SQLBot is an intelligent data query system based on a large language model and RAG. Versions 1.5.0 and below contain a Stored Prompt Injection vulnerability that chains three flaws: a missing permission check on the Excel upload API allowing any authenticated user to upload malicious terminology, unsanitized storage of terminology descriptions containing dangerous payloads, and a lack of semantic fencing when injecting terminology into the LLM's system prompt. Together, these flaws allow an attacker to hijack the LLM's reasoning to generate malicious PostgreSQL commands (e.g., COPY ... TO PROGRAM), ultimately achieving Remote Code Execution on the database or application server with postgres user privileges. The issue is fixed in v1.6.0.
SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the globalCopyFiles API eads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API. An admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.
SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, POST /api/import/importSY and POST /api/import/importZipMd write uploaded archives to a path derived from the multipart filename field without sanitization, allowing an admin to write files to arbitrary locations outside the temp directory - including system paths that enable RCE. This can lead to aata destruction by overwriting workspace or application files, and for Docker containers running as root (common default), this grants full container compromise. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.
Discourse is an open-source discussion platform. Prior to versions 2026.3.0-latest.1, 2026.2.1, and 2026.1.2, a type coercion issue in a post actions API endpoint allowed non-staff users to issue warnings to other users. Warnings are a staff-only moderation feature. The vulnerability required the attacker to be a logged-in user and to send a specifically crafted request. No data exposure or privilege escalation beyond the ability to create unauthorized user warnings was possible. Versions 2026.3.0-latest.1, 2026.2.1, and 2026.1.2 contain a patch. No known workarounds are available.
Discourse is an open-source discussion platform. Prior to versions 2026.3.0-latest.1, 2026.2.1, and 2026.1.2, the onebox method in the SharedAiConversation model renders the conversation title directly into HTML without proper sanitization. Versions 2026.3.0-latest.1, 2026.2.1, and 2026.1.2 contain a patch. As a workaround, tighten access by changing the `ai_bot_public_sharing_allowed_groups` site setting.
Discourse is an open-source discussion platform. Versions prior to 2026.3.0-latest.1, 2026.2.1, and 2026.1.2 have a cross-site scripting vulnerability that arises because the system trusts the raw output from an AI Large Language Model (LLM) and renders it using htmlSafe in the Review Queue interface without adequate sanitization. A malicious attacker can use valid Prompt Injection techniques to force the AI to return a malicious payload (e.g., tags). When a Staff member (Admin/Moderator) views the flagged post in the Review Queue, the payload executes. Versions 2026.3.0-latest.1, 2026.2.1, and 2026.1.2 contain a patch. As a workaround, temporarily disable AI triage automation scripts.
ormar is a async mini ORM for Python. Versions 0.23.0 and below are vulnerable to Pydantic validation bypass through the model constructor, allowing any unauthenticated user to skip all field validation by injecting "__pk_only__": true into a JSON request body. By injecting "__pk_only__": true into a JSON request body, an unauthenticated attacker can skip all field validation and persist unvalidated data directly to the database. A secondary __excluded__ parameter injection uses the same pattern to selectively nullify arbitrary model fields (e.g., email or role) during construction. This affects ormar's canonical FastAPI integration pattern recommended in its official documentation, enabling privilege escalation, data integrity violations, and business logic bypass in any application using ormar.Model directly as a request body parameter. This issue has been fixed in version 0.23.1.