Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In December 2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix usage slab after free
[ +0.000021] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000027] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881b8605f88 by task amd_pci_unplug/2147
[ +0.000023] CPU: 6 PID: 2147 Comm: amd_pci_unplug Not tainted 6.10.0+ #1
[ +0.000016] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/ROG STRIX B550-F GAMING (WI-FI), BIOS 1401 12/03/2020
[ +0.000016] Call Trace:
[ +0.000008] <TASK>
[ +0.000009] dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0
[ +0.000017] print_report+0xce/0x5f0
[ +0.000017] ? drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000019] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000015] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x72/0x200
[ +0.000016] ? drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000019] kasan_report+0xbe/0x110
[ +0.000015] ? drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000023] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x30
[ +0.000014] drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000020] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[ +0.000016] ? __pfx_drm_sched_entity_flush+0x10/0x10 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000020] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[ +0.000013] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? enable_work+0x124/0x220
[ +0.000015] ? __pfx_enable_work+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000013] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000014] ? free_large_kmalloc+0x85/0xf0
[ +0.000016] drm_sched_entity_destroy+0x18/0x30 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000020] amdgpu_vce_sw_fini+0x55/0x170 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000735] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ +0.000016] vce_v4_0_sw_fini+0x80/0x110 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000726] amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0x331/0xfc0 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000679] ? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xe0
[ +0.000017] ? __pfx_amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000662] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000014] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[ +0.000013] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xe0
[ +0.000016] amdgpu_driver_release_kms+0x16/0x80 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000663] drm_minor_release+0xc9/0x140 [drm]
[ +0.000081] drm_release+0x1fd/0x390 [drm]
[ +0.000082] __fput+0x36c/0xad0
[ +0.000018] __fput_sync+0x3c/0x50
[ +0.000014] __x64_sys_close+0x7d/0xe0
[ +0.000014] x64_sys_call+0x1bc6/0x2680
[ +0.000014] do_syscall_64+0x70/0x130
[ +0.000014] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000014] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x60/0x190
[ +0.000015] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000014] ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50
[ +0.000012] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x110
[ +0.000015] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ +0.000014] RIP: 0033:0x7ffff7b14f67
[ +0.000013] Code: ff e8 0d 16 02 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 73 ba f7 ff
[ +0.000026] RSP: 002b:00007fffffffe378 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
[ +0.000019] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ffff7b14f67
[ +0.000014] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffff7f6f47a RDI: 0000000000000003
[ +0.000014] RBP: 00007fffffffe3a0 R08: 0000555555569890 R09: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000014] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fffffffe5c8
[ +0.000013] R13: 00005555555552a9 R14: 0000555555557d48 R15: 00007ffff7ffd040
[ +0.000020] </TASK>
[ +0.000016] Allocated by task 383 on cpu 7 at 26.880319s:
[ +0.000014] kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x60
[ +0.000008] kasan_save_track+0x18/0x70
[ +0.000007] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x38/0x60
[ +0.000007] __kasan_kmalloc+0xc1/0xd0
[ +0.000007] kmalloc_trace_noprof+0x180/0x380
[ +0.000007] drm_sched_init+0x411/0xec0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000012] amdgpu_device_init+0x695f/0xa610 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000658] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x1a/0x120 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000662] amdgpu_pci_p
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udmabuf: change folios array from kmalloc to kvmalloc
When PAGE_SIZE 4096, MAX_PAGE_ORDER 10, 64bit machine,
page_alloc only support 4MB.
If above this, trigger this warn and return NULL.
udmabuf can change size limit, if change it to 3072(3GB), and then alloc
3GB udmabuf, will fail create.
[ 4080.876581] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 4080.876843] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2015 at mm/page_alloc.c:4556 __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350
[ 4080.878839] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350
[ 4080.879470] Call Trace:
[ 4080.879473] <TASK>
[ 4080.879473] ? __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350
[ 4080.879475] ? __warn.cold+0x8e/0xe8
[ 4080.880647] ? __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350
[ 4080.880909] ? report_bug+0xff/0x140
[ 4080.881175] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80
[ 4080.881556] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[ 4080.881559] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 4080.882077] ? udmabuf_create+0x131/0x400
Because MAX_PAGE_ORDER, kmalloc can max alloc 4096 * (1 << 10), 4MB
memory, each array entry is pointer(8byte), so can save 524288 pages(2GB).
Further more, costly order(order 3) may not be guaranteed that it can be
applied for, due to fragmentation.
This patch change udmabuf array use kvmalloc_array, this can fallback
alloc into vmalloc, which can guarantee allocation for any size and does
not affect the performance of kmalloc allocations.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfsplus: don't query the device logical block size multiple times
Devices block sizes may change. One of these cases is a loop device by
using ioctl LOOP_SET_BLOCK_SIZE.
While this may cause other issues like IO being rejected, in the case of
hfsplus, it will allocate a block by using that size and potentially write
out-of-bounds when hfsplus_read_wrapper calls hfsplus_submit_bio and the
latter function reads a different io_size.
Using a new min_io_size initally set to sb_min_blocksize works for the
purposes of the original fix, since it will be set to the max between
HFSPLUS_SECTOR_SIZE and the first seen logical block size. We still use the
max between HFSPLUS_SECTOR_SIZE and min_io_size in case the latter is not
initialized.
Tested by mounting an hfsplus filesystem with loop block sizes 512, 1024
and 4096.
The produced KASAN report before the fix looks like this:
[ 419.944641] ==================================================================
[ 419.945655] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a
[ 419.946703] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88800721fc00 by task repro/10678
[ 419.947612]
[ 419.947846] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 10678 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-00008-gdf56e0f2f3ca #84
[ 419.949007] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 419.950035] Call Trace:
[ 419.950384] <TASK>
[ 419.950676] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x78
[ 419.951212] ? hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a
[ 419.951830] print_report+0x14c/0x49e
[ 419.952361] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x267/0x278
[ 419.952979] ? kmem_cache_debug_flags+0xc/0x1d
[ 419.953561] ? hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a
[ 419.954231] kasan_report+0x89/0xb0
[ 419.954748] ? hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a
[ 419.955367] hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a
[ 419.955948] ? __pfx_hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x10/0x10
[ 419.956618] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x59/0x1a9
[ 419.957214] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1a/0x2e
[ 419.957772] hfsplus_fill_super+0x348/0x1590
[ 419.958355] ? hlock_class+0x4c/0x109
[ 419.958867] ? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10
[ 419.959499] ? __pfx_string+0x10/0x10
[ 419.960006] ? lock_acquire+0x3e2/0x454
[ 419.960532] ? bdev_name.constprop.0+0xce/0x243
[ 419.961129] ? __pfx_bdev_name.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
[ 419.961799] ? pointer+0x3f0/0x62f
[ 419.962277] ? __pfx_pointer+0x10/0x10
[ 419.962761] ? vsnprintf+0x6c4/0xfba
[ 419.963178] ? __pfx_vsnprintf+0x10/0x10
[ 419.963621] ? setup_bdev_super+0x376/0x3b3
[ 419.964029] ? snprintf+0x9d/0xd2
[ 419.964344] ? __pfx_snprintf+0x10/0x10
[ 419.964675] ? lock_acquired+0x45c/0x5e9
[ 419.965016] ? set_blocksize+0x139/0x1c1
[ 419.965381] ? sb_set_blocksize+0x6d/0xae
[ 419.965742] ? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10
[ 419.966179] mount_bdev+0x12f/0x1bf
[ 419.966512] ? __pfx_mount_bdev+0x10/0x10
[ 419.966886] ? vfs_parse_fs_string+0xce/0x111
[ 419.967293] ? __pfx_vfs_parse_fs_string+0x10/0x10
[ 419.967702] ? __pfx_hfsplus_mount+0x10/0x10
[ 419.968073] legacy_get_tree+0x104/0x178
[ 419.968414] vfs_get_tree+0x86/0x296
[ 419.968751] path_mount+0xba3/0xd0b
[ 419.969157] ? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10
[ 419.969594] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1e2/0x260
[ 419.970311] do_mount+0x99/0xe0
[ 419.970630] ? __pfx_do_mount+0x10/0x10
[ 419.971008] __do_sys_mount+0x199/0x1c9
[ 419.971397] do_syscall_64+0xd0/0x135
[ 419.971761] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 419.972233] RIP: 0033:0x7c3cb812972e
[ 419.972564] Code: 48 8b 0d f5 46 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d c2 46 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 419.974371] RSP: 002b:00007ffe30632548 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 419.975048] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe306328d8 RCX: 00007c3cb812972e
[ 419.975701] RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000c80 RDI:
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cachefiles: Fix NULL pointer dereference in object->file
At present, the object->file has the NULL pointer dereference problem in
ondemand-mode. The root cause is that the allocated fd and object->file
lifetime are inconsistent, and the user-space invocation to anon_fd uses
object->file. Following is the process that triggers the issue:
[write fd] [umount]
cachefiles_ondemand_fd_write_iter
fscache_cookie_state_machine
cachefiles_withdraw_cookie
if (!file) return -ENOBUFS
cachefiles_clean_up_object
cachefiles_unmark_inode_in_use
fput(object->file)
object->file = NULL
// file NULL pointer dereference!
__cachefiles_write(..., file, ...)
Fix this issue by add an additional reference count to the object->file
before write/llseek, and decrement after it finished.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: coex: check NULL return of kmalloc in btc_fw_set_monreg()
kmalloc may fail, return value might be NULL and will cause
NULL pointer dereference. Add check NULL return of kmalloc in
btc_fw_set_monreg().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cw1200: Fix potential NULL dereference
A recent refactoring was identified by static analysis to
cause a potential NULL dereference, fix this!
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: xlnx: zynqmp_disp: layer may be null while releasing
layer->info can be null if we have an error on the first layer in
zynqmp_disp_create_layers
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: zynqmp_kms: Unplug DRM device before removal
Prevent userspace accesses to the DRM device from causing
use-after-frees by unplugging the device before we remove it. This
causes any further userspace accesses to result in an error without
further calls into this driver's internals.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ivpu: Prevent recovery invocation during probe and resume
Refactor IPC send and receive functions to allow correct
handling of operations that should not trigger a recovery process.
Expose ivpu_send_receive_internal(), which is now utilized by the D0i3
entry, DCT initialization, and HWS initialization functions.
These functions have been modified to return error codes gracefully,
rather than initiating recovery.
The updated functions are invoked within ivpu_probe() and ivpu_resume(),
ensuring that any errors encountered during these stages result in a proper
teardown or shutdown sequence. The previous approach of triggering recovery
within these functions could lead to a race condition, potentially causing
undefined behavior and kernel crashes due to null pointer dereferences.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix use-after-free in ath12k_dp_cc_cleanup()
During ath12k module removal, in ath12k_core_deinit(),
ath12k_mac_destroy() un-registers ah->hw from mac80211 and frees
the ah->hw as well as all the ar's in it. After this
ath12k_core_soc_destroy()-> ath12k_dp_free()-> ath12k_dp_cc_cleanup()
tries to access one of the freed ar's from pending skb.
This is because during mac destroy, driver failed to flush few
data packets, which were accessed later in ath12k_dp_cc_cleanup()
and freed, but using ar from the packet led to this use-after-free.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ath12k_dp_cc_cleanup.part.0+0x5e2/0xd40 [ath12k]
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888150bd3514 by task modprobe/8926
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 8926 Comm: modprobe Not tainted
6.11.0-rc2-wt-ath+ #1746
Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7HVK/NUC8i7HVB, BIOS
HNKBLi70.86A.0067.2021.0528.1339 05/28/2021
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xe0
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x33/0x3a0
print_report+0xb5/0x260
? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x24/0x80
kasan_report+0xd8/0x110
? ath12k_dp_cc_cleanup.part.0+0x5e2/0xd40 [ath12k]
? ath12k_dp_cc_cleanup.part.0+0x5e2/0xd40 [ath12k]
kasan_check_range+0xf3/0x1a0
__kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
ath12k_dp_cc_cleanup.part.0+0x5e2/0xd40 [ath12k]
ath12k_dp_free+0x178/0x420 [ath12k]
ath12k_core_stop+0x176/0x200 [ath12k]
ath12k_core_deinit+0x13f/0x210 [ath12k]
ath12k_pci_remove+0xad/0x1c0 [ath12k]
pci_device_remove+0x9b/0x1b0
device_remove+0xbf/0x150
device_release_driver_internal+0x3c3/0x580
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
driver_detach+0xc4/0x190
bus_remove_driver+0x130/0x2a0
driver_unregister+0x68/0x90
pci_unregister_driver+0x24/0x240
? find_module_all+0x13e/0x1e0
ath12k_pci_exit+0x10/0x20 [ath12k]
__do_sys_delete_module+0x32c/0x580
? module_flags+0x2f0/0x2f0
? kmem_cache_free+0xf0/0x410
? __fput+0x56f/0xab0
? __fput+0x56f/0xab0
? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x4f/0x70
x64_sys_call+0x522/0x9f0
do_syscall_64+0x64/0x130
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f8182c6ac8b
Commit 24de1b7b231c ("wifi: ath12k: fix flush failure in recovery
scenarios") added the change to decrement the pending packets count
in case of recovery which make sense as ah->hw as well all
ar's in it are intact during recovery, but during core deinit there
is no use in decrementing packets count or waking up the empty waitq
as the module is going to be removed also ar's from pending skb's
can't be used and the packets should just be released back.
To fix this, avoid accessing ar from skb->cb when driver is being
unregistered.
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.1.1-00214-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1
Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.0.c5-00481-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-3