OpenClaw versions 2026.1.30 and earlier, contain an information disclosure vulnerability, patched in 2026.2.1, in the MS Teams attachment downloader (optional extension must be enabled) that leaks bearer tokens to allowlisted suffix domains. When retrying downloads after receiving 401 or 403 responses, the application sends Authorization bearer tokens to untrusted hosts matching the permissive suffix-based allowlist, enabling token theft.
OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.2 contain a vulnerability in the gateway WebSocket connect handshake in which it allows skipping device identity checks when auth.token is present but not validated. Attackers can connect to the gateway without providing device identity or pairing by exploiting the presence check instead of validation, potentially gaining operator access in vulnerable deployments.
OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.2 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability where clients with operator.write scope can approve or deny exec approval requests by sending the /approve chat command. The /approve command path invokes exec.approval.resolve through an internal privileged gateway client, bypassing the operator.approvals permission check that protects direct RPC calls.
OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.13 use non-constant-time string comparison for hook token validation, allowing attackers to infer tokens through timing measurements. Remote attackers with network access to the hooks endpoint can exploit timing side-channels across multiple requests to gradually recover the authentication token.
OpenClaw versions 2026.1.29-beta.1 prior to 2026.2.14 contain a vulnerability in the sandbox browser bridge server in which it accepts requests without requiring gateway authentication, allowing local attackers to access browser control endpoints. A local attacker can enumerate tabs, retrieve WebSocket URLs, execute JavaScript, and exfiltrate cookies and session data from authenticated browser contexts.
OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.14 contain a webhook routing vulnerability in the Google Chat monitor component that allows cross-account policy context misrouting when multiple webhook targets share the same HTTP path. Attackers can exploit first-match request verification semantics to process inbound webhook events under incorrect account contexts, bypassing intended allowlists and session policies.
OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.2 contain an exec approvals (must be enabled) allowlist bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands by injecting command substitution syntax. Attackers can bypass the allowlist protection by embedding unescaped $() or backticks inside double-quoted strings to execute unauthorized commands.
OpenClaw version 2026.1.14-1 prior to 2026.2.2, with the Matrix plugin installed and enabled, contain a vulnerability in which DM allowlist matching could be bypassed by exact-matching against sender display names and localparts without homeserver validation. Remote Matrix users can impersonate allowed identities by using attacker-controlled display names or matching localparts from different homeservers to reach the routing and agent pipeline.
OpenClaw exec-approvals allowlist validation checks pre-expansion argv tokens but execution uses real shell expansion, allowing safe bins like head, tail, or grep to read arbitrary local files via glob patterns or environment variables. Authorized callers or prompt-injection attacks can exploit this to disclose files readable by the gateway or node process when host execution is enabled in allowlist mode.
OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.12 use non-constant-time string comparison for hook token validation, allowing attackers to infer tokens through timing measurements. Remote attackers with network access to the hooks endpoint can exploit timing side-channels across multiple requests to gradually determine the authentication token.