Using string formatting and exception handling, an attacker may bypass n8n's python-task-executor sandbox restrictions and run arbitrary unrestricted Python code in the underlying operating system.
The vulnerability can be exploited via the Code block by an authenticated user with basic permissions and can lead to a full n8n instance takeover on instances operating under "Internal" execution mode.
If the instance is operating under the "External" execution mode (ex. n8n's official Docker image) - arbitrary code execution occurs inside a Sidecar container and not the main node, which significantly reduces the vulnerability impact.
n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. In versions from 0.150.0 to before 2.2.2, an authentication bypass vulnerability in the Stripe Trigger node allows unauthenticated parties to trigger workflows by sending forged Stripe webhook events. The Stripe Trigger creates and stores a Stripe webhook signing secret when registering the webhook endpoint, but incoming webhook requests were not verified against this secret. As a result, any HTTP client that knows the webhook URL could send a POST request containing a matching event type, causing the workflow to execute as if a legitimate Stripe event had been received. This issue affects n8n users who have active workflows using the Stripe Trigger node. An attacker could potentially fake payment or subscription events and influence downstream workflow behavior. The practical risk is reduced by the fact that the webhook URL contains a high-entropy UUID; however, authenticated n8n users with access to the workflow can view this webhook ID. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.2. A temporary workaround for this issue involves users deactivating affected workflows or restricting access to workflows containing Stripe Trigger nodes to trusted users only.