IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.2 through 5.0.3 is vulnerable to cross-site scripting. This vulnerability allows an authenticated user to embed arbitrary JavaScript code in the Web UI thus altering the intended functionality potentially leading to credentials disclosure within a trusted session.
IBM Db2 on Cloud Pak for Data and Db2 Warehouse on Cloud Pak for Data versions 4.8, 5.0, 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 could allow an authenticated user to bypass client-side validation and manipulate input data using man in the middle techniques.
IBM Engineering Workflow Management 7.0.2 through 7.0.2 Interim Fix 035, 7.0.3 through 7.0.3 Interim Fix 017, and 7.1 through 7.1 Interim Fix 004 is vulnerable to HTTP header injection, caused by improper validation of input by the HOST headers. This could allow an attacker to conduct various attacks against the vulnerable system, including cross-site scripting, cache poisoning or session hijacking.
The geomap panel's XYZ tile layer has a sanitize-then-interpolate ordering bug. sanitizeTextPanelContent() runs on the raw template string before getTemplateSrv().replace() substitutes the variable value, which uses the glob format with no HTML escaping. The result is passed to OpenLayers via element.innerHTML. An Editor can set a textbox variable's default value to an XSS payload that executes for every user who opens the dashboard. This is a bypass of the CVE-2023-0507 fix
Mattermost versions 11.7.x <= 11.7.0, 11.6.x <= 11.6.2, 11.5.x <= 11.5.5, 10.11.x <= 10.11.17 fail to invalidate cached authentication state for active WebSocket connections during global session revocation, which allows a user with an existing WebSocket connection to remain authenticated and continue receiving real-time events until the cached session expires or the client reconnects.. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00664
Mattermost versions 11.7.x <= 11.7.0, 10.11.x <= 10.11.17 fail to enforce bot-specific permission checks on the user active status endpoint, which allows a User Manager with user management write access but no Integrations access to deactivate bot accounts via the PUT /api/v4/users/{id}/active API endpoint.. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00667
Mattermost versions 11.7.x <= 11.7.0, 11.6.x <= 11.6.2, 11.5.x <= 11.5.5, 10.11.x <= 10.11.17 Fail to validate channel ownership of an existing subscription before applying edits which allows an authenticated attacker to hijack subscriptions from channels they have no access to via a crafted PUT request to the subscription edit endpoint.. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00650
Mattermost versions 11.7.x <= 11.7.0, 11.6.x <= 11.6.2, 11.5.x <= 11.5.5, 10.11.x <= 10.11.17 fail to authenticate Atlassian Connect installed callbacks, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to inject a rogue sharedSecret and disrupt the Jira integration via POST to /ac/installed during the pending-install window.. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00654
MISP core contained multiple broken access-control flaws where authorization checks were performed against the wrong entity, or where ownership/editability checks were missing on write paths. In affected subsystems, a lower-privileged authenticated user with the relevant feature permission could cause the application to authorize one object but mutate another, or could modify objects that were merely visible rather than editable by the user’s organization.
The affected paths included:
* Event Reports tag removal: the route-authorized report could differ from the report ID used for tag detachment, enabling cross-organization tag removal from another event report
* Collection Elements bulk deletion: bulk deletion authorized against a collection whose ID matched the collection-element row ID, rather than the element’s actual parent collection, enabling deletion of elements from collections the user did not own.
* Analyst Data capture/update: nested analyst data updates could overwrite an existing record without applying the normal canEditAnalystData ownership check, enabling cross-organization overwrite of analyst data records.
* Template Elements editing: editing authorized against a template whose ID matched the template-element ID, rather than the element’s actual parent template, enabling unauthorized edits to another organization’s template elements.
* Decaying Model editing and mappings: write paths loaded models using view-scope access but did not verify edit ownership, enabling users to edit or remap visible models owned by another organization.
Successful exploitation could allow an authenticated user with subsystem-specific permissions to perform unauthorized cross-organization modifications or deletions of MISP data, resulting in integrity loss, unauthorized tampering with shared intelligence, and disruption of analyst workflows.
The Azure Active Directory (AAD) authentication implementation contained multiple weaknesses in its OAuth 2.0 authorization flow that could allow attackers to bypass important security guarantees provided by the protocol.
The application used the PHP session identifier (session_id()) as the OAuth state parameter. Because session identifiers are long-lived authentication credentials, exposing them in OAuth redirect URLs could leak valid session tokens through browser history, HTTP Referer headers, reverse proxies, access logs, or third-party infrastructure involved in the authentication flow. If obtained by an attacker, the leaked session identifier could potentially be used for session hijacking.
Additionally, the implementation did not regenerate the session identifier after successful authentication, leaving authenticated sessions susceptible to session fixation attacks where an attacker forces a victim to use a known session identifier before login and later reuses that identifier after authentication.
The OAuth state value was also not implemented as a dedicated, single-use nonce. This weakened CSRF protections and increased the risk of replay attacks against the OAuth callback process.
The authentication flow further failed to enforce HTTPS for the configured OAuth redirect URI. If a non-HTTPS redirect URI was used, OAuth authorization codes and access tokens could traverse the network in plaintext, exposing sensitive credentials to network attackers.
Finally, OAuth error responses containing attacker-controlled GET parameters were logged verbatim. An attacker could inject control characters or crafted log content, leading to log forging, log injection, or corruption of audit records.
The fix introduces:
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A dedicated cryptographically random OAuth state value.
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Single-use state validation and invalidation.
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Constant-time state comparison using hash_equals().
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Session identifier rotation after successful authentication.
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Enforcement of HTTPS-only redirect URIs.
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Sanitized and length-limited logging of OAuth error parameters.
AAD Authentication Plugin (OAuth 2.0 / Azure Active Directory integration)