Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In December 2024
In mtk_p2p_wext_set_key of drivers/misc/mediatek/connectivity/wlan/gen2/os/linux/gl_p2p.c, there is a possible OOB write due to improper input validation. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
In mtk_cfg80211_vendor_packet_keep_alive_start and mtk_cfg80211_vendor_set_config of drivers/misc/mediatek/connectivity/wlan/gen2/os/linux/gl_vendor.c, there is a possible OOB write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
In procfile_write of drivers/misc/mediatek/connectivity/wlan/gen2/os/linux/gl_proc.c, there is a possible OOB write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
In get_binary of vendor/mediatek/proprietary/hardware/connectivity/gps/gps_hal/src/data_coder.c, there is a possible out of bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
Itsourcecode Online Discussion Forum Project v.1.0.0 is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS) via /bcc_forum/members/home.php.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlink: terminate outstanding dump on socket close
Netlink supports iterative dumping of data. It provides the families
the following ops:
- start - (optional) kicks off the dumping process
- dump - actual dump helper, keeps getting called until it returns 0
- done - (optional) pairs with .start, can be used for cleanup
The whole process is asynchronous and the repeated calls to .dump
don't actually happen in a tight loop, but rather are triggered
in response to recvmsg() on the socket.
This gives the user full control over the dump, but also means that
the user can close the socket without getting to the end of the dump.
To make sure .start is always paired with .done we check if there
is an ongoing dump before freeing the socket, and if so call .done.
The complication is that sockets can get freed from BH and .done
is allowed to sleep. So we use a workqueue to defer the call, when
needed.
Unfortunately this does not work correctly. What we defer is not
the cleanup but rather releasing a reference on the socket.
We have no guarantee that we own the last reference, if someone
else holds the socket they may release it in BH and we're back
to square one.
The whole dance, however, appears to be unnecessary. Only the user
can interact with dumps, so we can clean up when socket is closed.
And close always happens in process context. Some async code may
still access the socket after close, queue notification skbs to it etc.
but no dumps can start, end or otherwise make progress.
Delete the workqueue and flush the dump state directly from the release
handler. Note that further cleanup is possible in -next, for instance
we now always call .done before releasing the main module reference,
so dump doesn't have to take a reference of its own.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix possible UAF in sctp_v6_available()
A lockdep report [1] with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y hints
that sctp_v6_available() is calling dev_get_by_index_rcu()
and ipv6_chk_addr() without holding rcu.
[1]
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.12.0-rc5-virtme #1216 Tainted: G W
-----------------------------
net/core/dev.c:876 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by sctp_hello/31495:
#0: ffff9f1ebbdb7418 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sctp_bind (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 net/sctp/socket.c:315) sctp
stack backtrace:
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 31495 Comm: sctp_hello Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc5-virtme #1216
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822)
dev_get_by_index_rcu (net/core/dev.c:876 (discriminator 7))
sctp_v6_available (net/sctp/ipv6.c:701) sctp
sctp_do_bind (net/sctp/socket.c:400 (discriminator 1)) sctp
sctp_bind (net/sctp/socket.c:320) sctp
inet6_bind_sk (net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:465)
? security_socket_bind (security/security.c:4581 (discriminator 1))
__sys_bind (net/socket.c:1848 net/socket.c:1869)
? do_user_addr_fault (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:347 ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:880 ./include/linux/mm.h:729 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1340)
? do_user_addr_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:84 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:98 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:882 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/mm.h:729 (discriminator 13) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1340 (discriminator 13))
__x64_sys_bind (net/socket.c:1877 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1875 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1875 (discriminator 1))
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1))
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
RIP: 0033:0x7f59b934a1e7
Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 15 39 8c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 b8 31 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
All code
========
0: 44 00 00 add %r8b,(%rax)
3: 48 8b 15 39 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c39(%rip),%rdx # 0xc8c43
a: f7 d8 neg %eax
c: 64 89 02 mov %eax,%fs:(%rdx)
f: b8 ff ff ff ff mov $0xffffffff,%eax
14: eb bd jmp 0xffffffffffffffd3
16: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 cs nopw 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
1d: 00 00 00
20: 0f 1f 00 nopl (%rax)
23: b8 31 00 00 00 mov $0x31,%eax
28: 0f 05 syscall
2a:* 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff cmp $0xfffffffffffff001,%rax <-- trapping instruction
30: 73 01 jae 0x33
32: c3 ret
33: 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c09(%rip),%rcx # 0xc8c43
3a: f7 d8 neg %eax
3c: 64 89 01 mov %eax,%fs:(%rcx)
3f: 48 rex.W
Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
0: 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff cmp $0xfffffffffffff001,%rax
6: 73 01 jae 0x9
8: c3 ret
9: 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c09(%rip),%rcx # 0xc8c19
10: f7 d8 neg %eax
12: 64 89 01 mov %eax,%fs:(%rcx)
15: 48 rex.W
RSP: 002b:00007ffe2d0ad398 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe2d0ad3d0 RCX: 00007f59b934a1e7
RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 00007ffe2d0ad3d0 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007f59b9253298 R11: 000000000000
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix null-ptr-deref in block_touch_buffer tracepoint
Patch series "nilfs2: fix null-ptr-deref bugs on block tracepoints".
This series fixes null pointer dereference bugs that occur when using
nilfs2 and two block-related tracepoints.
This patch (of 2):
It has been reported that when using "block:block_touch_buffer"
tracepoint, touch_buffer() called from __nilfs_get_folio_block() causes a
NULL pointer dereference, or a general protection fault when KASAN is
enabled.
This happens because since the tracepoint was added in touch_buffer(), it
references the dev_t member bh->b_bdev->bd_dev regardless of whether the
buffer head has a pointer to a block_device structure. In the current
implementation, the block_device structure is set after the function
returns to the caller.
Here, touch_buffer() is used to mark the folio/page that owns the buffer
head as accessed, but the common search helper for folio/page used by the
caller function was optimized to mark the folio/page as accessed when it
was reimplemented a long time ago, eliminating the need to call
touch_buffer() here in the first place.
So this solves the issue by eliminating the touch_buffer() call itself.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/oa: Fix "Missing outer runtime PM protection" warning
Fix the following drm_WARN:
[953.586396] xe 0000:00:02.0: [drm] Missing outer runtime PM protection
...
<4> [953.587090] ? xe_pm_runtime_get_noresume+0x8d/0xa0 [xe]
<4> [953.587208] guc_exec_queue_add_msg+0x28/0x130 [xe]
<4> [953.587319] guc_exec_queue_fini+0x3a/0x40 [xe]
<4> [953.587425] xe_exec_queue_destroy+0xb3/0xf0 [xe]
<4> [953.587515] xe_oa_release+0x9c/0xc0 [xe]
(cherry picked from commit b107c63d2953907908fd0cafb0e543b3c3167b75)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Handle dml allocation failure to avoid crash
[Why]
In the case where a dml allocation fails for any reason, the
current state's dml contexts would no longer be valid. Then
subsequent calls dc_state_copy_internal would shallow copy
invalid memory and if the new state was released, a double
free would occur.
[How]
Reset dml pointers in new_state to NULL and avoid invalid
pointer
(cherry picked from commit bcafdc61529a48f6f06355d78eb41b3aeda5296c)