Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In September 2025
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix race on port output
assume the following setup on a single machine:
1. An openvswitch instance with one bridge and default flows
2. two network namespaces "server" and "client"
3. two ovs interfaces "server" and "client" on the bridge
4. for each ovs interface a veth pair with a matching name and 32 rx and
tx queues
5. move the ends of the veth pairs to the respective network namespaces
6. assign ip addresses to each of the veth ends in the namespaces (needs
to be the same subnet)
7. start some http server on the server network namespace
8. test if a client in the client namespace can reach the http server
when following the actions below the host has a chance of getting a cpu
stuck in a infinite loop:
1. send a large amount of parallel requests to the http server (around
3000 curls should work)
2. in parallel delete the network namespace (do not delete interfaces or
stop the server, just kill the namespace)
there is a low chance that this will cause the below kernel cpu stuck
message. If this does not happen just retry.
Below there is also the output of bpftrace for the functions mentioned
in the output.
The series of events happening here is:
1. the network namespace is deleted calling
`unregister_netdevice_many_notify` somewhere in the process
2. this sets first `NETREG_UNREGISTERING` on both ends of the veth and
then runs `synchronize_net`
3. it then calls `call_netdevice_notifiers` with `NETDEV_UNREGISTER`
4. this is then handled by `dp_device_event` which calls
`ovs_netdev_detach_dev` (if a vport is found, which is the case for
the veth interface attached to ovs)
5. this removes the rx_handlers of the device but does not prevent
packages to be sent to the device
6. `dp_device_event` then queues the vport deletion to work in
background as a ovs_lock is needed that we do not hold in the
unregistration path
7. `unregister_netdevice_many_notify` continues to call
`netdev_unregister_kobject` which sets `real_num_tx_queues` to 0
8. port deletion continues (but details are not relevant for this issue)
9. at some future point the background task deletes the vport
If after 7. but before 9. a packet is send to the ovs vport (which is
not deleted at this point in time) which forwards it to the
`dev_queue_xmit` flow even though the device is unregistering.
In `skb_tx_hash` (which is called in the `dev_queue_xmit`) path there is
a while loop (if the packet has a rx_queue recorded) that is infinite if
`dev->real_num_tx_queues` is zero.
To prevent this from happening we update `do_output` to handle devices
without carrier the same as if the device is not found (which would
be the code path after 9. is done).
Additionally we now produce a warning in `skb_tx_hash` if we will hit
the infinite loop.
bpftrace (first word is function name):
__dev_queue_xmit server: real_num_tx_queues: 1, cpu: 2, pid: 28024, tid: 28024, skb_addr: 0xffff9edb6f207000, reg_state: 1
netdev_core_pick_tx server: addr: 0xffff9f0a46d4a000 real_num_tx_queues: 1, cpu: 2, pid: 28024, tid: 28024, skb_addr: 0xffff9edb6f207000, reg_state: 1
dp_device_event server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, event 2, reg_state: 1
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
dp_device_event server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, event 6, reg_state: 2
ovs_netdev_detach_dev server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, reg_state: 2
netdev_rx_handler_unregister server: real_num_tx_queues: 1, cpu: 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, reg_state: 2
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
netdev_rx_handler_unregister ret server: real_num_tx_queues: 1, cpu: 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, reg_state: 2
dp_
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6/addrconf: fix a potential refcount underflow for idev
Now in addrconf_mod_rs_timer(), reference idev depends on whether
rs_timer is not pending. Then modify rs_timer timeout.
There is a time gap in [1], during which if the pending rs_timer
becomes not pending. It will miss to hold idev, but the rs_timer
is activated. Thus rs_timer callback function addrconf_rs_timer()
will be executed and put idev later without holding idev. A refcount
underflow issue for idev can be caused by this.
if (!timer_pending(&idev->rs_timer))
in6_dev_hold(idev);
<--------------[1]
mod_timer(&idev->rs_timer, jiffies + when);
To fix the issue, hold idev if mod_timer() return 0.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: Fix memory leaks in error path
The memory allocated by vxlan_vnigroup_init() is not freed in the error
path, leading to memory leaks [1]. Fix by calling
vxlan_vnigroup_uninit() in the error path.
The leaks can be reproduced by annotating gro_cells_init() with
ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION() and then running:
# echo "100" > /sys/kernel/debug/fail_function/probability
# echo "1" > /sys/kernel/debug/fail_function/times
# echo "gro_cells_init" > /sys/kernel/debug/fail_function/inject
# printf %#x -12 > /sys/kernel/debug/fail_function/gro_cells_init/retval
# ip link add name vxlan0 type vxlan dstport 4789 external vnifilter
RTNETLINK answers: Cannot allocate memory
[1]
unreferenced object 0xffff88810db84a00 (size 512):
comm "ip", pid 330, jiffies 4295010045 (age 66.016s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
f8 d5 76 0e 81 88 ff ff 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ..v.............
03 00 04 00 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 04 00 01 00 ....H...........
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81a3097a>] kmalloc_trace+0x2a/0x60
[<ffffffff82f049fc>] vxlan_vnigroup_init+0x4c/0x160
[<ffffffff82ecd69e>] vxlan_init+0x1ae/0x280
[<ffffffff836858ca>] register_netdevice+0x57a/0x16d0
[<ffffffff82ef67b7>] __vxlan_dev_create+0x7c7/0xa50
[<ffffffff82ef6ce6>] vxlan_newlink+0xd6/0x130
[<ffffffff836d02ab>] __rtnl_newlink+0x112b/0x18a0
[<ffffffff836d0a8c>] rtnl_newlink+0x6c/0xa0
[<ffffffff836c0ddf>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x43f/0xd40
[<ffffffff83908ce0>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440
[<ffffffff839066af>] netlink_unicast+0x53f/0x810
[<ffffffff839072d8>] netlink_sendmsg+0x958/0xe70
[<ffffffff835c319f>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x78f/0xa90
[<ffffffff835cd6da>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x13a/0x1e0
[<ffffffff835cd94c>] __sys_sendmsg+0x11c/0x1f0
[<ffffffff8424da78>] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x80
unreferenced object 0xffff88810e76d5f8 (size 192):
comm "ip", pid 330, jiffies 4295010045 (age 66.016s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 db e1 4f e7 00 00 00 00 ..........O.....
08 d6 76 0e 81 88 ff ff 08 d6 76 0e 81 88 ff ff ..v.......v.....
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81a3162e>] __kmalloc_node+0x4e/0x90
[<ffffffff81a0e166>] kvmalloc_node+0xa6/0x1f0
[<ffffffff8276e1a3>] bucket_table_alloc.isra.0+0x83/0x460
[<ffffffff8276f18b>] rhashtable_init+0x43b/0x7c0
[<ffffffff82f04a1c>] vxlan_vnigroup_init+0x6c/0x160
[<ffffffff82ecd69e>] vxlan_init+0x1ae/0x280
[<ffffffff836858ca>] register_netdevice+0x57a/0x16d0
[<ffffffff82ef67b7>] __vxlan_dev_create+0x7c7/0xa50
[<ffffffff82ef6ce6>] vxlan_newlink+0xd6/0x130
[<ffffffff836d02ab>] __rtnl_newlink+0x112b/0x18a0
[<ffffffff836d0a8c>] rtnl_newlink+0x6c/0xa0
[<ffffffff836c0ddf>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x43f/0xd40
[<ffffffff83908ce0>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440
[<ffffffff839066af>] netlink_unicast+0x53f/0x810
[<ffffffff839072d8>] netlink_sendmsg+0x958/0xe70
[<ffffffff835c319f>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x78f/0xa90
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irqchip/alpine-msi: Fix refcount leak in alpine_msix_init_domains
of_irq_find_parent() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented,
We should use of_node_put() on it when not needed anymore.
Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: Fix nexthop hash size
The nexthop code expects a 31 bit hash, such as what is returned by
fib_multipath_hash() and rt6_multipath_hash(). Passing the 32 bit hash
returned by skb_get_hash() can lead to problems related to the fact that
'int hash' is a negative number when the MSB is set.
In the case of hash threshold nexthop groups, nexthop_select_path_hthr()
will disproportionately select the first nexthop group entry. In the case
of resilient nexthop groups, nexthop_select_path_res() may do an out of
bounds access in nh_buckets[], for example:
hash = -912054133
num_nh_buckets = 2
bucket_index = 65535
which leads to the following panic:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc900025910c8
PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 10026b067 PMD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 4 PID: 856 Comm: kworker/4:3 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc2+ #34
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
RIP: 0010:nexthop_select_path+0x197/0xbf0
Code: c1 e4 05 be 08 00 00 00 4c 8b 35 a4 14 7e 01 4e 8d 6c 25 00 4a 8d 7c 25 08 48 01 dd e8 c2 25 15 ff 49 8d 7d 08 e8 39 13 15 ff <4d> 89 75 08 48 89 ef e8 7d 12 15 ff 48 8b 5d 00 e8 14 55 2f 00 85
RSP: 0018:ffff88810c36f260 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000002000c0 RCX: ffffffffaf02dd77
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffc900025910c8
RBP: ffffc900025910c0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520004b2219
R10: ffffc900025910cf R11: 31392d2068736168 R12: 00000000002000c0
R13: ffffc900025910c0 R14: 00000000fffef608 R15: ffff88811840e900
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffc900025910c8 CR3: 0000000129d00000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x23/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x1ee/0x5c0
? __pfx_is_prefetch.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_page_fault_oops+0x10/0x10
? search_bpf_extables+0xfe/0x1c0
? fixup_exception+0x3b/0x470
? exc_page_fault+0xf6/0x110
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? nexthop_select_path+0x197/0xbf0
? nexthop_select_path+0x197/0xbf0
? lock_is_held_type+0xe7/0x140
vxlan_xmit+0x5b2/0x2340
? __lock_acquire+0x92b/0x3370
? __pfx_vxlan_xmit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_register_lock_class+0x10/0x10
? skb_network_protocol+0xce/0x2d0
? dev_hard_start_xmit+0xca/0x350
? __pfx_vxlan_xmit+0x10/0x10
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xca/0x350
__dev_queue_xmit+0x513/0x1e20
? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0x44/0x90
? skb_push+0x4c/0x80
? eth_header+0x81/0xe0
? __pfx_eth_header+0x10/0x10
? neigh_resolve_output+0x215/0x310
? ip6_finish_output2+0x2ba/0xc90
ip6_finish_output2+0x2ba/0xc90
? lock_release+0x236/0x3e0
? ip6_mtu+0xbb/0x240
? __pfx_ip6_finish_output2+0x10/0x10
? find_held_lock+0x83/0xa0
? lock_is_held_type+0xe7/0x140
ip6_finish_output+0x1ee/0x780
ip6_output+0x138/0x460
? __pfx_ip6_output+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_ip6_finish_output+0x10/0x10
NF_HOOK.constprop.0+0xc0/0x420
? __pfx_NF_HOOK.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
? ndisc_send_skb+0x2c0/0x960
? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x93/0x110
? lock_is_held_type+0xe7/0x140
ndisc_send_skb+0x4be/0x960
? __pfx_ndisc_send_skb+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0x65/0x90
? find_held_lock+0x83/0xa0
ndisc_send_ns+0xb0/0x110
? __pfx_ndisc_send_ns+0x10/0x10
addrconf_dad_work+0x631/0x8e0
? lock_acquire+0x180/0x3f0
? __pfx_addrconf_dad_work+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90
process_one_work+0x582/0x9c0
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90
worker_thread+0x93/0x630
? __kthread_parkme+0xdc/0x100
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x1a5/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix amdgpu_irq_put call trace in gmc_v10_0_hw_fini
The gmc.ecc_irq is enabled by firmware per IFWI setting,
and the host driver is not privileged to enable/disable
the interrupt. So, it is meaningless to use the amdgpu_irq_put
function in gmc_v10_0_hw_fini, which also leads to the call
trace.
[ 82.340264] Call Trace:
[ 82.340265] <TASK>
[ 82.340269] gmc_v10_0_hw_fini+0x83/0xa0 [amdgpu]
[ 82.340447] gmc_v10_0_suspend+0xe/0x20 [amdgpu]
[ 82.340623] amdgpu_device_ip_suspend_phase2+0x127/0x1c0 [amdgpu]
[ 82.340789] amdgpu_device_ip_suspend+0x3d/0x80 [amdgpu]
[ 82.340955] amdgpu_device_pre_asic_reset+0xdd/0x2b0 [amdgpu]
[ 82.341122] amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0x4dd/0xbb2 [amdgpu]
[ 82.341359] amdgpu_debugfs_reset_work+0x4c/0x70 [amdgpu]
[ 82.341529] process_one_work+0x21d/0x3f0
[ 82.341535] worker_thread+0x1fa/0x3c0
[ 82.341538] ? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
[ 82.341540] kthread+0xff/0x130
[ 82.341544] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 82.341547] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Add length check in indx_get_root
This adds a length check to guarantee the retrieved index root is legit.
[ 162.459513] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 162.460176] Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880037bca99 by task mount/243
[ 162.460851]
[ 162.461252] CPU: 0 PID: 243 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7 #42
[ 162.461744] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 162.462609] Call Trace:
[ 162.462954] <TASK>
[ 162.463276] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
[ 162.463822] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689
[ 162.464608] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3a/0x60
[ 162.465766] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 162.466975] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130
[ 162.467506] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0xc0/0xf0
[ 162.467998] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 162.468536] __asan_load2+0x68/0x90
[ 162.468923] hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 162.469282] ? cmp_uints+0xe0/0xe0
[ 162.469557] ? cmp_sdh+0x90/0x90
[ 162.469864] ? ni_find_attr+0x214/0x300
[ 162.470217] ? ni_load_mi+0x80/0x80
[ 162.470479] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 162.470931] ? ntfs_bread_run+0x190/0x190
[ 162.471307] ? indx_get_root+0xe4/0x190
[ 162.471556] ? indx_get_root+0x140/0x190
[ 162.471833] ? indx_init+0x1e0/0x1e0
[ 162.472069] ? fnd_clear+0x115/0x140
[ 162.472363] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x100/0x100
[ 162.472731] indx_find+0x184/0x470
[ 162.473461] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0
[ 162.474429] ? indx_find_buffer+0x2d0/0x2d0
[ 162.474704] ? do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 162.474962] dir_search_u+0x196/0x2f0
[ 162.475381] ? ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x450/0x450
[ 162.475661] ? ntfs_security_init+0x3d6/0x440
[ 162.475906] ? is_sd_valid+0x180/0x180
[ 162.476191] ntfs_extend_init+0x13f/0x2c0
[ 162.476496] ? ntfs_fix_post_read+0x130/0x130
[ 162.476861] ? iput.part.0+0x286/0x320
[ 162.477325] ntfs_fill_super+0x11e0/0x1b50
[ 162.477709] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 162.477970] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20
[ 162.478258] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150
[ 162.478538] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370
[ 162.478789] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 162.479038] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20
[ 162.479374] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130
[ 162.479729] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0
[ 162.480124] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 162.480484] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 162.480894] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 162.481467] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440
[ 162.482280] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 162.482714] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0
[ 162.483264] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0
[ 162.484782] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 162.485593] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110
[ 162.486024] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 162.486543] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 162.487141] RIP: 0033:0x7f9d374e948a
[ 162.488324] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008
[ 162.489728] RSP: 002b:00007ffe30e73d18 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 162.490971] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000561cdb43a060 RCX: 00007f9d374e948a
[ 162.491669] RDX: 0000561cdb43a260 RSI: 0000561cdb43a2e0 RDI: 0000561cdb442af0
[ 162.492050] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000561cdb43a280 R09: 0000000000000020
[ 162.492459] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000561cdb442af0
[ 162.493183] R13: 0000561cdb43a260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
[ 162.493644] </TASK>
[ 162.493908]
[ 162.494214] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 162.494761] page:000000003e38a3d5 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x37bc
[ 162.496064] flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 162.497278] raw: 000fffffc0000000 ffffea00000df1c8 ffffea00000df008 0000000000000000
[ 162.498928] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000240000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 162.500542] page dumped becau
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mlxsw: minimal: fix potential memory leak in mlxsw_m_linecards_init
The line cards array is not freed in the error path of
mlxsw_m_linecards_init(), which can lead to a memory leak. Fix by
freeing the array in the error path, thereby making the error path
identical to mlxsw_m_linecards_fini().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: dwc3: qcom: Fix potential memory leak
Function dwc3_qcom_probe() allocates memory for resource structure
which is pointed by parent_res pointer. This memory is not
freed. This leads to memory leak. Use stack memory to prevent
memory leak.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: Avoid NULL pointer access during management transmit cleanup
Currently 'ar' reference is not added in skb_cb.
Though this is generally not used during transmit completion
callbacks, on interface removal the remaining idr cleanup callback
uses the ar pointer from skb_cb from management txmgmt_idr. Hence fill them
during transmit call for proper usage to avoid NULL pointer dereference.
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.0.1-00029-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1