Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In August 2021
OpenOLAT is a web-based learning management system (LMS). A path traversal vulnerability exists in versions prior to 15.3.18, 15.5.3, and 16.0.0. Using a specially prepared ZIP file, it is possible to overwrite any file that is writable by the application server user (e.g. the tomcat user). Depending on the configuration this can be limited to files of the OpenOlat user data directory, however, if not properly set up, the attack could also be used to overwrite application server config files, java code or even operating system files. The attack could be used to corrupt or modify any OpenOlat file such as course structures, config files or temporary test data. Those attack would require in-depth knowledge of the installation and thus more theoretical. If the app server configuration allows the execution of jsp files and the path to the context is known, it is also possible to execute java code. If the app server runs with the same user that is used to deploy the OpenOlat code or has write permissions on the OpenOlat code files and the path to the context is know, code injection is possible. The attack requires an OpenOlat user account to upload a ZIP file and trigger the unzip method. It can not be exploited by unregistered users. The problem is fixed in versions 15.3.18, 15.5.3 and 16.0.0. There are no known workarounds aside from upgrading.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Neutron before 16.4.1, 17.x before 17.2.1, and 18.x before 18.1.1. Authenticated attackers can reconfigure dnsmasq via a crafted extra_dhcp_opts value.
HashiCorp Vault Enterprise 0.9.2 through 1.6.2 allowed the read of license metadata from DR secondaries without authentication. Fixed in 1.6.3.
Deserialization of untrusted data in multiple functions in MIK.starlight 7.9.5.24363 allows authenticated remote attackers to execute operating system commands by crafting serialized objects.
The npm package "tar" (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created. This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with names containing unicode values that normalized to the same value. Additionally, on Windows systems, long path portions would resolve to the same file system entities as their 8.3 "short path" counterparts. A specially crafted tar archive could thus include a directory with one form of the path, followed by a symbolic link with a different string that resolves to the same file system entity, followed by a file using the first form. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink that had a different apparent name that resolved to the same entry in the filesystem, it was thus possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-qq89-hq3f-393p.
The npm package "tar" (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part, accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that contain `..` path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory. This logic was insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contained a path that was not an absolute path, but specified a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as `C:some\path`. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example `D:\extraction\dir`, then the result of `path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath)` would resolve against the current working directory on the `C:` drive, rather than the extraction target directory. Additionally, a `..` portion of the path could occur immediately after the drive letter, such as `C:../foo`, and was not properly sanitized by the logic that checked for `..` within the normalized and split portions of the path. This only affects users of `node-tar` on Windows systems. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. There is no reasonable way to work around this issue without performing the same path normalization procedures that node-tar now does. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched versions of node-tar, rather than attempt to sanitize paths themselves.
`@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the `node_modules` folder hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is, in part, accomplished by resolving dependency specifiers defined in `package.json` manifests for dependencies with a specific name, and nesting folders to resolve conflicting dependencies. When multiple dependencies differ only in the case of their name, Arborist's internal data structure saw them as separate items that could coexist within the same level in the `node_modules` hierarchy. However, on case-insensitive file systems (such as macOS and Windows), this is not the case. Combined with a symlink dependency such as `file:/some/path`, this allowed an attacker to create a situation in which arbitrary contents could be written to any location on the filesystem. For example, a package `pwn-a` could define a dependency in their `package.json` file such as `"foo": "file:/some/path"`. Another package, `pwn-b` could define a dependency such as `FOO: "file:foo.tgz"`. On case-insensitive file systems, if `pwn-a` was installed, and then `pwn-b` was installed afterwards, the contents of `foo.tgz` would be written to `/some/path`, and any existing contents of `/some/path` would be removed. Anyone using npm v7.20.6 or earlier on a case-insensitive filesystem is potentially affected. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist 2.8.2 which is included in npm v7.20.7 and above.
`@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the node_modules folder hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is accomplished by extracting package contents into a project's `node_modules` folder. If the `node_modules` folder of the root project or any of its dependencies is somehow replaced with a symbolic link, it could allow Arborist to write package dependencies to any arbitrary location on the file system. Note that symbolic links contained within package artifact contents are filtered out, so another means of creating a `node_modules` symbolic link would have to be employed. 1. A `preinstall` script could replace `node_modules` with a symlink. (This is prevented by using `--ignore-scripts`.) 2. An attacker could supply the target with a git repository, instructing them to run `npm install --ignore-scripts` in the root. This may be successful, because `npm install --ignore-scripts` is typically not capable of making changes outside of the project directory, so it may be deemed safe. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist 2.8.2 which is included in npm v7.20.7 and above. For more information including workarounds please see the referenced GHSA-gmw6-94gg-2rc2.
Matrix is an ecosystem for open federated Instant Messaging and Voice over IP. In versions 1.41.0 and prior, unauthorised users can access the membership (list of members, with their display names) of a room if they know the ID of the room. The vulnerability is limited to rooms with `shared` history visibility. Furthermore, the unauthorised user must be using an account on a vulnerable homeserver that is in the room. Server administrators should upgrade to 1.41.1 or later in order to receive the patch. One workaround is available. Administrators of servers that use a reverse proxy could, with potentially unacceptable loss of functionality, block the endpoints: `/_matrix/client/r0/rooms/{room_id}/members` with `at` query parameter, and `/_matrix/client/unstable/rooms/{room_id}/members` with `at` query parameter.
A flaw has been found in libssh in versions prior to 0.9.6. The SSH protocol keeps track of two shared secrets during the lifetime of the session. One of them is called secret_hash and the other session_id. Initially, both of them are the same, but after key re-exchange, previous session_id is kept and used as an input to new secret_hash. Historically, both of these buffers had shared length variable, which worked as long as these buffers were same. But the key re-exchange operation can also change the key exchange method, which can be based on hash of different size, eventually creating "secret_hash" of different size than the session_id has. This becomes an issue when the session_id memory is zeroed or when it is used again during second key re-exchange.