Zammad packages built with packager.io (DEB and RPM) could have allowed a local attacker who already had file system write privileges as the unprivileged zammad service account to escalate to full root privileges on the host. Service processes began running as root and executed files that were owned and writable by the zammad account before dropping their identity to that account. An attacker holding that foothold could have escalated within seconds, because the affected services were restarted automatically whenever they stopped; no administrator interaction was required. Only installations from the DEB and RPM packages were affected — installations from source or the official container images were not. All released packaged versions were affected.
Joomla Extension - ordasoft.com - Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in OrdaSoft Joomla CCK < 8.3.16 - site/uploader.php is reached through the component’s normal frontend routing (task=getContent), a task with no authentication or ACL check anywhere in the dispatch chain. The handler validates the uploaded file’s content with a real magic-byte MIME check, but the extension allow-list that would otherwise restrict the saved file’s extension was present in the source and commented out. The saved file’s extension was taken directly from the attacker-supplied filename with no validation, and the file was written to a path directly under the Joomla web root that is executed by the PHP handler. An image/PHP polyglot, a file whose header bytes satisfy the MIME check with PHP source appended after, passed the content check while carrying a .php extension of the attacker’s choosing.