Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. From 0.3.0 until 0.3.8, the @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend-module-sentry package is affected by improper input validation in sentry scaffolder actions. An authenticated internal user who can execute the affected actions may cause the backend to contact unintended destinations and disclose Sentry integration credentials. Subsequent impact depends on network reachability and the privileges granted to the configured token. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.8.
Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. From 0.11.12 until 1.14.7 and 1.15.5, the @backstage/plugin-techdocs-node package is affected by improper validation of mkdocs plugin configuration in techdocs. An authenticated attacker with control over a TechDocs source repository could cause a documentation build to retrieve and publish data from network locations reachable by the build environment. Exposure depends on deployment topology, build mode, and target endpoint protections. Modern cloud metadata services that require tokens or special headers are not directly accessible through the affected behavior. This issue is fixed in @backstage/plugin-techdocs-node versions 1.14.7 and 1.15.5.
A flaw was found in SSSD. A local user can trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) by exploiting a race condition in the autofs responder between asynchronous enumeration completion and map invalidation. By repeatedly sending concurrent map enumeration and invalidation requests, an attacker can cause memory to leak, leading to excessive memory consumption that can disrupt or crash the autofs service.
A flaw was found in SSSD (System Security Services Daemon). When Identity Provider (IdP) authentication is enabled, pre-authentication requests retain state in memory without being cleared or timed out. A local attacker can repeatedly initiate authentication flows without completing them, causing unbounded memory consumption. This memory exhaustion can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) by degrading or terminating SSSD authentication services.
A repository's external issue tracker regular expression containing alternating capture groups could produce invalid slice indexes when Gitea rendered issue references, causing a runtime panic that terminated the Gitea process. A user who can edit a repository's external issue tracker settings could make any later rendering of matching content, such as viewing a README, crash the instance for all users.
With `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` set to a matching entry such as `*` or a hostname wildcard, Gitea's migration URL validation could permit reserved and link-local addresses, such as `169.254.169.254`, even when `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`. The local-network block list did not cover these ranges, and a hostname matching the allow list was accepted regardless of its resolved address. A user who can start migrations on such an instance could reach these addresses from the Gitea server; the default empty `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` configuration is not affected.
When Gitea's web installer is reachable against a database that already contains users, such as after `INSTALL_LOCK` has been reset to `false`, submitting the install form with an administrator username matching an existing account issued an authenticated session for that account without verifying its password. If the account is an administrator, the session grants full administrative access, including changing the account's password. Databases with a single user also did not require the reinstall confirmation.
Gitea expanded a workflow's static `strategy.matrix` into its full Cartesian product without a size limit when creating a run, before the fork pull request approval gate applied. A user who can open a pull request from a fork could submit a small workflow file whose matrix expands to a very large number of jobs, consuming server memory and potentially terminating the Gitea process. No runner is required. Static matrices above 256 combinations are now rejected before expansion.
When a private repository is transferred to a user who lacks access, Gitea grants that recipient temporary read access as a collaborator so they can review the repository. Rejecting or cancelling the transfer did not revoke this collaboration, so the named recipient kept persistent read access to the private repository, including its code, issues, pull requests and wiki, and could clone it. The repository owner was not notified. Transfer-granted access is now removed while collaborations that existed before the transfer are preserved.
Gitea validated a push mirror's remote address against the `[migrations]` allow and block lists only when the mirror was created. Each synchronization passed the stored address directly to `git push`, so a name that later resolved to a blocked or internal address was still reached. A user with administrator access to a repository, which includes repositories they create themselves, could aim push mirror synchronization at internal Git services and force-push the repository's contents to them.