Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In August 2024
Tenda AX1806 v1.0.0.1 contains a stack overflow via the iptv.stb.port parameter in the function setIptvInfo.
Tenda AX1806 v1.0.0.1 contains a stack overflow via the serverName parameter in the function form_fast_setting_internet_set.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: Fix shift-out-of-bounds in dbDiscardAG
When searching for the next smaller log2 block, BLKSTOL2() returned 0,
causing shift exponent -1 to be negative.
This patch fixes the issue by exiting the loop directly when negative
shift is found.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/pm: Fix the null pointer dereference in apply_state_adjust_rules
Check the pointer value to fix potential null pointer
dereference
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Fix the null pointer dereference to ras_manager
Check ras_manager before using it
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/pm: Fix the null pointer dereference for smu7
optimize the code to avoid pass a null pointer (hwmgr->backend)
to function smu7_update_edc_leakage_table.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: add missing check_func_arg_reg_off() to prevent out-of-bounds memory accesses
Currently, it's possible to pass in a modified CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR to
a global function as an argument. The adverse effects of this is that
BPF helpers can continue to make use of this modified
CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR from within the context of the global function,
which can unintentionally result in out-of-bounds memory accesses and
therefore compromise overall system stability i.e.
[ 244.157771] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.161345] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810914be68 by task test_progs/302
[ 244.167151] CPU: 0 PID: 302 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G O E 6.10.0-rc3-00131-g66b586715063 #533
[ 244.174318] Call Trace:
[ 244.175787] <TASK>
[ 244.177356] dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
[ 244.179531] print_report+0xce/0x670
[ 244.182314] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x200/0x3e0
[ 244.184908] kasan_report+0xd7/0x110
[ 244.187408] ? bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.189714] ? bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.192020] bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.194264] bpf_prog_b02a02fdd2bdc5fa_global_call_bpf_dynptr_data+0x22/0x26
[ 244.198044] bpf_prog_b0fe7b9d7dc3abde_callback_adjust_bpf_dynptr_reg_off+0x1f/0x23
[ 244.202136] bpf_user_ringbuf_drain+0x2c7/0x570
[ 244.204744] ? 0xffffffffc0009e58
[ 244.206593] ? __pfx_bpf_user_ringbuf_drain+0x10/0x10
[ 244.209795] bpf_prog_33ab33f6a804ba2d_user_ringbuf_callback_const_ptr_to_dynptr_reg_off+0x47/0x4b
[ 244.215922] bpf_trampoline_6442502480+0x43/0xe3
[ 244.218691] __x64_sys_prlimit64+0x9/0xf0
[ 244.220912] do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0
[ 244.223043] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 244.226458] RIP: 0033:0x7ffa3eb8f059
[ 244.228582] Code: 08 89 e8 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8f 1d 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 244.241307] RSP: 002b:00007ffa3e9c6eb8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012e
[ 244.246474] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffa3e9c7cdc RCX: 00007ffa3eb8f059
[ 244.250478] RDX: 00007ffa3eb162b4 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007ffa3e9c7fb0
[ 244.255396] RBP: 00007ffa3e9c6ed0 R08: 00007ffa3e9c76c0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 244.260195] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: ffffffffffffff80
[ 244.264201] R13: 000000000000001c R14: 00007ffc5d6b4260 R15: 00007ffa3e1c7000
[ 244.268303] </TASK>
Add a check_func_arg_reg_off() to the path in which the BPF verifier
verifies the arguments of global function arguments, specifically
those which take an argument of type ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR |
MEM_RDONLY. Also, process_dynptr_func() doesn't appear to perform any
explicit and strict type matching on the supplied register type, so
let's also enforce that a register either type PTR_TO_STACK or
CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR is by the caller.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix NULL dereference at band check in starting tx ba session
In MLD connection, link_data/link_conf are dynamically allocated. They
don't point to vif->bss_conf. So, there will be no chanreq assigned to
vif->bss_conf and then the chan will be NULL. Tweak the code to check
ht_supported/vht_supported/has_he/has_eht on sta deflink.
Crash log (with rtw89 version under MLO development):
[ 9890.526087] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ 9890.526102] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 9890.526105] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 9890.526109] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 9890.526114] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 9890.526119] CPU: 2 PID: 6367 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.9.0 #1
[ 9890.526123] Hardware name: LENOVO 2356AD1/2356AD1, BIOS G7ETB3WW (2.73 ) 11/28/2018
[ 9890.526126] Workqueue: phy2 rtw89_core_ba_work [rtw89_core]
[ 9890.526203] RIP: 0010:ieee80211_start_tx_ba_session (net/mac80211/agg-tx.c:618 (discriminator 1)) mac80211
[ 9890.526279] Code: f7 e8 d5 93 3e ea 48 83 c4 28 89 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 49 8b 84 24 e0 f1 ff ff 48 8b 80 90 1b 00 00 <83> 38 03 0f 84 37 fe ff ff bb ea ff ff ff eb cc 49 8b 84 24 10 f3
All code
========
0: f7 e8 imul %eax
2: d5 (bad)
3: 93 xchg %eax,%ebx
4: 3e ea ds (bad)
6: 48 83 c4 28 add $0x28,%rsp
a: 89 d8 mov %ebx,%eax
c: 5b pop %rbx
d: 41 5c pop %r12
f: 41 5d pop %r13
11: 41 5e pop %r14
13: 41 5f pop %r15
15: 5d pop %rbp
16: c3 retq
17: cc int3
18: cc int3
19: cc int3
1a: cc int3
1b: 49 8b 84 24 e0 f1 ff mov -0xe20(%r12),%rax
22: ff
23: 48 8b 80 90 1b 00 00 mov 0x1b90(%rax),%rax
2a:* 83 38 03 cmpl $0x3,(%rax) <-- trapping instruction
2d: 0f 84 37 fe ff ff je 0xfffffffffffffe6a
33: bb ea ff ff ff mov $0xffffffea,%ebx
38: eb cc jmp 0x6
3a: 49 rex.WB
3b: 8b .byte 0x8b
3c: 84 24 10 test %ah,(%rax,%rdx,1)
3f: f3 repz
Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
0: 83 38 03 cmpl $0x3,(%rax)
3: 0f 84 37 fe ff ff je 0xfffffffffffffe40
9: bb ea ff ff ff mov $0xffffffea,%ebx
e: eb cc jmp 0xffffffffffffffdc
10: 49 rex.WB
11: 8b .byte 0x8b
12: 84 24 10 test %ah,(%rax,%rdx,1)
15: f3 repz
[ 9890.526285] RSP: 0018:ffffb8db09013d68 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 9890.526291] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9308e0d656c8
[ 9890.526295] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffab99460b RDI: ffffffffab9a7685
[ 9890.526300] RBP: ffffb8db09013db8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000873
[ 9890.526304] R10: ffff9308e0d64800 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff9308e5ff6e70
[ 9890.526308] R13: ffff930952500e20 R14: ffff9309192a8c00 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 9890.526313] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff930b4e700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 9890.526316] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 9890.526318] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000391c58005 CR4: 00000000001706f0
[ 9890.526321] Call Trace:
[ 9890.526324] <TASK>
[ 9890.526327] ? show_regs (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:479)
[ 9890.526335] ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434)
[ 9890.526340] ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:713)
[ 9890.526347] ? search_module_extables (kernel/module/main.c:3256 (discriminator
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: nl80211: disallow setting special AP channel widths
Setting the AP channel width is meant for use with the normal
20/40/... MHz channel width progression, and switching around
in S1G or narrow channels isn't supported. Disallow that.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: apple: fix device reference counting
Drivers must call nvme_uninit_ctrl after a successful nvme_init_ctrl.
Split the allocation side out to make the error handling boundary easier
to navigate. The apple driver had been doing this wrong, leaking the
controller device memory on a tagset failure.