In multi-node deployments, an attacker who had already obtained code execution on one appliance node could submit a value through an internal cluster interface that was written into monitoring configuration on another node without sufficient validation, potentially allowing OS commands to be executed there. Execution was limited to an unprivileged service account on that node.
An authenticated administrator could bypass the content validation applied to an administrative file upload and store a file containing dangerous content on the appliance. This did not by itself result in code execution, which would require a separate vulnerability to run the stored file.
An authenticated administrator on a node with an optional, separately licensed gateway role enabled could supply a connector URL that the server retrieved without sufficient validation of its scheme or destination, causing the server to issue requests to internal network services. Exploitation requires the licensed gateway role to be active.
An authorization check in the large file exchange feature of Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway did not correctly establish that the requesting user was a party to the package being requested. An authenticated user of that optional feature could read the subject, message body, and attachments of packages they neither sent nor received.
An authenticated administrator could initiate an administrative import using a file whose contents were not fully verified, because the import validated only the file's header rather than the complete file. This could allow unverified or forged content to be accepted and processed, affecting the integrity of the imported data.
Two Kiteworks Core cluster-management operations did not validate file paths supplied to them, so an attacker holding root on one node of a cluster could write files as root onto another node and cause them to be executed there. Exploitation requires backend root access on a cluster node and a pending software patch present on the target node.
An XML parser used by Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway did not restrict external entity references. Where an optional, non-default message-processing feature is enabled, a remote and unauthenticated sender could potentially use a crafted message to read files accessible to the gateway service account, including cryptographic key material and credentials, and have them sent to a destination they control.
An identity-verification weakness in Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway allowed the gateway to act on the Kiteworks platform on behalf of a user it had not authenticated, and to provision a platform account for an identity it did not already know. A remote, unauthenticated sender could potentially exploit this to obtain control of a platform account.
A user-provisioning interface in Kiteworks Core did not verify that the requesting administrator was entitled to grant the role being assigned. An administrator whose delegated permissions covered role changes alone could therefore raise an account to full system-administrator privileges.
Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway did not sufficiently validate the content of an uploaded backup, and allowed an administrator to influence how the application loaded it. An authenticated administrator could potentially use this to execute arbitrary code on the gateway as the underlying service account.