In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Add check for granularity in dml ceil/floor helpers
[Why]
Wrapper functions for dcn_bw_ceil2() and dcn_bw_floor2()
should check for granularity is non zero to avoid assert and
divide-by-zero error in dcn_bw_ functions.
[How]
Add check for granularity 0.
(cherry picked from commit f6e09701c3eb2ccb8cb0518e0b67f1c69742a4ec)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles
Encoding file handles is usually performed by a filesystem >encode_fh()
method that may fail for various reasons.
The legacy users of exportfs_encode_fh(), namely, nfsd and
name_to_handle_at(2) syscall are ready to cope with the possibility
of failure to encode a file handle.
There are a few other users of exportfs_encode_{fh,fid}() that
currently have a WARN_ON() assertion when ->encode_fh() fails.
Relax those assertions because they are wrong.
The second linked bug report states commit 16aac5ad1fa9 ("ovl: support
encoding non-decodable file handles") in v6.6 as the regressing commit,
but this is not accurate.
The aforementioned commit only increases the chances of the assertion
and allows triggering the assertion with the reproducer using overlayfs,
inotify and drop_caches.
Triggering this assertion was always possible with other filesystems and
other reasons of ->encode_fh() failures and more particularly, it was
also possible with the exact same reproducer using overlayfs that is
mounted with options index=on,nfs_export=on also on kernels < v6.6.
Therefore, I am not listing the aforementioned commit as a Fixes commit.
Backport hint: this patch will have a trivial conflict applying to
v6.6.y, and other trivial conflicts applying to stable kernels < v6.6.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: dummy: iio_simply_dummy_buffer: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'data' array is allocated via kmalloc() and it is used to push data
to user space from a triggered buffer, but it does not set values for
inactive channels, as it only uses iio_for_each_active_channel()
to assign new values.
Use kzalloc for the memory allocation to avoid pushing uninitialized
information to userspace.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: pressure: zpa2326: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'sample' local struct is used to push data to user space from a
triggered buffer, but it has a hole between the temperature and the
timestamp (u32 pressure, u16 temperature, GAP, u64 timestamp).
This hole is never initialized.
Initialize the struct to zero before using it to avoid pushing
uninitialized information to userspace.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_fs: Remove WARN_ON in functionfs_bind
This commit addresses an issue related to below kernel panic where
panic_on_warn is enabled. It is caused by the unnecessary use of WARN_ON
in functionsfs_bind, which easily leads to the following scenarios.
1.adb_write in adbd 2. UDC write via configfs
================= =====================
->usb_ffs_open_thread() ->UDC write
->open_functionfs() ->configfs_write_iter()
->adb_open() ->gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store()
->adb_write() ->usb_gadget_register_driver_owner
->driver_register()
->StartMonitor() ->bus_add_driver()
->adb_read() ->gadget_bind_driver()
<times-out without BIND event> ->configfs_composite_bind()
->usb_add_function()
->open_functionfs() ->ffs_func_bind()
->adb_open() ->functionfs_bind()
<ffs->state !=FFS_ACTIVE>
The adb_open, adb_read, and adb_write operations are invoked from the
daemon, but trying to bind the function is a process that is invoked by
UDC write through configfs, which opens up the possibility of a race
condition between the two paths. In this race scenario, the kernel panic
occurs due to the WARN_ON from functionfs_bind when panic_on_warn is
enabled. This commit fixes the kernel panic by removing the unnecessary
WARN_ON.
Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
[ 14.542395] Call trace:
[ 14.542464] ffs_func_bind+0x1c8/0x14a8
[ 14.542468] usb_add_function+0xcc/0x1f0
[ 14.542473] configfs_composite_bind+0x468/0x588
[ 14.542478] gadget_bind_driver+0x108/0x27c
[ 14.542483] really_probe+0x190/0x374
[ 14.542488] __driver_probe_device+0xa0/0x12c
[ 14.542492] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x220
[ 14.542498] __driver_attach+0x11c/0x1fc
[ 14.542502] bus_for_each_dev+0x104/0x160
[ 14.542506] driver_attach+0x24/0x34
[ 14.542510] bus_add_driver+0x154/0x270
[ 14.542514] driver_register+0x68/0x104
[ 14.542518] usb_gadget_register_driver_owner+0x48/0xf4
[ 14.542523] gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0xf8/0x144
[ 14.542526] configfs_write_iter+0xf0/0x138
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: imu: kmx61: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'buffer' local array is used to push data to user space from a
triggered buffer, but it does not set values for inactive channels, as
it only uses iio_for_each_active_channel() to assign new values.
Initialize the array to zero before using it to avoid pushing
uninitialized information to userspace.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: at91: call input_free_device() on allocated iio_dev
Current implementation of at91_ts_register() calls input_free_deivce()
on st->ts_input, however, the err label can be reached before the
allocated iio_dev is stored to st->ts_input. Thus call
input_free_device() on input instead of st->ts_input.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack: clamp maximum hashtable size to INT_MAX
Use INT_MAX as maximum size for the conntrack hashtable. Otherwise, it
is possible to hit WARN_ON_ONCE in __kvmalloc_node_noprof() when
resizing hashtable because __GFP_NOWARN is unset. See:
0708a0afe291 ("mm: Consider __GFP_NOWARN flag for oversized kvmalloc() calls")
Note: hashtable resize is only possible from init_netns.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rds: sysctl: rds_tcp_{rcv,snd}buf: avoid using current->nsproxy
As mentioned in a previous commit of this series, using the 'net'
structure via 'current' is not recommended for different reasons:
- Inconsistency: getting info from the reader's/writer's netns vs only
from the opener's netns.
- current->nsproxy can be NULL in some cases, resulting in an 'Oops'
(null-ptr-deref), e.g. when the current task is exiting, as spotted by
syzbot [1] using acct(2).
The per-netns structure can be obtained from the table->data using
container_of(), then the 'net' one can be retrieved from the listen
socket (if available).