GFI MailEssentials AI versions prior to 22.4 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the IP Blocklist management page. An authenticated user can supply HTML/JavaScript in the ctl00$ContentPlaceHolder1$pv1$txtIPDescription parameter to /MailEssentials/pages/MailSecurity/ipblocklist.aspx, which is stored and later rendered in the management interface, allowing script execution in the context of a logged-in user.
GFI MailEssentials AI versions prior to 22.4 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the IP DNS Blocklist configuration page. An authenticated user can supply HTML/JavaScript in the ctl00$ContentPlaceHolder1$pv1$TXB_IPs parameter to /MailEssentials/pages/MailSecurity/ipdnsblocklist.aspx, which is stored and later rendered in the management interface, allowing script execution in the context of a logged-in user.
GFI MailEssentials AI versions prior to 22.4 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the Keyword Filtering rule creation workflow. An authenticated user can supply HTML/JavaScript in the ctl00$ContentPlaceHolder1$pv1$TXB_RuleName parameter to /MailEssentials/pages/MailSecurity/contentchecking.aspx, which is stored and later rendered in the management interface, allowing script execution in the context of a logged-in user.
GFI MailEssentials AI versions prior to 22.4 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the Attachment Filtering rule creation workflow. An authenticated user can supply HTML/JavaScript in the ctl00$ContentPlaceHolder1$pv1$TXB_RuleName parameter to /MailEssentials/pages/MailSecurity/attachmentchecking.aspx, which is stored and later rendered in the management interface, allowing script execution in the context of a logged-in user.
GFI MailEssentials AI versions prior to 22.4 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the Advanced Content Filtering rule creation workflow. An authenticated user can supply HTML/JavaScript in the ctl00$ContentPlaceHolder1$pv1$txtRuleName parameter to /MailEssentials/pages/MailSecurity/advancedfiltering.aspx, which is stored and later rendered in the management interface, allowing script execution in the context of a logged-in user.
GFI MailEssentials AI versions prior to 22.4 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the Anti-Spam Whitelist management interface. An authenticated user can supply HTML/JavaScript in the ctl00$ContentPlaceHolder1$pv1$txtDescription parameter to /MailEssentials/pages/MailSecurity/Whitelist.aspx, which is stored and later rendered in the management interface, allowing script execution in the context of a logged-in user.
strongMan is a management interface for strongSwan, an OpenSource IPsec-based VPN. When storing credentials in the database (private keys, EAP secrets), strongMan encrypts the corresponding database fields. So far it used AES in CTR mode with a global database key. Together with an initialization vector (IV), a key stream is generated to encrypt the data in the database fields. But because strongMan did not generate individual IVs, every database field was encrypted using the same key stream. An attacker that has access to the database can use this to recover the encrypted credentials. In particular, because certificates, which have to be considered public information, are also encrypted using the same mechanism, an attacker can directly recover a large chunk of the key stream, which allows them to decrypt basically all other secrets especially ECDSA private keys and EAP secrets, which are usually a lot shorter. Version 0.2.0 fixes the issue by switching to AES-GCM-SIV encryption with a random nonce and an individually derived encryption key, using HKDF, for each encrypted value. Database migrations are provided to automatically re-encrypt all credentials.
Wings is the server control plane for Pterodactyl, a free, open-source game server management panel. Prior to version 1.12.1, a missing authorization check in multiple controllers allows any user with access to a node secret token to fetch information about any server on a Pterodactyl instance, even if that server is associated with a different node. This issue stems from missing logic to verify that the node requesting server data is the same node that the server is associated with. Any authenticated Wings node can retrieve server installation scripts (potentially containing secret values) and manipulate the installation status of servers belonging to other nodes. Wings nodes may also manipulate the transfer status of servers belonging to other nodes. This vulnerability requires a user to acquire a secret access token for a node. Unless a user gains access to a Wings secret access token they would not be able to access any of these vulnerable endpoints, as every endpoint requires a valid node access token. A single compromised Wings node daemon token (stored in plaintext at `/etc/pterodactyl/config.yml`) grants access to sensitive configuration data of every server on the panel, rather than only to servers that the node has access to. An attacker can use this information to move laterally through the system, send excessive notifications, destroy server data on other nodes, and otherwise exfiltrate secrets that they should not have access to with only a node token. Additionally, triggering a false transfer success causes the panel to delete the server from the source node, resulting in permanent data loss. Users should upgrade to version 1.12.1 to receive a fix.
Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. In versions prior to 3.27.0, an issue in Kata with Cloud Hypervisor allows a user of the container to modify the file system used by the Guest micro VM ultimately achieving arbitrary code execution as root in said VM. The current understanding is this doesn’t impact the security of the Host or of other containers / VMs running on that Host (note that arm64 QEMU lacks NVDIMM read-only support: It is believed that until the upstream QEMU gains this capability, a guest write could reach the image file). Version 3.27.0 patches the issue.
Echo is a Go web framework. In versions 5.0.0 through 5.0.2 on Windows, Echo’s `middleware.Static` using the default filesystem allows path traversal via backslashes, enabling unauthenticated remote file read outside the static root. In `middleware/static.go`, the requested path is unescaped and normalized with `path.Clean` (URL semantics). `path.Clean` does not treat `\` as a path separator, so `..\` sequences remain in the cleaned path. The resulting path is then passed to `currentFS.Open(...)`. When the filesystem is left at the default (nil), Echo uses `defaultFS` which calls `os.Open` (`echo.go:792`). On Windows, `os.Open` treats `\` as a path separator and resolves `..\`, allowing traversal outside the static root. Version 5.0.3 fixes the issue.