Jupyter Enterprise Gateway launches remote Jupyter Notebook kernels across distributed clusters like Apache Spark, Kubernetes, and Docker Swarm. In versions 2.0.0rc2 and above, prior to 3.3.0, the environment variables (KERNEL_XXX) used during the rendering of the Kubernetes manifest are vulnerable to Server Side Template Injection (SSTI). By including Jinja2 template expressions it is possible to execution Python code and OS Commands in the Enterprise Gateway service. The code can use or steal the Kubernetes service account token, which can steal Kubernetes secrets and be used to fully compromise the Kubernetes cluster by scheduling a privileged pod or a pod with a hostPath volume mount. This issue has been fixed in version 3.3.0.
Jupyter Enterprise Gateway launches remote Jupyter Notebook kernels across distributed clusters like Apache Spark, Kubernetes, and Docker Swarm. In versions prior to 3.3.0, the server interpolates untrusted environment variables (e.g., KERNEL_XXX) into Kubernetes manifests without YAML-aware escaping, enabling YAML injection attacks. Attackers can inject new fields, overwrite critical fields (e.g., duplicate securityContext keys, where the last one prevails), and inject document boundaries (--- for new documents, ... for end-of-document) to generate multiple resources, potentially creating arbitrary types, such as privileged pods. The Jinja2 template for the Kubernetes manifest contains several kernel_xxx variables, such as kernel_working_dir that are used when rendering the manifest and are all vectors for YAML injection. This issue has been fixed in version 3.3.0.
Jupyter Enterprise Gateway launches remote Jupyter Notebook kernels across distributed clusters like Apache Spark, Kubernetes, and Docker Swarm. Versions 2.0.0rc1 and above prior to 3.3.0 have a prohibited UID and GID feature that by default prevents launching kernels with UID or GID 0 (root), and this restriction can be bypassed using a specially crafted KERNEL_UID or KERNEL_GID value. This input validation vulnerability allows running Jupyter kernels as root, which can be dangerous as it allows more attack surface, and may lead to container escapes, compromising the worker node and all workloads running on it. Repeated exploitation can compromise all worker nodes, and thus the entire Kubernetes cluster. It is possible to specify volume mounts, so one vector for a container escape is to use a hostPath R/W volume mount, use this UID/GID bypass to run as root, and then gain code execution in the underlying worker node by creating a crontab entry in the mounted host file system. This issue has been fixed in version 3.0.0.
JupyterLab Git is a Git extension for JupyterLab. From 0.30.0b3 before 0.54.0, the PlainTextDiff.ts createHeader() method passes Git filenames directly to innerHTML when rendering renamed files in commit history, allowing a crafted filename to execute JavaScript when a victim views the rename diff in the Git History tab. This issue is fixed in version 0.54.0.
JupyterLab Git is a Git extension for JupyterLab. Prior to 0.54.0, jupyterlab-git uses fnmatch.fnmatchcase() in GitHandler.prepare() in jupyterlab_git/handlers.py to enforce excluded_paths, allowing an authenticated user on a case-insensitive filesystem to vary URL path casing and read excluded directories. This issue is fixed in version 0.54.0.
Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. Prior to 2.20, the nbconvert HTTP handlers in jupyter_server render user-authored notebook HTML under the Jupyter origin without a sandbox directive in their Content-Security-Policy. Combined with nbconvert.HTMLExporter's default non-sanitizing behavior, a notebook carrying an HTML payload in a display_data output triggers stored XSS with cookie access, full /api/* authority, and kernel RCE. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.20.
A vulnerability in jupyter-server versions 1.12.0 through 2.17.0 allows an attacker to bypass CORS origin validation when the `allow_origin_pat` configuration is used. The issue arises from the use of `re.match()` for validating the `Origin` header, which only anchors at the start of the string. This allows attacker-controlled domains such as `trusted.example.com.evil.com` to pass validation against patterns intended to match `trusted.example.com`. The vulnerability affects multiple locations in the codebase, including CORS headers, WebSocket connections, referer validation, and login redirects, potentially enabling phishing attacks, arbitrary code execution, and unauthorized access to sensitive API responses.
A path traversal vulnerability exists in jupyter-server version 2.17.0 due to an incorrect root directory boundary check in the _get_os_path() function within jupyter_server/services/contents/fileio.py. The check uses startswith(root) without appending a trailing path separator, allowing sibling directories with names starting with the same prefix as root_dir to bypass the check. Additionally, the to_os_path() function in utils.py does not strip ".." from path parts, enabling traversal sequences to bypass the vulnerable check. This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized read/write access to files in sibling directories, potentially exposing sensitive data in shared hosting environments.
JupyterHub is software that allows users to create a multi-user server for Jupyter notebooks. In versions 4.1.0 through 5.4.4, XSRF protection (updated in 4.1.0) inappropriately treated requests with Sec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors as same-origin requests, bypassing XSRF checks. The JSON API is not affected, only HTTP form endpoints, such as /hub/spawn and /hub/accept-share, meaning attackers could trigger server spawn (but not access the server) and if the attacker is a JupyterHub user permitted to share access to their server, cause a user to accept a share and have access to the attacker's server. This issue has been fixed in version 5.4.5. If developers are unable to immediately upgrade, they can temporarily mitigate this issue by dropping requests to JupyterHub with Sec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors if they are using a reverse proxy.
jupyterlab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. Prior to 4.5.7, JupyterLab's HTML sanitizer allowlists data-commandlinker-command and data-commandlinker-args on button elements, while CommandLinker listens for all click events on document.body and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.7.