Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In October 2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: re-fetch skb cb after tipc_msg_validate
As the call trace shows, the original skb was freed in tipc_msg_validate(),
and dereferencing the old skb cb would cause an use-after-free crash.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tipc_crypto_rcv_complete+0x1835/0x2240 [tipc]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
tipc_crypto_rcv_complete+0x1835/0x2240 [tipc]
tipc_crypto_rcv+0xd32/0x1ec0 [tipc]
tipc_rcv+0x744/0x1150 [tipc]
...
Allocated by task 47078:
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x158/0x4d0
__alloc_skb+0x1c1/0x270
tipc_buf_acquire+0x1e/0xe0 [tipc]
tipc_msg_create+0x33/0x1c0 [tipc]
tipc_link_build_proto_msg+0x38a/0x2100 [tipc]
tipc_link_timeout+0x8b8/0xef0 [tipc]
tipc_node_timeout+0x2a1/0x960 [tipc]
call_timer_fn+0x2d/0x1c0
...
Freed by task 47078:
tipc_msg_validate+0x7b/0x440 [tipc]
tipc_crypto_rcv_complete+0x4b5/0x2240 [tipc]
tipc_crypto_rcv+0xd32/0x1ec0 [tipc]
tipc_rcv+0x744/0x1150 [tipc]
This patch fixes it by re-fetching the skb cb from the new allocated skb
after calling tipc_msg_validate().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix sleep in atomic at close time
Matt reported a splat at msk close time:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/mptcp/protocol.c:2877
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 155, name: packetdrill
preempt_count: 201, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
4 locks held by packetdrill/155:
#0: ffff888001536990 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#6){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __sock_release (net/socket.c:650)
#1: ffff88800b498130 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_close (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2973)
#2: ffff88800b49a130 (sk_lock-AF_INET/1){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __mptcp_close_ssk (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2363)
#3: ffff88800b49a0b0 (slock-AF_INET){+...}-{2:2}, at: __lock_sock_fast (include/net/sock.h:1820)
Preemption disabled at:
0x0
CPU: 1 PID: 155 Comm: packetdrill Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5 #365
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 4))
__might_resched.cold (kernel/sched/core.c:9891)
__mptcp_destroy_sock (include/linux/kernel.h:110)
__mptcp_close (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2959)
mptcp_subflow_queue_clean (include/net/sock.h:1777)
__mptcp_close_ssk (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2363)
mptcp_destroy_common (net/mptcp/protocol.c:3170)
mptcp_destroy (include/net/sock.h:1495)
__mptcp_destroy_sock (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2886)
__mptcp_close (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2959)
mptcp_close (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2974)
inet_release (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:432)
__sock_release (net/socket.c:651)
sock_close (net/socket.c:1367)
__fput (fs/file_table.c:320)
task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:181 (discriminator 1))
exit_to_user_mode_prepare (include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49)
syscall_exit_to_user_mode (kernel/entry/common.c:130)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
We can't call mptcp_close under the 'fast' socket lock variant, replace
it with a sock_lock_nested() as the relevant code is already under the
listening msk socket lock protection.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/khugepaged: invoke MMU notifiers in shmem/file collapse paths
Any codepath that zaps page table entries must invoke MMU notifiers to
ensure that secondary MMUs (like KVM) don't keep accessing pages which
aren't mapped anymore. Secondary MMUs don't hold their own references to
pages that are mirrored over, so failing to notify them can lead to page
use-after-free.
I'm marking this as addressing an issue introduced in commit f3f0e1d2150b
("khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages"), but most of
the security impact of this only came in commit 27e1f8273113 ("khugepaged:
enable collapse pmd for pte-mapped THP"), which actually omitted flushes
for the removal of present PTEs, not just for the removal of empty page
tables.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: soc-pcm: Add NULL check in BE reparenting
Add NULL check in dpcm_be_reparent API, to handle
kernel NULL pointer dereference error.
The issue occurred in fuzzing test.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: Fix function prototype mismatch in snd_seq_expand_var_event
With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG),
indirect call targets are validated against the expected function
pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate
ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time,
which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed.
seq_copy_in_user() and seq_copy_in_kernel() did not have prototypes
matching snd_seq_dump_func_t. Adjust this and remove the casts. There
are not resulting binary output differences.
This was found as a result of Clang's new -Wcast-function-type-strict
flag, which is more sensitive than the simpler -Wcast-function-type,
which only checks for type width mismatches.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: raydium_ts_i2c - fix memory leak in raydium_i2c_send()
There is a kmemleak when test the raydium_i2c_ts with bpf mock device:
unreferenced object 0xffff88812d3675a0 (size 8):
comm "python3", pid 349, jiffies 4294741067 (age 95.695s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
11 0e 10 c0 01 00 04 00 ........
backtrace:
[<0000000068427125>] __kmalloc+0x46/0x1b0
[<0000000090180f91>] raydium_i2c_send+0xd4/0x2bf [raydium_i2c_ts]
[<000000006e631aee>] raydium_i2c_initialize.cold+0xbc/0x3e4 [raydium_i2c_ts]
[<00000000dc6fcf38>] raydium_i2c_probe+0x3cd/0x6bc [raydium_i2c_ts]
[<00000000a310de16>] i2c_device_probe+0x651/0x680
[<00000000f5a96bf3>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0
[<00000000096ba499>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170
[<00000000c5acb4d9>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
[<00000000264fe082>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150
[<00000000f919423c>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180
[<00000000e067feca>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0
[<0000000054301fc2>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140
[<00000000aad93b22>] device_add+0x810/0x1130
[<00000000c086a53f>] i2c_new_client_device+0x352/0x4e0
[<000000003c2c248c>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110
[<00000000ffec4177>] of_i2c_notify+0x100/0x160
unreferenced object 0xffff88812d3675c8 (size 8):
comm "python3", pid 349, jiffies 4294741070 (age 95.692s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
22 00 36 2d 81 88 ff ff ".6-....
backtrace:
[<0000000068427125>] __kmalloc+0x46/0x1b0
[<0000000090180f91>] raydium_i2c_send+0xd4/0x2bf [raydium_i2c_ts]
[<000000001d5c9620>] raydium_i2c_initialize.cold+0x223/0x3e4 [raydium_i2c_ts]
[<00000000dc6fcf38>] raydium_i2c_probe+0x3cd/0x6bc [raydium_i2c_ts]
[<00000000a310de16>] i2c_device_probe+0x651/0x680
[<00000000f5a96bf3>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0
[<00000000096ba499>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170
[<00000000c5acb4d9>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
[<00000000264fe082>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150
[<00000000f919423c>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180
[<00000000e067feca>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0
[<0000000054301fc2>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140
[<00000000aad93b22>] device_add+0x810/0x1130
[<00000000c086a53f>] i2c_new_client_device+0x352/0x4e0
[<000000003c2c248c>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110
[<00000000ffec4177>] of_i2c_notify+0x100/0x160
After BANK_SWITCH command from i2c BUS, no matter success or error
happened, the tx_buf should be freed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/sysfs: fix wrong empty schemes assumption under online tuning in damon_sysfs_set_schemes()
Commit da87878010e5 ("mm/damon/sysfs: support online inputs update") made
'damon_sysfs_set_schemes()' to be called for running DAMON context, which
could have schemes. In the case, DAMON sysfs interface is supposed to
update, remove, or add schemes to reflect the sysfs files. However, the
code is assuming the DAMON context wouldn't have schemes at all, and
therefore creates and adds new schemes. As a result, the code doesn't
work as intended for online schemes tuning and could have more than
expected memory footprint. The schemes are all in the DAMON context, so
it doesn't leak the memory, though.
Remove the wrong asssumption (the DAMON context wouldn't have schemes) in
'damon_sysfs_set_schemes()' to fix the bug.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
char: tpm: Protect tpm_pm_suspend with locks
Currently tpm transactions are executed unconditionally in
tpm_pm_suspend() function, which may lead to races with other tpm
accessors in the system.
Specifically, the hw_random tpm driver makes use of tpm_get_random(),
and this function is called in a loop from a kthread, which means it's
not frozen alongside userspace, and so can race with the work done
during system suspend:
tpm tpm0: tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error -52
tpm tpm0: invalid TPM_STS.x 0xff, dumping stack for forensics
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5+ #135
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-20220807_005459-localhost 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
tpm_tis_status.cold+0x19/0x20
tpm_transmit+0x13b/0x390
tpm_transmit_cmd+0x20/0x80
tpm1_pm_suspend+0xa6/0x110
tpm_pm_suspend+0x53/0x80
__pnp_bus_suspend+0x35/0xe0
__device_suspend+0x10f/0x350
Fix this by calling tpm_try_get_ops(), which itself is a wrapper around
tpm_chip_start(), but takes the appropriate mutex.
[Jason: reworked commit message, added metadata]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/bpf/32: Fix Oops on tail call tests
test_bpf tail call tests end up as:
test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 85 PASS
test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 111 PASS
test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 145 PASS
test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 170 PASS
test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 190 PASS
test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1
BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xf1b4e000
Faulting instruction address: 0xbe86b710
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash PowerMac
Modules linked in: test_bpf(+)
CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ #195
Hardware name: PowerMac3,1 750CL 0x87210 PowerMac
NIP: be86b710 LR: be857e88 CTR: be86b704
REGS: f1b4df20 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.1.0-rc4+)
MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 28008242 XER: 00000000
DAR: f1b4e000 DSISR: 42000000
GPR00: 00000001 f1b4dfe0 c11d2280 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000002 00000000
GPR08: f1b4e000 be86b704 f1b4e000 00000000 00000000 100d816a f2440000 fe73baa8
GPR16: f2458000 00000000 c1941ae4 f1fe2248 00000045 c0de0000 f2458030 00000000
GPR24: 000003e8 0000000f f2458000 f1b4dc90 3e584b46 00000000 f24466a0 c1941a00
NIP [be86b710] 0xbe86b710
LR [be857e88] __run_one+0xec/0x264 [test_bpf]
Call Trace:
[f1b4dfe0] [00000002] 0x2 (unreliable)
Instruction dump:
XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
This is a tentative to write above the stack. The problem is encoutered
with tests added by commit 38608ee7b690 ("bpf, tests: Add load store
test case for tail call")
This happens because tail call is done to a BPF prog with a different
stack_depth. At the time being, the stack is kept as is when the caller
tail calls its callee. But at exit, the callee restores the stack based
on its own properties. Therefore here, at each run, r1 is erroneously
increased by 32 - 16 = 16 bytes.
This was done that way in order to pass the tail call count from caller
to callee through the stack. As powerpc32 doesn't have a red zone in
the stack, it was necessary the maintain the stack as is for the tail
call. But it was not anticipated that the BPF frame size could be
different.
Let's take a new approach. Use register r4 to carry the tail call count
during the tail call, and save it into the stack at function entry if
required. This means the input parameter must be in r3, which is more
correct as it is a 32 bits parameter, then tail call better match with
normal BPF function entry, the down side being that we move that input
parameter back and forth between r3 and r4. That can be optimised later.
Doing that also has the advantage of maximising the common parts between
tail calls and a normal function exit.
With the fix, tail call tests are now successfull:
test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 53 PASS
test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 115 PASS
test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 154 PASS
test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 165 PASS
test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 101 PASS
test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 141 PASS
test_bpf: #6 Tail call error path, max count reached jited:1 994 PASS
test_bpf: #7 Tail call count preserved across function calls jited:1 140975 PASS
test_bpf: #8 Tail call error path, NULL target jited:1 110 PASS
test_bpf: #9 Tail call error path, index out of range jited:1 69 PASS
test_bpf: test_tail_calls: Summary: 10 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [10/10 JIT'ed]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: Handle attempt to delete multipath route when fib_info contains an nh reference
Gwangun Jung reported a slab-out-of-bounds access in fib_nh_match:
fib_nh_match+0xf98/0x1130 linux-6.0-rc7/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:961
fib_table_delete+0x5f3/0xa40 linux-6.0-rc7/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1753
inet_rtm_delroute+0x2b3/0x380 linux-6.0-rc7/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:874
Separate nexthop objects are mutually exclusive with the legacy
multipath spec. Fix fib_nh_match to return if the config for the
to be deleted route contains a multipath spec while the fib_info
is using a nexthop object.