Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In July 2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cachefiles: fix slab-use-after-free in cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read()
We got the following issue in a fuzz test of randomly issuing the restore
command:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read+0xb41/0xb60
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888122e84088 by task ondemand-04-dae/963
CPU: 13 PID: 963 Comm: ondemand-04-dae Not tainted 6.8.0-dirty #564
Call Trace:
kasan_report+0x93/0xc0
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read+0xb41/0xb60
vfs_read+0x169/0xb50
ksys_read+0xf5/0x1e0
Allocated by task 116:
kmem_cache_alloc+0x140/0x3a0
cachefiles_lookup_cookie+0x140/0xcd0
fscache_cookie_state_machine+0x43c/0x1230
[...]
Freed by task 792:
kmem_cache_free+0xfe/0x390
cachefiles_put_object+0x241/0x480
fscache_cookie_state_machine+0x5c8/0x1230
[...]
==================================================================
Following is the process that triggers the issue:
mount | daemon_thread1 | daemon_thread2
------------------------------------------------------------
cachefiles_withdraw_cookie
cachefiles_ondemand_clean_object(object)
cachefiles_ondemand_send_req
REQ_A = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + data_len)
wait_for_completion(&REQ_A->done)
cachefiles_daemon_read
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
msg->object_id = req->object->ondemand->ondemand_id
------ restore ------
cachefiles_ondemand_restore
xas_for_each(&xas, req, ULONG_MAX)
xas_set_mark(&xas, CACHEFILES_REQ_NEW)
cachefiles_daemon_read
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
copy_to_user(_buffer, msg, n)
xa_erase(&cache->reqs, id)
complete(&REQ_A->done)
------ close(fd) ------
cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release
cachefiles_put_object
cachefiles_put_object
kmem_cache_free(cachefiles_object_jar, object)
REQ_A->object->ondemand->ondemand_id
// object UAF !!!
When we see the request within xa_lock, req->object must not have been
freed yet, so grab the reference count of object before xa_unlock to
avoid the above issue.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cachefiles: fix slab-use-after-free in cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd()
We got the following issue in a fuzz test of randomly issuing the restore
command:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read+0x609/0xab0
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888109164a80 by task ondemand-04-dae/4962
CPU: 11 PID: 4962 Comm: ondemand-04-dae Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7-dirty #542
Call Trace:
kasan_report+0x94/0xc0
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read+0x609/0xab0
vfs_read+0x169/0xb50
ksys_read+0xf5/0x1e0
Allocated by task 626:
__kmalloc+0x1df/0x4b0
cachefiles_ondemand_send_req+0x24d/0x690
cachefiles_create_tmpfile+0x249/0xb30
cachefiles_create_file+0x6f/0x140
cachefiles_look_up_object+0x29c/0xa60
cachefiles_lookup_cookie+0x37d/0xca0
fscache_cookie_state_machine+0x43c/0x1230
[...]
Freed by task 626:
kfree+0xf1/0x2c0
cachefiles_ondemand_send_req+0x568/0x690
cachefiles_create_tmpfile+0x249/0xb30
cachefiles_create_file+0x6f/0x140
cachefiles_look_up_object+0x29c/0xa60
cachefiles_lookup_cookie+0x37d/0xca0
fscache_cookie_state_machine+0x43c/0x1230
[...]
==================================================================
Following is the process that triggers the issue:
mount | daemon_thread1 | daemon_thread2
------------------------------------------------------------
cachefiles_ondemand_init_object
cachefiles_ondemand_send_req
REQ_A = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + data_len)
wait_for_completion(&REQ_A->done)
cachefiles_daemon_read
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd
copy_to_user(_buffer, msg, n)
process_open_req(REQ_A)
------ restore ------
cachefiles_ondemand_restore
xas_for_each(&xas, req, ULONG_MAX)
xas_set_mark(&xas, CACHEFILES_REQ_NEW);
cachefiles_daemon_read
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
write(devfd, ("copen %u,%llu", msg->msg_id, size));
cachefiles_ondemand_copen
xa_erase(&cache->reqs, id)
complete(&REQ_A->done)
kfree(REQ_A)
cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd(REQ_A)
fd = get_unused_fd_flags
file = anon_inode_getfile
fd_install(fd, file)
load = (void *)REQ_A->msg.data;
load->fd = fd;
// load UAF !!!
This issue is caused by issuing a restore command when the daemon is still
alive, which results in a request being processed multiple times thus
triggering a UAF. So to avoid this problem, add an additional reference
count to cachefiles_req, which is held while waiting and reading, and then
released when the waiting and reading is over.
Note that since there is only one reference count for waiting, we need to
avoid the same request being completed multiple times, so we can only
complete the request if it is successfully removed from the xarray.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpt3sas: Avoid test/set_bit() operating in non-allocated memory
There is a potential out-of-bounds access when using test_bit() on a single
word. The test_bit() and set_bit() functions operate on long values, and
when testing or setting a single word, they can exceed the word
boundary. KASAN detects this issue and produces a dump:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _scsih_add_device.constprop.0 (./arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:60 ./include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h:29 drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c:7331) mpt3sas
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881d26e3c60 by task kworker/u1536:2/2965
For full log, please look at [1].
Make the allocation at least the size of sizeof(unsigned long) so that
set_bit() and test_bit() have sufficient room for read/write operations
without overwriting unallocated memory.
[1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZkNcALr3W3KGYYJG@gmail.com/
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: xattr: fix buffer overflow for invalid xattr
When an xattr size is not what is expected, it is printed out to the
kernel log in hex format as a form of debugging. But when that xattr
size is bigger than the expected size, printing it out can cause an
access off the end of the buffer.
Fix this all up by properly restricting the size of the debug hex dump
in the kernel log.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm: fix use-after-free case in tcpm_register_source_caps
There could be a potential use-after-free case in
tcpm_register_source_caps(). This could happen when:
* new (say invalid) source caps are advertised
* the existing source caps are unregistered
* tcpm_register_source_caps() returns with an error as
usb_power_delivery_register_capabilities() fails
This causes port->partner_source_caps to hold on to the now freed source
caps.
Reset port->partner_source_caps value to NULL after unregistering
existing source caps.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: class: cdc-wdm: Fix CPU lockup caused by excessive log messages
The syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in
the cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver's immediate
resubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the
dummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup:
cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71
cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625]
CPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup:
#1: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle
#2: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle
#3: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle
#4: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle
#5: 98% system, 1% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle
Modules linked in:
irq event stamp: 73096
hardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline]
hardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994
hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline]
hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551
softirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline]
softirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582
softirqs last disabled at (73043): [<ffff800080020de8>] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588
CPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
Testing showed that the problem did not occur if the two error
messages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding
material to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time.
In any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to
avoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is
to ratelimit the two dev_err() calls. Therefore we replace them with
dev_err_ratelimited().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix possible race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from()
syzbot found a race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from() [1]
If compiler reads more than once (*ppcpu_rt),
second read could read NULL, if another cpu clears
the value in rt6_get_pcpu_route().
Add a READ_ONCE() to prevent this race.
Also add rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() because
we rely on RCU protection while dereferencing pcpu_rt.
[1]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000012: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000090-0x0000000000000097]
CPU: 0 PID: 7543 Comm: kworker/u8:17 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-syzkaller-00013-g2bfcfd584ff5 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:__fib6_drop_pcpu_from.part.0+0x10a/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:984
Code: f8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 16 02 00 00 4d 8b 3f 4d 85 ff 74 31 e8 74 a7 fa f7 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 0f 85 1e 02 00 00 49 8b 87 90 00 00 00 48 8b 0c 24 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc900040df070 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000012 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff89932e16
RDX: ffff888049dd1e00 RSI: ffffffff89932d7c RDI: 0000000000000091
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000007
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88807fa080b8
R13: fffffbfff1a9a07d R14: ffffed100ff41022 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32c26000 CR3: 000000005d56e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:966 [inline]
fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1027 [inline]
fib6_purge_rt+0x7f2/0x9f0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1038
fib6_del_route net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1998 [inline]
fib6_del+0xa70/0x17b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2043
fib6_clean_node+0x426/0x5b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2205
fib6_walk_continue+0x44f/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2127
fib6_walk+0x182/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2175
fib6_clean_tree+0xd7/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2255
__fib6_clean_all+0x100/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2271
rt6_sync_down_dev net/ipv6/route.c:4906 [inline]
rt6_disable_ip+0x7ed/0xa00 net/ipv6/route.c:4911
addrconf_ifdown.isra.0+0x117/0x1b40 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3855
addrconf_notify+0x223/0x19e0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3778
notifier_call_chain+0xb9/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:93
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbe/0x140 net/core/dev.c:1992
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2030 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2044 [inline]
dev_close_many+0x333/0x6a0 net/core/dev.c:1585
unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x46d/0x19f0 net/core/dev.c:11193
unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11276 [inline]
default_device_exit_batch+0x85b/0xae0 net/core/dev.c:11759
ops_exit_list+0x128/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:178
cleanup_net+0x5b7/0xbf0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640
process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline]
worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393
kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Always stop health timer during driver removal
Currently, if teardown_hca fails to execute during driver removal, mlx5
does not stop the health timer. Afterwards, mlx5 continue with driver
teardown. This may lead to a UAF bug, which results in page fault
Oops[1], since the health timer invokes after resources were freed.
Hence, stop the health monitor even if teardown_hca fails.
[1]
mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: Unload vfs: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0)
mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0)
mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0)
mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: cleanup
mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: wait_func:1155:(pid 1967079): TEARDOWN_HCA(0x103) timeout. Will cause a leak of a command resource
mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: mlx5_function_close:1288:(pid 1967079): tear_down_hca failed, skip cleanup
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa26487064230
PGD 100c00067 P4D 100c00067 PUD 100e5a067 PMD 105ed7067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G OE ------- --- 6.7.0-68.fc38.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0013.121520200651 12/15/2020
RIP: 0010:ioread32be+0x34/0x60
RSP: 0018:ffffa26480003e58 EFLAGS: 00010292
RAX: ffffa26487064200 RBX: ffff9042d08161a0 RCX: ffff904c108222c0
RDX: 000000010bbf1b80 RSI: ffffffffc055ddb0 RDI: ffffa26487064230
RBP: ffff9042d08161a0 R08: 0000000000000022 R09: ffff904c108222e8
R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000441 R12: ffffffffc055ddb0
R13: ffffa26487064200 R14: ffffa26480003f00 R15: ffff904c108222c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff904c10800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffa26487064230 CR3: 00000002c4420006 CR4: 00000000007706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? __die+0x23/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0
? exc_page_fault+0x175/0x180
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core]
? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core]
? ioread32be+0x34/0x60
mlx5_health_check_fatal_sensors+0x20/0x100 [mlx5_core]
? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core]
poll_health+0x42/0x230 [mlx5_core]
? __next_timer_interrupt+0xbc/0x110
? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core]
call_timer_fn+0x21/0x130
? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core]
__run_timers+0x222/0x2c0
run_timer_softirq+0x1d/0x40
__do_softirq+0xc9/0x2c8
__irq_exit_rcu+0xa6/0xc0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x90
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xcc/0x440
? cpuidle_enter_state+0xbd/0x440
cpuidle_enter+0x2d/0x40
do_idle+0x20d/0x270
cpu_startup_entry+0x2a/0x30
rest_init+0xd0/0xd0
arch_call_rest_init+0xe/0x30
start_kernel+0x709/0xa90
x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
x86_64_start_kernel+0x96/0xa0
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x18f/0x19b
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ionic: fix kernel panic in XDP_TX action
In the XDP_TX path, ionic driver sends a packet to the TX path with rx
page and corresponding dma address.
After tx is done, ionic_tx_clean() frees that page.
But RX ring buffer isn't reset to NULL.
So, it uses a freed page, which causes kernel panic.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8881576c110c
PGD 773801067 P4D 773801067 PUD 87f086067 PMD 87efca067 PTE 800ffffea893e060
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 25 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.9.0+ #11
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_f0b8caeac1068a55_balancer_ingress+0x3b/0x44f
Code: 00 53 41 55 41 56 41 57 b8 01 00 00 00 48 8b 5f 08 4c 8b 77 00 4c 89 f7 48 83 c7 0e 48 39 d8
RSP: 0018:ffff888104e6fa28 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8881576c1140 RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: ffffffffc0051f64 RSI: ffffc90002d33048 RDI: ffff8881576c110e
RBP: ffff888104e6fa88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1027a04a23
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881b03a21a8
R13: ffff8881589f800f R14: ffff8881576c1100 R15: 00000001576c1100
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88881ae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff8881576c110c CR3: 0000000767a90000 CR4: 00000000007506f0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x20/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x254/0x790
? __pfx_page_fault_oops+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_is_prefetch.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
? search_bpf_extables+0x165/0x260
? fixup_exception+0x4a/0x970
? exc_page_fault+0xcb/0xe0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? 0xffffffffc0051f64
? bpf_prog_f0b8caeac1068a55_balancer_ingress+0x3b/0x44f
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x54/0x220
ionic_rx_service+0x11ab/0x3010 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
? ionic_tx_clean+0x29b/0xc60 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
? __pfx_ionic_tx_clean+0x10/0x10 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
? __pfx_ionic_rx_service+0x10/0x10 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
? ionic_tx_cq_service+0x25d/0xa00 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
? __pfx_ionic_rx_service+0x10/0x10 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
ionic_cq_service+0x69/0x150 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
ionic_txrx_napi+0x11a/0x540 [ionic 9180c3001ab627d82bbc5f3ebe8a0decaf6bb864]
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa0/0x440
net_rx_action+0x7e7/0xc30
? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.name
->d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed;
there are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (->d_lock on dentry,
->d_lock on its parent, ->i_rwsem exclusive on the parent's inode,
rename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable
snapshot of the name instead.