Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In September 2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: misaligned: Restrict user access to kernel memory
raw_copy_{to,from}_user() do not call access_ok(), so this code allowed
userspace to access any virtual memory address.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: Boards: Fix NULL pointer deref in BYT/CHT boards harder
Since commit 13f58267cda3 ("ASoC: soc.h: don't create dummy Component
via COMP_DUMMY()") dummy codecs declared like this:
SND_SOC_DAILINK_DEF(dummy,
DAILINK_COMP_ARRAY(COMP_DUMMY()));
expand to:
static struct snd_soc_dai_link_component dummy[] = {
};
Which means that dummy is a zero sized array and thus dais[i].codecs should
not be dereferenced *at all* since it points to the address of the next
variable stored in the data section as the "dummy" variable has an address
but no size, so even dereferencing dais[0] is already an out of bounds
array reference.
Which means that the if (dais[i].codecs->name) check added in
commit 7d99a70b6595 ("ASoC: Intel: Boards: Fix NULL pointer deref
in BYT/CHT boards") relies on that the part of the next variable which
the name member maps to just happens to be NULL.
Which apparently so far it usually is, except when it isn't
and then it results in crashes like this one:
[ 28.795659] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000030011
...
[ 28.795780] Call Trace:
[ 28.795787] <TASK>
...
[ 28.795862] ? strcmp+0x18/0x40
[ 28.795872] 0xffffffffc150c605
[ 28.795887] platform_probe+0x40/0xa0
...
[ 28.795979] ? __pfx_init_module+0x10/0x10 [snd_soc_sst_bytcr_wm5102]
Really fix things this time around by checking dais.num_codecs != 0.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/tdx: Fix data leak in mmio_read()
The mmio_read() function makes a TDVMCALL to retrieve MMIO data for an
address from the VMM.
Sean noticed that mmio_read() unintentionally exposes the value of an
initialized variable (val) on the stack to the VMM.
This variable is only needed as an output value. It did not need to be
passed to the VMM in the first place.
Do not send the original value of *val to the VMM.
[ dhansen: clarify what 'val' is used for. ]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: unset the binding mark of a reused connection
Steve French reported null pointer dereference error from sha256 lib.
cifs.ko can send session setup requests on reused connection.
If reused connection is used for binding session, conn->binding can
still remain true and generate_preauth_hash() will not set
sess->Preauth_HashValue and it will be NULL.
It is used as a material to create an encryption key in
ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey. ->Preauth_HashValue cause null pointer
dereference error from crypto_shash_update().
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 8 PID: 429254 Comm: kworker/8:39
Hardware name: LENOVO 20MAS08500/20MAS08500, BIOS N2CET69W (1.52 )
Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ksmbd]
RIP: 0010:lib_sha256_base_do_update.isra.0+0x11e/0x1d0 [sha256_ssse3]
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x6d/0x80
? __die+0x24/0x80
? page_fault_oops+0x99/0x1b0
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2ee/0x6b0
? exc_page_fault+0x83/0x1b0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3]
? lib_sha256_base_do_update.isra.0+0x11e/0x1d0 [sha256_ssse3]
? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3]
? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3]
_sha256_update+0x77/0xa0 [sha256_ssse3]
sha256_avx2_update+0x15/0x30 [sha256_ssse3]
crypto_shash_update+0x1e/0x40
hmac_update+0x12/0x20
crypto_shash_update+0x1e/0x40
generate_key+0x234/0x380 [ksmbd]
generate_smb3encryptionkey+0x40/0x1c0 [ksmbd]
ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey+0x72/0xa0 [ksmbd]
ntlm_authenticate.isra.0+0x423/0x5d0 [ksmbd]
smb2_sess_setup+0x952/0xaa0 [ksmbd]
__process_request+0xa3/0x1d0 [ksmbd]
__handle_ksmbd_work+0x1c4/0x2f0 [ksmbd]
handle_ksmbd_work+0x2d/0xa0 [ksmbd]
process_one_work+0x16c/0x350
worker_thread+0x306/0x440
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xef/0x120
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix double put of @cfile in smb2_set_path_size()
If smb2_compound_op() is called with a valid @cfile and returned
-EINVAL, we need to call cifs_get_writable_path() before retrying it
as the reference of @cfile was already dropped by previous call.
This fixes the following KASAN splat when running fstests generic/013
against Windows Server 2022:
CIFS: Attempting to mount //w22-fs0/scratch
run fstests generic/013 at 2024-09-02 19:48:59
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88811f1a3730 by task kworker/3:2/176
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 176 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40
04/01/2014
Workqueue: cifsoplockd cifs_oplock_break [cifs]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
? detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200
print_report+0x156/0x4d9
? detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200
? __virt_addr_valid+0x145/0x300
? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90
? detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200
kasan_report+0xda/0x110
? detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200
detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200
timer_delete+0x96/0xe0
? __pfx_timer_delete+0x10/0x10
? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50
try_to_grab_pending+0x46/0x3b0
__cancel_work+0x89/0x1b0
? __pfx___cancel_work+0x10/0x10
? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
cifs_close_deferred_file+0x110/0x2c0 [cifs]
? __pfx_cifs_close_deferred_file+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10
cifs_oplock_break+0x4c1/0xa50 [cifs]
? __pfx_cifs_oplock_break+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? lock_is_held_type+0x85/0xf0
? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90
process_one_work+0x4c6/0x9f0
? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? lock_acquired+0x220/0x550
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x37/0x100
worker_thread+0x2e4/0x570
? __kthread_parkme+0xd1/0xf0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x17f/0x1c0
? kthread+0xda/0x1c0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x60
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1118:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
cifs_new_fileinfo+0xc8/0x9d0 [cifs]
cifs_atomic_open+0x467/0x770 [cifs]
lookup_open.isra.0+0x665/0x8b0
path_openat+0x4c3/0x1380
do_filp_open+0x167/0x270
do_sys_openat2+0x129/0x160
__x64_sys_creat+0xad/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 83:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70
poison_slab_object+0xe9/0x160
__kasan_slab_free+0x32/0x50
kfree+0xf2/0x300
process_one_work+0x4c6/0x9f0
worker_thread+0x2e4/0x570
kthread+0x17f/0x1c0
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x60
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xad/0xc0
insert_work+0x29/0xe0
__queue_work+0x5ea/0x760
queue_work_on+0x6d/0x90
_cifsFileInfo_put+0x3f6/0x770 [cifs]
smb2_compound_op+0x911/0x3940 [cifs]
smb2_set_path_size+0x228/0x270 [cifs]
cifs_set_file_size+0x197/0x460 [cifs]
cifs_setattr+0xd9c/0x14b0 [cifs]
notify_change+0x4e3/0x740
do_truncate+0xfa/0x180
vfs_truncate+0x195/0x200
__x64_sys_truncate+0x109/0x150
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/qspinlock: Fix deadlock in MCS queue
If an interrupt occurs in queued_spin_lock_slowpath() after we increment
qnodesp->count and before node->lock is initialized, another CPU might
see stale lock values in get_tail_qnode(). If the stale lock value happens
to match the lock on that CPU, then we write to the "next" pointer of
the wrong qnode. This causes a deadlock as the former CPU, once it becomes
the head of the MCS queue, will spin indefinitely until it's "next" pointer
is set by its successor in the queue.
Running stress-ng on a 16 core (16EC/16VP) shared LPAR, results in
occasional lockups similar to the following:
$ stress-ng --all 128 --vm-bytes 80% --aggressive \
--maximize --oomable --verify --syslog \
--metrics --times --timeout 5m
watchdog: CPU 15 Hard LOCKUP
......
NIP [c0000000000b78f4] queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x1184/0x1490
LR [c000000001037c5c] _raw_spin_lock+0x6c/0x90
Call Trace:
0xc000002cfffa3bf0 (unreliable)
_raw_spin_lock+0x6c/0x90
raw_spin_rq_lock_nested.part.135+0x4c/0xd0
sched_ttwu_pending+0x60/0x1f0
__flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x1dc/0x670
smp_ipi_demux_relaxed+0xa4/0x100
xive_muxed_ipi_action+0x20/0x40
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x80/0x240
handle_irq_event_percpu+0x2c/0x80
handle_percpu_irq+0x84/0xd0
generic_handle_irq+0x54/0x80
__do_irq+0xac/0x210
__do_IRQ+0x74/0xd0
0x0
do_IRQ+0x8c/0x170
hardware_interrupt_common_virt+0x29c/0x2a0
--- interrupt: 500 at queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x4b8/0x1490
......
NIP [c0000000000b6c28] queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x4b8/0x1490
LR [c000000001037c5c] _raw_spin_lock+0x6c/0x90
--- interrupt: 500
0xc0000029c1a41d00 (unreliable)
_raw_spin_lock+0x6c/0x90
futex_wake+0x100/0x260
do_futex+0x21c/0x2a0
sys_futex+0x98/0x270
system_call_exception+0x14c/0x2f0
system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
The following code flow illustrates how the deadlock occurs.
For the sake of brevity, assume that both locks (A and B) are
contended and we call the queued_spin_lock_slowpath() function.
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
spin_lock_irqsave(A) |
spin_unlock_irqrestore(A) |
spin_lock(B) |
| |
▼ |
id = qnodesp->count++; |
(Note that nodes[0].lock == A) |
| |
▼ |
Interrupt |
(happens before "nodes[0].lock = B") |
| |
▼ |
spin_lock_irqsave(A) |
| |
▼ |
id = qnodesp->count++ |
nodes[1].lock = A |
| |
▼ |
Tail of MCS queue |
| spin_lock_irqsave(A)
▼ |
Head of MCS queue ▼
| CPU0 is previous tail
▼ |
Spin indefinitely ▼
(until "nodes[1].next != NULL") prev = get_tail_qnode(A, CPU0)
|
▼
prev == &qnodes[CPU0].nodes[0]
(as qnodes
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: dapm: Fix UAF for snd_soc_pcm_runtime object
When using kernel with the following extra config,
- CONFIG_KASAN=y
- CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y
- CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE=y
- CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC=y
- CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=4096
kernel detects that snd_pcm_suspend_all() access a freed
'snd_soc_pcm_runtime' object when the system is suspended, which
leads to a use-after-free bug:
[ 52.047746] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_pcm_suspend_all+0x1a8/0x270
[ 52.047765] Read of size 1 at addr ffff0000b9434d50 by task systemd-sleep/2330
[ 52.047785] Call trace:
[ 52.047787] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3c0
[ 52.047794] show_stack+0x34/0x50
[ 52.047797] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x8c
[ 52.047802] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2c0
[ 52.047809] kasan_report+0x210/0x230
[ 52.047815] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x3c/0x50
[ 52.047820] snd_pcm_suspend_all+0x1a8/0x270
[ 52.047824] snd_soc_suspend+0x19c/0x4e0
The snd_pcm_sync_stop() has a NULL check on 'substream->runtime' before
making any access. So we need to always set 'substream->runtime' to NULL
everytime we kfree() it.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: ti: am65-cpsw: Fix NULL dereference on XDP_TX
If number of TX queues are set to 1 we get a NULL pointer
dereference during XDP_TX.
~# ethtool -L eth0 tx 1
~# ./xdp-trafficgen udp -A <ipv6-src> -a <ipv6-dst> eth0 -t 2
Transmitting on eth0 (ifindex 2)
[ 241.135257] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000030
Fix this by using actual TX queues instead of max TX queues
when picking the TX channel in am65_cpsw_ndo_xdp_xmit().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sch/netem: fix use after free in netem_dequeue
If netem_dequeue() enqueues packet to inner qdisc and that qdisc
returns __NET_XMIT_STOLEN. The packet is dropped but
qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() is not called to update the parent's
q.qlen, leading to the similar use-after-free as Commit
e04991a48dbaf382 ("netem: fix return value if duplicate enqueue
fails")
Commands to trigger KASAN UaF:
ip link add type dummy
ip link set lo up
ip link set dummy0 up
tc qdisc add dev lo parent root handle 1: drr
tc filter add dev lo parent 1: basic classid 1:1
tc class add dev lo classid 1:1 drr
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle 2: netem
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 2: handle 3: drr
tc filter add dev lo parent 3: basic classid 3:1 action mirred egress
redirect dev dummy0
tc class add dev lo classid 3:1 drr
ping -c1 -W0.01 localhost # Trigger bug
tc class del dev lo classid 1:1
tc class add dev lo classid 1:1 drr
ping -c1 -W0.01 localhost # UaF
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libfs: fix get_stashed_dentry()
get_stashed_dentry() tries to optimistically retrieve a stashed dentry
from a provided location. It needs to ensure to hold rcu lock before it
dereference the stashed location to prevent UAF issues. Use
rcu_dereference() instead of READ_ONCE() it's effectively equivalent
with some lockdep bells and whistles and it communicates clearly that
this expects rcu protection.