Vulnerabilities
Vulnerable Software
Security Vulnerabilities
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/v3d: Fix vaddr leak when indirect CSD has zeroed workgroups v3d_rewrite_csd_job_wg_counts_from_indirect() maps both the indirect buffer and the workgroup buffer and is expected to release them before returning. When any of the workgroup counts read from the buffer is zero, the function bailed out early and skipped the cleanup, leaking the vaddr mappings of both BOs. Jump to the cleanup path instead of returning directly, so the mappings are always dropped.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.002
Published
2026-06-25
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Limit XDomain response copy to actual frame size tb_xdomain_copy() copies req->response_size bytes from the received packet buffer regardless of the actual frame size. When a short response arrives, this reads past the valid frame data in the DMA pool buffer into stale contents from previous transactions. Use the minimum of frame size and expected response size for the copy length.
CVSS Score
7.1
EPSS Score
0.002
Published
2026-06-25
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size [Why & How] During HDCP 2.x repeater authentication over HDMI, the driver reads the sink's RxStatus register and extracts a 10-bit message size field (max value 1023). This value is used as the read length for the ReceiverID list without being clamped to the size of the destination buffer rx_id_list[177]. A malicious HDMI repeater could advertise a message size larger than the buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write during the I2C read. Clamp the read length in mod_hdcp_read_rx_id_list() to the size of the rx_id_list buffer, matching the approach already used in the DP branch. (cherry picked from commit 229212219e4247d9486f8ba41ef087358490be09)
CVSS Score
7.8
EPSS Score
0.002
Published
2026-06-25
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Bound VBIOS record-chain walk loops [Why & How] All record-chain walk loops in bios_parser.c and bios_parser2.c use for(;;) and only terminate on a 0xFF record_type sentinel or zero record_size. A malformed VBIOS image missing the terminator record causes unbounded iteration at probe time, potentially hundreds of thousands of iterations with record_size=1. In the final iterations near the BIOS image boundary, struct casts beyond the 2-byte header validated by GET_IMAGE can also read out of bounds. Cap all 14 record-chain walk loops to BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD (256) iterations. The atombios.h defines up to 22 distinct record types and atomfirmware.h has 13. Assuming an average of less than 10 records per type (which is reasonable since most are connector- based) 256 is a generous upper bound. (cherry picked from commit 95700a3d660287ed657d6892f7be9ffc0e294a93)
CVSS Score
7.1
EPSS Score
0.002
Published
2026-06-25
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/v3d: Fix global performance monitor reference counting In the SET_GLOBAL ioctl, v3d_perfmon_find() bumps the reference count on the perfmon it returns, but v3d_perfmon_set_global_ioctl() and v3d_perfmon_delete() fail to release that reference on several paths: 1. v3d_perfmon_set_global_ioctl() leaks the reference on its error paths. 2. CLEAR_GLOBAL leaks both the find reference and the reference previously stashed in v3d->global_perfmon by the SET_GLOBAL ioctl that configured it. 3. Destroying a perfmon that is the current global perfmon leaks the reference stashed by the SET_GLOBAL ioctl. Release each of these references explicitly.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.002
Published
2026-06-25
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/display: fix oops in suspend/shutdown without display The xe driver keeps track of whether to probe display, and whether display hardware is there, using xe->info.probe_display. It gets set to false if there's no display after intel_display_device_probe(). However, the display may also be disabled via fuses, detected at a later time in intel_display_device_info_runtime_init(). In this case, the xe driver does for_each_intel_crtc() on uninitialized mode config in xe_display_flush_cleanup_work(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference, and generally calls display code with display info cleared. Check for intel_display_device_present() after intel_display_device_info_runtime_init(), and reset xe->info.probe_display as necessary. Also do unset_display_features() for completeness, although display runtime init has already done that. This will need to be unified across all cases later. Move intel_display_device_info_runtime_init() call slightly earlier, similar to i915, to avoid a bunch of unnecessary setup for no display cases. Note #1: The xe driver has no business doing low level display plumbing like for_each_intel_crtc() to begin with. It all needs to happen in display code. Note #2: The actual bug is present already in commit 44e694958b95 ("drm/xe/display: Implement display support"), but the oops was likely introduced later at commit ddf6492e0e50 ("drm/xe/display: Make display suspend/resume work on discrete"). (cherry picked from commit 7c3eb9f47533220888a67266448185fd0775d4da)
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.002
Published
2026-06-25
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: fix NULL dereference in get_queue_ids() When usr_queue_id_array is NULL and num_queues is non-zero, get_queue_ids() returns NULL. The callers check only IS_ERR() on the return value; since IS_ERR(NULL) == false the check passes, and suspend_queues() calls q_array_invalidate() which immediately dereferences NULL while iterating num_queues times. Userspace can trigger this via kfd_ioctl_set_debug_trap() by supplying num_queues > 0 with a zero queue_array_ptr, causing a kernel panic. A NULL usr_queue_id_array with num_queues == 0 is a legitimate no-op (q_array_invalidate never executes, and resume_queues already guards all queue_ids dereferences behind a NULL check). Return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL) only when num_queues is non-zero and the pointer is absent; both callers already propagate IS_ERR() returns correctly to userspace. (cherry picked from commit f165a82cdf503884bb1797771c61b2fcc72113d4)
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.002
Published
2026-06-25
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: require Ethernet MAC header before using eth_hdr() `ip6t_eui64`, `xt_mac`, the `bitmap:ip,mac`, `hash:ip,mac`, and `hash:mac` ipset types, and `nf_log_syslog` access `eth_hdr(skb)` after either assuming that the skb is associated with an Ethernet device or checking only that the `ETH_HLEN` bytes at `skb_mac_header(skb)` lie between `skb->head` and `skb->data`. Make these paths first verify that the skb is associated with an Ethernet device, that the MAC header was set, and that it spans at least a full Ethernet header before accessing `eth_hdr(skb)`.
CVSS Score
9.4
EPSS Score
0.004
Published
2026-06-25
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() checks vvs->rx_bytes + len > vvs->buf_alloc. virtio_transport_recv_enqueue() skips coalescing for packets with VIRTIO_VSOCK_SEQ_EOM. If fed with packets with len == 0 and VIRTIO_VSOCK_SEQ_EOM, a very large number of packets can be queued because vvs->rx_bytes stays at 0. Fix this by estimating the skb metadata size: (Number of skbs in the queue) * SKB_TRUESIZE(0)
CVSS Score
7.1
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-06-25
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/umem: Fix truncation for block sizes >= 4G When the iommu is used the linearization of the mapping can give a single block that is very large split across multiple SG entries. When __rdma_block_iter_next() reassembles the split SG entries it is overflowing the 32 bit stack values and computed the wrong DMA addresses for blocks after the truncation. Use the right types to hold DMA addresses.
CVSS Score
7.8
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-06-25


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