Out-of-bounds Write vulnerability in Apache Commons Configuration.This issue affects Apache Commons Configuration: from 2.0 before 2.10.1.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.10.1, which fixes the issue.
Object lifecycle issue in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 123.0.6312.58 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit object corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
Out of bounds read in Swiftshader in Google Chrome prior to 123.0.6312.58 allowed a remote attacker to perform out of bounds memory access via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
Use after free in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 123.0.6312.58 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
Inappropriate implementation in Downloads in Google Chrome prior to 123.0.6312.58 allowed a remote attacker to perform UI spoofing via a crafted URL. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
Incorrect security UI in iOS in Google Chrome prior to 123.0.6312.58 allowed a remote attacker to perform UI spoofing via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
Inappropriate implementation in iOS in Google Chrome prior to 123.0.6312.58 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
Inappropriate implementation in iOS in Google Chrome prior to 123.0.6312.58 allowed a remote attacker to perform UI spoofing via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)
Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement
Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS).
CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented
Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data
and return addresses are accompanied by so called "shadow stacks",
holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren't
writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their
contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address
coming from the traditional stack.
In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In
various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of
the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then
invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an
exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly.
Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn't right:
Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack.
The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing.