Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In October 2025
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: ymfpci: Fix BUG_ON in probe function
The snd_dma_buffer.bytes field now contains the aligned size, which this
snd_BUG_ON() did not account for, resulting in the following:
[ 9.625915] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 9.633440] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 126 at sound/pci/ymfpci/ymfpci_main.c:2168 snd_ymfpci_create+0x681/0x698 [snd_ymfpci]
[ 9.648926] Modules linked in: snd_ymfpci(+) snd_intel_dspcfg kvm(+) snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_ac97_codec snd_mpu401_uart snd_opl3_lib irqbypass snd_hda_codec gameport snd_rawmidi crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul cfg80211 snd_hda_core polyval_clmulni polyval_generic gf128mul snd_seq_device ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hwdep ac97_bus sha512_ssse3 rfkill snd_pcm aesni_intel tg3 snd_timer crypto_simd snd mxm_wmi libphy cryptd k10temp fam15h_power pcspkr soundcore sp5100_tco wmi acpi_cpufreq mac_hid dm_multipath sg loop fuse dm_mod bpf_preload ip_tables x_tables ext4 crc32c_generic crc16 mbcache jbd2 sr_mod cdrom ata_generic pata_acpi firewire_ohci crc32c_intel firewire_core xhci_pci crc_itu_t pata_via xhci_pci_renesas floppy
[ 9.711849] CPU: 0 PID: 126 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.1.21-1-lts #1 08d2e5ece03136efa7c6aeea9a9c40916b1bd8da
[ 9.722200] Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./990FX Extreme4, BIOS P2.70 06/05/2014
[ 9.732204] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
[ 9.736580] RIP: 0010:snd_ymfpci_create+0x681/0x698 [snd_ymfpci]
[ 9.742594] Code: 8c c0 4c 89 e2 48 89 df 48 c7 c6 92 c6 8c c0 e8 15 d0 e9 ff 48 83 c4 08 44 89 e8 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 d3 7a 33 e3 <0f> 0b e9 cb fd ff ff 41 bd fb ff ff ff eb db 41 bd f4 ff ff ff eb
[ 9.761358] RSP: 0018:ffffab64804e7da0 EFLAGS: 00010287
[ 9.766594] RAX: ffff8fa2df06c400 RBX: ffff8fa3073a8000 RCX: ffff8fa303fbc4a8
[ 9.773734] RDX: ffff8fa2df06d000 RSI: 0000000000000010 RDI: 0000000000000020
[ 9.780876] RBP: ffff8fa300b5d0d0 R08: ffff8fa3073a8e50 R09: 00000000df06bf00
[ 9.788018] R10: ffff8fa2df06bf00 R11: 00000000df068200 R12: ffff8fa3073a8918
[ 9.795159] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000080 R15: ffff8fa2df068200
[ 9.802317] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8fa9fec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 9.810414] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 9.816158] CR2: 000055febaf66500 CR3: 0000000101a2e000 CR4: 00000000000406f0
[ 9.823301] Call Trace:
[ 9.825747] <TASK>
[ 9.827889] snd_card_ymfpci_probe+0x194/0x950 [snd_ymfpci b78a5fe64b5663a6390a909c67808567e3e73615]
[ 9.837030] ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x90/0x2d0
[ 9.841918] local_pci_probe+0x45/0x80
[ 9.845680] work_for_cpu_fn+0x1a/0x30
[ 9.849431] process_one_work+0x1c7/0x380
[ 9.853464] worker_thread+0x1af/0x390
[ 9.857225] ? rescuer_thread+0x3b0/0x3b0
[ 9.861254] kthread+0xde/0x110
[ 9.864414] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 9.869210] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 9.872792] </TASK>
[ 9.874985] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix potential UAF of struct nilfs_sc_info in nilfs_segctor_thread()
The finalization of nilfs_segctor_thread() can race with
nilfs_segctor_kill_thread() which terminates that thread, potentially
causing a use-after-free BUG as KASAN detected.
At the end of nilfs_segctor_thread(), it assigns NULL to "sc_task" member
of "struct nilfs_sc_info" to indicate the thread has finished, and then
notifies nilfs_segctor_kill_thread() of this using waitqueue
"sc_wait_task" on the struct nilfs_sc_info.
However, here, immediately after the NULL assignment to "sc_task", it is
possible that nilfs_segctor_kill_thread() will detect it and return to
continue the deallocation, freeing the nilfs_sc_info structure before the
thread does the notification.
This fixes the issue by protecting the NULL assignment to "sc_task" and
its notification, with spinlock "sc_state_lock" of the struct
nilfs_sc_info. Since nilfs_segctor_kill_thread() does a final check to
see if "sc_task" is NULL with "sc_state_lock" locked, this can eliminate
the race.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: Revert "scsi: core: Do not increase scsi_device's iorequest_cnt if dispatch failed"
The "atomic_inc(&cmd->device->iorequest_cnt)" in scsi_queue_rq() would
cause kernel panic because cmd->device may be freed after returning from
scsi_dispatch_cmd().
This reverts commit cfee29ffb45b1c9798011b19d454637d1b0fe87d.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irqchip: Fix refcount leak in platform_irqchip_probe
of_irq_find_parent() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented,
We should use of_node_put() on it when not needed anymore.
Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmi_si: fix a memleak in try_smi_init()
Kmemleak reported the following leak info in try_smi_init():
unreferenced object 0xffff00018ecf9400 (size 1024):
comm "modprobe", pid 2707763, jiffies 4300851415 (age 773.308s)
backtrace:
[<000000004ca5b312>] __kmalloc+0x4b8/0x7b0
[<00000000953b1072>] try_smi_init+0x148/0x5dc [ipmi_si]
[<000000006460d325>] 0xffff800081b10148
[<0000000039206ea5>] do_one_initcall+0x64/0x2a4
[<00000000601399ce>] do_init_module+0x50/0x300
[<000000003c12ba3c>] load_module+0x7a8/0x9e0
[<00000000c246fffe>] __se_sys_init_module+0x104/0x180
[<00000000eea99093>] __arm64_sys_init_module+0x24/0x30
[<0000000021b1ef87>] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x94/0x250
[<0000000070f4f8b7>] do_el0_svc+0x48/0xe0
[<000000005a05337f>] el0_svc+0x24/0x3c
[<000000005eb248d6>] el0_sync_handler+0x160/0x164
[<0000000030a59039>] el0_sync+0x160/0x180
The problem was that when an error occurred before handlers registration
and after allocating `new_smi->si_sm`, the variable wouldn't be freed in
the error handling afterwards since `shutdown_smi()` hadn't been
registered yet. Fix it by adding a `kfree()` in the error handling path
in `try_smi_init()`.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (coretemp) Simplify platform device handling
Coretemp's platform driver is unconventional. All the real work is done
globally by the initcall and CPU hotplug notifiers, while the "driver"
effectively just wraps an allocation and the registration of the hwmon
interface in a long-winded round-trip through the driver core. The whole
logic of dynamically creating and destroying platform devices to bring
the interfaces up and down is error prone, since it assumes
platform_device_add() will synchronously bind the driver and set drvdata
before it returns, thus results in a NULL dereference if drivers_autoprobe
is turned off for the platform bus. Furthermore, the unusual approach of
doing that from within a CPU hotplug notifier, already commented in the
code that it deadlocks suspend, also causes lockdep issues for other
drivers or subsystems which may want to legitimately register a CPU
hotplug notifier from a platform bus notifier.
All of these issues can be solved by ripping this unusual behaviour out
completely, simply tying the platform devices to the lifetime of the
module itself, and directly managing the hwmon interfaces from the
hotplug notifiers. There is a slight user-visible change in that
/sys/bus/platform/drivers/coretemp will no longer appear, and
/sys/devices/platform/coretemp.n will remain present if package n is
hotplugged off, but hwmon users should really only be looking for the
presence of the hwmon interfaces, whose behaviour remains unchanged.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: mcs: Fix NULL pointer dereferences
When system is rebooted after creating macsec interface
below NULL pointer dereference crashes occurred. This
patch fixes those crashes by using correct order of teardown
[ 3324.406942] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[ 3324.415726] Mem abort info:
[ 3324.418510] ESR = 0x96000006
[ 3324.421557] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 3324.426865] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 3324.429913] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 3324.433047] Data abort info:
[ 3324.435921] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006
[ 3324.439748] CM = 0, WnR = 0
....
[ 3324.575915] Call trace:
[ 3324.578353] cn10k_mdo_del_secy+0x24/0x180
[ 3324.582440] macsec_common_dellink+0xec/0x120
[ 3324.586788] macsec_notify+0x17c/0x1c0
[ 3324.590529] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x70
[ 3324.594965] call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x34/0x7c
[ 3324.599921] rollback_registered_many+0x354/0x5bc
[ 3324.604616] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x88/0x10c
[ 3324.609399] unregister_netdev+0x20/0x30
[ 3324.613313] otx2_remove+0x8c/0x310
[ 3324.616794] pci_device_shutdown+0x30/0x70
[ 3324.620882] device_shutdown+0x11c/0x204
[ 966.664930] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[ 966.673712] Mem abort info:
[ 966.676497] ESR = 0x96000006
[ 966.679543] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 966.684848] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 966.687895] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 966.691028] Data abort info:
[ 966.693900] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006
[ 966.697729] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 966.833467] Call trace:
[ 966.835904] cn10k_mdo_stop+0x20/0xa0
[ 966.839557] macsec_dev_stop+0xe8/0x11c
[ 966.843384] __dev_close_many+0xbc/0x140
[ 966.847298] dev_close_many+0x84/0x120
[ 966.851039] rollback_registered_many+0x114/0x5bc
[ 966.855735] unregister_netdevice_many.part.0+0x14/0xa0
[ 966.860952] unregister_netdevice_many+0x18/0x24
[ 966.865560] macsec_notify+0x1ac/0x1c0
[ 966.869303] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x70
[ 966.873738] call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x34/0x7c
[ 966.878694] rollback_registered_many+0x354/0x5bc
[ 966.883390] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x88/0x10c
[ 966.888173] unregister_netdev+0x20/0x30
[ 966.892090] otx2_remove+0x8c/0x310
[ 966.895571] pci_device_shutdown+0x30/0x70
[ 966.899660] device_shutdown+0x11c/0x204
[ 966.903574] __do_sys_reboot+0x208/0x290
[ 966.907487] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x20/0x30
[ 966.911489] el0_svc_handler+0x80/0x1c0
[ 966.915316] el0_svc+0x8/0x180
[ 966.918362] Code: f9400000 f9400a64 91220014 f94b3403 (f9400060)
[ 966.924448] ---[ end trace 341778e799c3d8d7 ]---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drivers: base: Free devm resources when unregistering a device
In the current code, devres_release_all() only gets called if the device
has a bus and has been probed.
This leads to issues when using bus-less or driver-less devices where
the device might never get freed if a managed resource holds a reference
to the device. This is happening in the DRM framework for example.
We should thus call devres_release_all() in the device_del() function to
make sure that the device-managed actions are properly executed when the
device is unregistered, even if it has neither a bus nor a driver.
This is effectively the same change than commit 2f8d16a996da ("devres:
release resources on device_del()") that got reverted by commit
a525a3ddeaca ("driver core: free devres in device_release") over
memory leaks concerns.
This patch effectively combines the two commits mentioned above to
release the resources both on device_del() and device_release() and get
the best of both worlds.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: fix mid leak during reconnection after timeout threshold
When the number of responses with status of STATUS_IO_TIMEOUT
exceeds a specified threshold (NUM_STATUS_IO_TIMEOUT), we reconnect
the connection. But we do not return the mid, or the credits
returned for the mid, or reduce the number of in-flight requests.
This bug could result in the server->in_flight count to go bad,
and also cause a leak in the mids.
This change moves the check to a few lines below where the
response is decrypted, even of the response is read from the
transform header. This way, the code for returning the mids
can be reused.
Also, the cifs_reconnect was reconnecting just the transport
connection before. In case of multi-channel, this may not be
what we want to do after several timeouts. Changed that to
reconnect the session and the tree too.
Also renamed NUM_STATUS_IO_TIMEOUT to a more appropriate name
MAX_STATUS_IO_TIMEOUT.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bus: mhi: host: Range check CHDBOFF and ERDBOFF
If the value read from the CHDBOFF and ERDBOFF registers is outside the
range of the MHI register space then an invalid address might be computed
which later causes a kernel panic. Range check the read value to prevent
a crash due to bad data from the device.