In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: validate bsscfg indices in IF events
brcmf_fweh_handle_if_event() validates the firmware-provided interface
index before it touches drvr->iflist[], but it still uses the raw
bsscfgidx field as an array index without a matching range check.
Reject IF events whose bsscfg index does not fit in drvr->iflist[]
before indexing the interface array.
[add missing wifi prefix]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: roccat: fix use-after-free in roccat_report_event
roccat_report_event() iterates over the device->readers list without
holding the readers_lock. This allows a concurrent roccat_release() to
remove and free a reader while it's still being accessed, leading to a
use-after-free.
Protect the readers list traversal with the readers_lock mutex.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lapbether: handle NETDEV_PRE_TYPE_CHANGE
lapbeth_data_transmit() expects the underlying device type
to be ARPHRD_ETHER.
Returning NOTIFY_BAD from lapbeth_device_event() makes sure
bonding driver can not break this expectation.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vc4: Fix a memory leak in hang state error path
When vc4_save_hang_state() encounters an early return condition, it
returns without freeing the previously allocated `kernel_state`,
leaking memory.
Add the missing kfree() calls by consolidating the early return paths
into a single place.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: af_key: zero aligned sockaddr tail in PF_KEY exports
PF_KEY export paths use `pfkey_sockaddr_size()` when reserving sockaddr
payload space, so IPv6 addresses occupy 32 bytes on the wire. However,
`pfkey_sockaddr_fill()` initializes only the first 28 bytes of
`struct sockaddr_in6`, leaving the final 4 aligned bytes uninitialized.
Not every PF_KEY message is affected. The state and policy dump builders
already zero the whole message buffer before filling the sockaddr
payloads. Keep the fix to the export paths that still append aligned
sockaddr payloads with plain `skb_put()`:
- `SADB_ACQUIRE`
- `SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING`
- `SADB_X_MIGRATE`
Fix those paths by clearing only the aligned sockaddr tail after
`pfkey_sockaddr_fill()`.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm_user: fix info leak in build_mapping()
struct xfrm_usersa_id has a one-byte padding hole after the proto
field, which ends up never getting set to zero before copying out to
userspace. Fix that up by zeroing out the whole structure before
setting individual variables.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: Wait for RCU readers during policy netns exit
xfrm_policy_fini() frees the policy_bydst hash tables after flushing the
policy work items and deleting all policies, but it does not wait for
concurrent RCU readers to leave their read-side critical sections first.
The policy_bydst tables are published via rcu_assign_pointer() and are
looked up through rcu_dereference_check(), so netns teardown must also
wait for an RCU grace period before freeing the table memory.
Fix this by adding synchronize_rcu() before freeing the policy hash tables.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_log: initialize nfgenmsg in NLMSG_DONE terminator
When batching multiple NFLOG messages (inst->qlen > 1), __nfulnl_send()
appends an NLMSG_DONE terminator with sizeof(struct nfgenmsg) payload via
nlmsg_put(), but never initializes the nfgenmsg bytes. The nlmsg_put()
helper only zeroes alignment padding after the payload, not the payload
itself, so four bytes of stale kernel heap data are leaked to userspace
in the NLMSG_DONE message body.
Use nfnl_msg_put() to build the NLMSG_DONE terminator, which initializes
the nfgenmsg payload via nfnl_fill_hdr(), consistent with how
__build_packet_message() already constructs NFULNL_MSG_PACKET headers.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_write_end_inline
KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in
ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a
copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted on
a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the inode
block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into an
adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.
The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the on-disk
id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline data. On a
corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical maximum inline data
capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode block buffer.
Call trace (crash path):
vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)
do_splice_direct
splice_direct_to_actor
iter_file_splice_write
ocfs2_file_write_iter
generic_perform_write
ocfs2_write_end
ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
memcpy_from_folio <-- KASAN: write OOB
So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to
alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.