm_ioremap() for non-exclusive mappings. Since devm_ioremap() may return
a NULL pointer and the caller only checks error pointers with IS_ERR(),
NULL could bypass the check and lead to an invalid dereference.
Fix the issue by checking if devm_ioremap() returns NULL. When it does,
qmp_usb_iomap() now returns an error pointer via IOMEM_ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM),
ensuring safe and consistent error handling.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: free old damon_sysfs_scheme_filter->memcg_path on write
memcg_path_store() assigns a newly allocated memory buffer to
filter->memcg_path, without deallocating the previously allocated and
assigned memory buffer. As a result, users can leak kernel memory by
continuously writing a data to memcg_path DAMOS sysfs file. Fix the leak
by deallocating the previously set memory buffer.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: codecs: wcd9335: Fix missing free of regulator supplies
Driver gets and enables all regulator supplies in probe path
(wcd9335_parse_dt() and wcd9335_power_on_reset()), but does not cleanup
in final error paths and in unbind (missing remove() callback). This
leads to leaked memory and unbalanced regulator enable count during
probe errors or unbind.
Fix this by converting entire code into devm_regulator_bulk_get_enable()
which also greatly simplifies the code.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: handle csum tree error with rescue=ibadroots correctly
[BUG]
There is syzbot based reproducer that can crash the kernel, with the
following call trace: (With some debug output added)
DEBUG: rescue=ibadroots parsed
BTRFS: device fsid 14d642db-7b15-43e4-81e6-4b8fac6a25f8 devid 1 transid 8 /dev/loop0 (7:0) scanned by repro (1010)
BTRFS info (device loop0): first mount of filesystem 14d642db-7b15-43e4-81e6-4b8fac6a25f8
BTRFS info (device loop0): using blake2b (blake2b-256-generic) checksum algorithm
BTRFS info (device loop0): using free-space-tree
BTRFS warning (device loop0): checksum verify failed on logical 5312512 mirror 1 wanted 0xb043382657aede36608fd3386d6b001692ff406164733d94e2d9a180412c6003 found 0x810ceb2bacb7f0f9eb2bf3b2b15c02af867cb35ad450898169f3b1f0bd818651 level 0
DEBUG: read tree root path failed for tree csum, ret=-5
BTRFS warning (device loop0): checksum verify failed on logical 5328896 mirror 1 wanted 0x51be4e8b303da58e6340226815b70e3a93592dac3f30dd510c7517454de8567a found 0x51be4e8b303da58e634022a315b70e3a93592dac3f30dd510c7517454de8567a level 0
BTRFS warning (device loop0): checksum verify failed on logical 5292032 mirror 1 wanted 0x1924ccd683be9efc2fa98582ef58760e3848e9043db8649ee382681e220cdee4 found 0x0cb6184f6e8799d9f8cb335dccd1d1832da1071d12290dab3b85b587ecacca6e level 0
process 'repro' launched './file2' with NULL argv: empty string added
DEBUG: no csum root, idatacsums=0 ibadroots=134217728
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000041: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000208-0x000000000000020f]
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1010 Comm: repro Tainted: G OE 6.15.0-custom+ #249 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022
RIP: 0010:btrfs_lookup_csum+0x93/0x3d0 [btrfs]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btrfs_lookup_bio_sums+0x47a/0xdf0 [btrfs]
btrfs_submit_bbio+0x43e/0x1a80 [btrfs]
submit_one_bio+0xde/0x160 [btrfs]
btrfs_readahead+0x498/0x6a0 [btrfs]
read_pages+0x1c3/0xb20
page_cache_ra_order+0x4b5/0xc20
filemap_get_pages+0x2d3/0x19e0
filemap_read+0x314/0xde0
__kernel_read+0x35b/0x900
bprm_execve+0x62e/0x1140
do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x3fc/0x520
__x64_sys_execveat+0xdc/0x130
do_syscall_64+0x54/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[CAUSE]
Firstly the fs has a corrupted csum tree root, thus to mount the fs we
have to go "ro,rescue=ibadroots" mount option.
Normally with that mount option, a bad csum tree root should set
BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DATA_CSUMS flag, so that any future data read will
ignore csum search.
But in this particular case, we have the following call trace that
caused NULL csum root, but not setting BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DATA_CSUMS:
load_global_roots_objectid():
ret = btrfs_search_slot();
/* Succeeded */
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu()
found = true;
/* We found the root item for csum tree. */
root = read_tree_root_path();
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
if (!btrfs_test_opt(fs_info, IGNOREBADROOTS))
/*
* Since we have rescue=ibadroots mount option,
* @ret is still 0.
*/
break;
if (!found || ret) {
/* @found is true, @ret is 0, error handling for csum
* tree is skipped.
*/
}
This means we completely skipped to set BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DATA_CSUMS if
the csum tree is corrupted, which results unexpected later csum lookup.
[FIX]
If read_tree_root_path() failed, always populate @ret to the error
number.
As at the end of the function, we need @ret to determine if we need to
do the extra error handling for csum tree.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: save the SR_SUM status over switches
When threads/tasks are switched we need to ensure the old execution's
SR_SUM state is saved and the new thread has the old SR_SUM state
restored.
The issue was seen under heavy load especially with the syz-stress tool
running, with crashes as follows in schedule_tail:
Unable to handle kernel access to user memory without uaccess routines
at virtual address 000000002749f0d0
Oops [#1]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 4875 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted
5.12.0-rc2-syzkaller-00467-g0d7588ab9ef9 #0
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
epc : schedule_tail+0x72/0xb2 kernel/sched/core.c:4264
ra : task_pid_vnr include/linux/sched.h:1421 [inline]
ra : schedule_tail+0x70/0xb2 kernel/sched/core.c:4264
epc : ffffffe00008c8b0 ra : ffffffe00008c8ae sp : ffffffe025d17ec0
gp : ffffffe005d25378 tp : ffffffe00f0d0000 t0 : 0000000000000000
t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : 00000000000f4240 s0 : ffffffe025d17ee0
s1 : 000000002749f0d0 a0 : 000000000000002a a1 : 0000000000000003
a2 : 1ffffffc0cfac500 a3 : ffffffe0000c80cc a4 : 5ae9db91c19bbe00
a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000000f00000 a7 : ffffffe000082eba
s2 : 0000000000040000 s3 : ffffffe00eef96c0 s4 : ffffffe022c77fe0
s5 : 0000000000004000 s6 : ffffffe067d74e00 s7 : ffffffe067d74850
s8 : ffffffe067d73e18 s9 : ffffffe067d74e00 s10: ffffffe00eef96e8
s11: 000000ae6cdf8368 t3 : 5ae9db91c19bbe00 t4 : ffffffc4043cafb2
t5 : ffffffc4043cafba t6 : 0000000000040000
status: 0000000000000120 badaddr: 000000002749f0d0 cause:
000000000000000f
Call Trace:
[<ffffffe00008c8b0>] schedule_tail+0x72/0xb2 kernel/sched/core.c:4264
[<ffffffe000005570>] ret_from_exception+0x0/0x14
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace b5f8f9231dc87dda ]---
The issue comes from the put_user() in schedule_tail
(kernel/sched/core.c) doing the following:
asmlinkage __visible void schedule_tail(struct task_struct *prev)
{
...
if (current->set_child_tid)
put_user(task_pid_vnr(current), current->set_child_tid);
...
}
the put_user() macro causes the code sequence to come out as follows:
1: __enable_user_access()
2: reg = task_pid_vnr(current);
3: *current->set_child_tid = reg;
4: __disable_user_access()
The problem is that we may have a sleeping function as argument which
could clear SR_SUM causing the panic above. This was fixed by
evaluating the argument of the put_user() macro outside the user-enabled
section in commit 285a76bb2cf5 ("riscv: evaluate put_user() arg before
enabling user access")"
In order for riscv to take advantage of unsafe_get/put_XXX() macros and
to avoid the same issue we had with put_user() and sleeping functions we
must ensure code flow can go through switch_to() from within a region of
code with SR_SUM enabled and come back with SR_SUM still enabled. This
patch addresses the problem allowing future work to enable full use of
unsafe_get/put_XXX() macros without needing to take a CSR bit flip cost
on every access. Make switch_to() save and restore SR_SUM.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: serial: uartlite: register uart driver in init
When two instances of uart devices are probing, a concurrency race can
occur. If one thread calls uart_register_driver function, which first
allocates and assigns memory to 'uart_state' member of uart_driver
structure, the other instance can bypass uart driver registration and
call ulite_assign. This calls uart_add_one_port, which expects the uart
driver to be fully initialized. This leads to a kernel panic due to a
null pointer dereference:
[ 8.143581] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000002b8
[ 8.156982] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 8.156984] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 8.156986] PGD 0 P4D 0
...
[ 8.180668] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x19/0x30
[ 8.188624] Call Trace:
[ 8.188629] ? __die_body.cold+0x1a/0x1f
[ 8.195260] ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x290
[ 8.209183] ? __irq_resolve_mapping+0x47/0x80
[ 8.209187] ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x140
[ 8.209190] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 8.209196] ? mutex_lock+0x19/0x30
[ 8.223116] uart_add_one_port+0x60/0x440
[ 8.223122] ? proc_tty_register_driver+0x43/0x50
[ 8.223126] ? tty_register_driver+0x1ca/0x1e0
[ 8.246250] ulite_probe+0x357/0x4b0 [uartlite]
To prevent it, move uart driver registration in to init function. This
will ensure that uart_driver is always registered when probe function
is called.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: sanitize request list handling
Validate the request in nvme_tcp_handle_r2t() to ensure it's not part of
any list, otherwise a malicious R2T PDU might inject a loop in request
list processing.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix out-of-bounds read in snd_usb_get_audioformat_uac3()
In snd_usb_get_audioformat_uac3(), the length value returned from
snd_usb_ctl_msg() is used directly for memory allocation without
validation. This length is controlled by the USB device.
The allocated buffer is cast to a uac3_cluster_header_descriptor
and its fields are accessed without verifying that the buffer
is large enough. If the device returns a smaller than expected
length, this leads to an out-of-bounds read.
Add a length check to ensure the buffer is large enough for
uac3_cluster_header_descriptor.