In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: check dot and dotdot of dx_root before making dir indexed
Syzbot reports a issue as follows:
============================================
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed11022e24fe
PGD 23ffee067 P4D 23ffee067 PUD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 5079 Comm: syz-executor306 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5-g55027e689933 #0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
make_indexed_dir+0xdaf/0x13c0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2341
ext4_add_entry+0x222a/0x25d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2451
ext4_rename fs/ext4/namei.c:3936 [inline]
ext4_rename2+0x26e5/0x4370 fs/ext4/namei.c:4214
[...]
============================================
The immediate cause of this problem is that there is only one valid dentry
for the block to be split during do_split, so split==0 results in out of
bounds accesses to the map triggering the issue.
do_split
unsigned split
dx_make_map
count = 1
split = count/2 = 0;
continued = hash2 == map[split - 1].hash;
---> map[4294967295]
The maximum length of a filename is 255 and the minimum block size is 1024,
so it is always guaranteed that the number of entries is greater than or
equal to 2 when do_split() is called.
But syzbot's crafted image has no dot and dotdot in dir, and the dentry
distribution in dirblock is as follows:
bus dentry1 hole dentry2 free
|xx--|xx-------------|...............|xx-------------|...............|
0 12 (8+248)=256 268 256 524 (8+256)=264 788 236 1024
So when renaming dentry1 increases its name_len length by 1, neither hole
nor free is sufficient to hold the new dentry, and make_indexed_dir() is
called.
In make_indexed_dir() it is assumed that the first two entries of the
dirblock must be dot and dotdot, so bus and dentry1 are left in dx_root
because they are treated as dot and dotdot, and only dentry2 is moved
to the new leaf block. That's why count is equal to 1.
Therefore add the ext4_check_dx_root() helper function to add more sanity
checks to dot and dotdot before starting the conversion to avoid the above
issue.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix for possible memory corruption
Init Control Block is dereferenced incorrectly. Correctly dereference ICB
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: During vport delete send async logout explicitly
During vport delete, it is observed that during unload we hit a crash
because of stale entries in outstanding command array. For all these stale
I/O entries, eh_abort was issued and aborted (fast_fail_io = 2009h) but
I/Os could not complete while vport delete is in process of deleting.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001c
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
Workqueue: qla2xxx_wq qla_do_work [qla2xxx]
RIP: 0010:dma_direct_unmap_sg+0x51/0x1e0
RSP: 0018:ffffa1e1e150fc68 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000021 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000021 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce208a7a0d0
RBP: ffff8ce208a7a0d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8ce378aac9c8
R10: ffff8ce378aac8a0 R11: ffffa1e1e150f9d8 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ce378aac9c8 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d217f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000001c CR3: 0000002089acc000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
qla2xxx_qpair_sp_free_dma+0x417/0x4e0
? qla2xxx_qpair_sp_compl+0x10d/0x1a0
? qla2x00_status_entry+0x768/0x2830
? newidle_balance+0x2f0/0x430
? dequeue_entity+0x100/0x3c0
? qla24xx_process_response_queue+0x6a1/0x19e0
? __schedule+0x2d5/0x1140
? qla_do_work+0x47/0x60
? process_one_work+0x267/0x440
? process_one_work+0x440/0x440
? worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0
? process_one_work+0x440/0x440
? kthread+0x156/0x180
? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
Send out async logout explicitly for all the ports during vport delete.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mISDN: Fix a use after free in hfcmulti_tx()
Don't dereference *sp after calling dev_kfree_skb(*sp).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
protect the fetch of ->fd[fd] in do_dup2() from mispredictions
both callers have verified that fd is not greater than ->max_fds;
however, misprediction might end up with
tofree = fdt->fd[fd];
being speculatively executed. That's wrong for the same reasons
why it's wrong in close_fd()/file_close_fd_locked(); the same
solution applies - array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds) could differ
from fd only in case of speculative execution on mispredicted path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: pca953x: fix pca953x_irq_bus_sync_unlock race
Ensure that `i2c_lock' is held when setting interrupt latch and mask in
pca953x_irq_bus_sync_unlock() in order to avoid races.
The other (non-probe) call site pca953x_gpio_set_multiple() ensures the
lock is held before calling pca953x_write_regs().
The problem occurred when a request raced against irq_bus_sync_unlock()
approximately once per thousand reboots on an i.MX8MP based system.
* Normal case
0-0022: write register AI|3a {03,02,00,00,01} Input latch P0
0-0022: write register AI|49 {fc,fd,ff,ff,fe} Interrupt mask P0
0-0022: write register AI|08 {ff,00,00,00,00} Output P3
0-0022: write register AI|12 {fc,00,00,00,00} Config P3
* Race case
0-0022: write register AI|08 {ff,00,00,00,00} Output P3
0-0022: write register AI|08 {03,02,00,00,01} *** Wrong register ***
0-0022: write register AI|12 {fc,00,00,00,00} Config P3
0-0022: write register AI|49 {fc,fd,ff,ff,fe} Interrupt mask P0
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix race between delayed_work() and ceph_monc_stop()
The way the delayed work is handled in ceph_monc_stop() is prone to
races with mon_fault() and possibly also finish_hunting(). Both of
these can requeue the delayed work which wouldn't be canceled by any of
the following code in case that happens after cancel_delayed_work_sync()
runs -- __close_session() doesn't mess with the delayed work in order
to avoid interfering with the hunting interval logic. This part was
missed in commit b5d91704f53e ("libceph: behave in mon_fault() if
cur_mon < 0") and use-after-free can still ensue on monc and objects
that hang off of it, with monc->auth and monc->monmap being
particularly susceptible to quickly being reused.
To fix this:
- clear monc->cur_mon and monc->hunting as part of closing the session
in ceph_monc_stop()
- bail from delayed_work() if monc->cur_mon is cleared, similar to how
it's done in mon_fault() and finish_hunting() (based on monc->hunting)
- call cancel_delayed_work_sync() after the session is closed
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: configfs: Prevent OOB read/write in usb_string_copy()
Userspace provided string 's' could trivially have the length zero. Left
unchecked this will firstly result in an OOB read in the form
`if (str[0 - 1] == '\n') followed closely by an OOB write in the form
`str[0 - 1] = '\0'`.
There is already a validating check to catch strings that are too long.
Let's supply an additional check for invalid strings that are too short.