Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In June 2025
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix crash due to stale SRB access around I/O timeouts
Ensure SRB is returned during I/O timeout error escalation. If that is not
possible fail the escalation path.
Following crash stack was seen:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000002f56aa90f8
IP: qla_chk_edif_rx_sa_delete_pending+0x14/0x30 [qla2xxx]
Call Trace:
? qla2x00_status_entry+0x19f/0x1c50 [qla2xxx]
? qla2x00_start_sp+0x116/0x1170 [qla2xxx]
? dma_pool_alloc+0x1d6/0x210
? mempool_alloc+0x54/0x130
? qla24xx_process_response_queue+0x548/0x12b0 [qla2xxx]
? qla_do_work+0x2d/0x40 [qla2xxx]
? process_one_work+0x14c/0x390
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
video: fbdev: arkfb: Check the size of screen before memset_io()
In the function arkfb_set_par(), the value of 'screen_size' is
calculated by the user input. If the user provides the improper value,
the value of 'screen_size' may larger than 'info->screen_size', which
may cause the following bug:
[ 659.399066] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90003000000
[ 659.399077] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 659.399079] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 659.399094] RIP: 0010:memset_orig+0x33/0xb0
[ 659.399116] Call Trace:
[ 659.399122] arkfb_set_par+0x143f/0x24c0
[ 659.399130] fb_set_var+0x604/0xeb0
[ 659.399161] do_fb_ioctl+0x234/0x670
[ 659.399189] fb_ioctl+0xdd/0x130
Fix the this by checking the value of 'screen_size' before memset_io().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/core: Do not requeue task on CPU excluded from cpus_mask
The following warning was triggered on a large machine early in boot on
a distribution kernel but the same problem should also affect mainline.
WARNING: CPU: 439 PID: 10 at ../kernel/workqueue.c:2231 process_one_work+0x4d/0x440
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rescuer_thread+0x1f6/0x360
kthread+0x156/0x180
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
Commit c6e7bd7afaeb ("sched/core: Optimize ttwu() spinning on p->on_cpu")
optimises ttwu by queueing a task that is descheduling on the wakelist,
but does not check if the task descheduling is still allowed to run on that CPU.
In this warning, the problematic task is a workqueue rescue thread which
checks if the rescue is for a per-cpu workqueue and running on the wrong CPU.
While this is early in boot and it should be possible to create workers,
the rescue thread may still used if the MAYDAY_INITIAL_TIMEOUT is reached
or MAYDAY_INTERVAL and on a sufficiently large machine, the rescue
thread is being used frequently.
Tracing confirmed that the task should have migrated properly using the
stopper thread to handle the migration. However, a parallel wakeup from udev
running on another CPU that does not share CPU cache observes p->on_cpu and
uses task_cpu(p), queues the task on the old CPU and triggers the warning.
Check that the wakee task that is descheduling is still allowed to run
on its current CPU and if not, wait for the descheduling to complete
and select an allowed CPU.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
video: fbdev: vt8623fb: Check the size of screen before memset_io()
In the function vt8623fb_set_par(), the value of 'screen_size' is
calculated by the user input. If the user provides the improper value,
the value of 'screen_size' may larger than 'info->screen_size', which
may cause the following bug:
[ 583.339036] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90005000000
[ 583.339049] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 583.339052] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 583.339074] RIP: 0010:memset_orig+0x33/0xb0
[ 583.339110] Call Trace:
[ 583.339118] vt8623fb_set_par+0x11cd/0x21e0
[ 583.339146] fb_set_var+0x604/0xeb0
[ 583.339181] do_fb_ioctl+0x234/0x670
[ 583.339209] fb_ioctl+0xdd/0x130
Fix the this by checking the value of 'screen_size' before memset_io().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
video: fbdev: arkfb: Fix a divide-by-zero bug in ark_set_pixclock()
Since the user can control the arguments of the ioctl() from the user
space, under special arguments that may result in a divide-by-zero bug
in:
drivers/video/fbdev/arkfb.c:784: ark_set_pixclock(info, (hdiv * info->var.pixclock) / hmul);
with hdiv=1, pixclock=1 and hmul=2 you end up with (1*1)/2 = (int) 0.
and then in:
drivers/video/fbdev/arkfb.c:504: rv = dac_set_freq(par->dac, 0, 1000000000 / pixclock);
we'll get a division-by-zero.
The following log can reveal it:
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
RIP: 0010:ark_set_pixclock drivers/video/fbdev/arkfb.c:504 [inline]
RIP: 0010:arkfb_set_par+0x10fc/0x24c0 drivers/video/fbdev/arkfb.c:784
Call Trace:
fb_set_var+0x604/0xeb0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1034
do_fb_ioctl+0x234/0x670 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1110
fb_ioctl+0xdd/0x130 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1189
Fix this by checking the argument of ark_set_pixclock() first.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched, cpuset: Fix dl_cpu_busy() panic due to empty cs->cpus_allowed
With cgroup v2, the cpuset's cpus_allowed mask can be empty indicating
that the cpuset will just use the effective CPUs of its parent. So
cpuset_can_attach() can call task_can_attach() with an empty mask.
This can lead to cpumask_any_and() returns nr_cpu_ids causing the call
to dl_bw_of() to crash due to percpu value access of an out of bound
CPU value. For example:
[80468.182258] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff8b6648b0
:
[80468.191019] RIP: 0010:dl_cpu_busy+0x30/0x2b0
:
[80468.207946] Call Trace:
[80468.208947] cpuset_can_attach+0xa0/0x140
[80468.209953] cgroup_migrate_execute+0x8c/0x490
[80468.210931] cgroup_update_dfl_csses+0x254/0x270
[80468.211898] cgroup_subtree_control_write+0x322/0x400
[80468.212854] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0
[80468.213777] new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0
[80468.214689] vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280
[80468.215592] ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
[80468.216463] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80
[80468.224287] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Fix that by using effective_cpus instead. For cgroup v1, effective_cpus
is the same as cpus_allowed. For v2, effective_cpus is the real cpumask
to be used by tasks within the cpuset anyway.
Also update task_can_attach()'s 2nd argument name to cs_effective_cpus to
reflect the change. In addition, a check is added to task_can_attach()
to guard against the possibility that cpumask_any_and() may return a
value >= nr_cpu_ids.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/xive: Fix refcount leak in xive_get_max_prio
of_find_node_by_path() returns a node pointer with
refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when done.
Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/spufs: Fix refcount leak in spufs_init_isolated_loader
of_find_node_by_path() returns remote device nodepointer with
refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when done.
Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: ensure pages are unlocked on cow_file_range() failure
There is a hung_task report on zoned btrfs like below.
https://github.com/naota/linux/issues/59
[726.328648] INFO: task rocksdb:high0:11085 blocked for more than 241 seconds.
[726.329839] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc1+ #1
[726.330484] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[726.331603] task:rocksdb:high0 state:D stack: 0 pid:11085 ppid: 11082 flags:0x00000000
[726.331608] Call Trace:
[726.331611] <TASK>
[726.331614] __schedule+0x2e5/0x9d0
[726.331622] schedule+0x58/0xd0
[726.331626] io_schedule+0x3f/0x70
[726.331629] __folio_lock+0x125/0x200
[726.331634] ? find_get_entries+0x1bc/0x240
[726.331638] ? filemap_invalidate_unlock_two+0x40/0x40
[726.331642] truncate_inode_pages_range+0x5b2/0x770
[726.331649] truncate_inode_pages_final+0x44/0x50
[726.331653] btrfs_evict_inode+0x67/0x480
[726.331658] evict+0xd0/0x180
[726.331661] iput+0x13f/0x200
[726.331664] do_unlinkat+0x1c0/0x2b0
[726.331668] __x64_sys_unlink+0x23/0x30
[726.331670] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
[726.331674] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[726.331677] RIP: 0033:0x7fb9490a171b
[726.331681] RSP: 002b:00007fb943ffac68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000057
[726.331684] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb9490a171b
[726.331686] RDX: 00007fb943ffb040 RSI: 000055a6bbe6ec20 RDI: 00007fb94400d300
[726.331687] RBP: 00007fb943ffad00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[726.331688] R10: 0000000000000031 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb943ffb000
[726.331690] R13: 00007fb943ffb040 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fb943ffd260
[726.331693] </TASK>
While we debug the issue, we found running fstests generic/551 on 5GB
non-zoned null_blk device in the emulated zoned mode also had a
similar hung issue.
Also, we can reproduce the same symptom with an error injected
cow_file_range() setup.
The hang occurs when cow_file_range() fails in the middle of
allocation. cow_file_range() called from do_allocation_zoned() can
split the give region ([start, end]) for allocation depending on
current block group usages. When btrfs can allocate bytes for one part
of the split regions but fails for the other region (e.g. because of
-ENOSPC), we return the error leaving the pages in the succeeded regions
locked. Technically, this occurs only when @unlock == 0. Otherwise, we
unlock the pages in an allocated region after creating an ordered
extent.
Considering the callers of cow_file_range(unlock=0) won't write out
the pages, we can unlock the pages on error exit from
cow_file_range(). So, we can ensure all the pages except @locked_page
are unlocked on error case.
In summary, cow_file_range now behaves like this:
- page_started == 1 (return value)
- All the pages are unlocked. IO is started.
- unlock == 1
- All the pages except @locked_page are unlocked in any case
- unlock == 0
- On success, all the pages are locked for writing out them
- On failure, all the pages except @locked_page are unlocked
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: replace BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE with fs_info->max_extent_size
On zoned filesystem, data write out is limited by max_zone_append_size,
and a large ordered extent is split according the size of a bio. OTOH,
the number of extents to be written is calculated using
BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE, and that estimated number is used to reserve the
metadata bytes to update and/or create the metadata items.
The metadata reservation is done at e.g, btrfs_buffered_write() and then
released according to the estimation changes. Thus, if the number of extent
increases massively, the reserved metadata can run out.
The increase of the number of extents easily occurs on zoned filesystem
if BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE > max_zone_append_size. And, it causes the
following warning on a small RAM environment with disabling metadata
over-commit (in the following patch).
[75721.498492] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[75721.505624] BTRFS: block rsv 1 returned -28
[75721.512230] WARNING: CPU: 24 PID: 2327559 at fs/btrfs/block-rsv.c:537 btrfs_use_block_rsv+0x560/0x760 [btrfs]
[75721.581854] CPU: 24 PID: 2327559 Comm: kworker/u64:10 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.18.0-rc2-BTRFS-ZNS+ #109
[75721.597200] Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/H12SSL-NT, BIOS 2.0 02/22/2021
[75721.607310] Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
[75721.616209] RIP: 0010:btrfs_use_block_rsv+0x560/0x760 [btrfs]
[75721.646649] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fbdf3e0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[75721.654126] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000004000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[75721.663524] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: fffff52001f7be6e
[75721.672921] RBP: ffffc9000fbdf420 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff889f8d1fc6c7
[75721.682493] R10: ffffed13f1a3f8d8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88980a3c0e28
[75721.692284] R13: ffff889b66590000 R14: ffff88980a3c0e40 R15: ffff88980a3c0e8a
[75721.701878] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff889f8d000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[75721.712601] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[75721.720726] CR2: 000055d12e05c018 CR3: 0000800193594000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
[75721.730499] Call Trace:
[75721.735166] <TASK>
[75721.739886] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1e1/0x1100 [btrfs]
[75721.747545] ? btrfs_alloc_logged_file_extent+0x550/0x550 [btrfs]
[75721.756145] ? btrfs_get_32+0xea/0x2d0 [btrfs]
[75721.762852] ? btrfs_get_32+0xea/0x2d0 [btrfs]
[75721.769520] ? push_leaf_left+0x420/0x620 [btrfs]
[75721.776431] ? memcpy+0x4e/0x60
[75721.781931] split_leaf+0x433/0x12d0 [btrfs]
[75721.788392] ? btrfs_get_token_32+0x580/0x580 [btrfs]
[75721.795636] ? push_for_double_split.isra.0+0x420/0x420 [btrfs]
[75721.803759] ? leaf_space_used+0x15d/0x1a0 [btrfs]
[75721.811156] btrfs_search_slot+0x1bc3/0x2790 [btrfs]
[75721.818300] ? lock_downgrade+0x7c0/0x7c0
[75721.824411] ? free_extent_buffer.part.0+0x107/0x200 [btrfs]
[75721.832456] ? split_leaf+0x12d0/0x12d0 [btrfs]
[75721.839149] ? free_extent_buffer.part.0+0x14f/0x200 [btrfs]
[75721.846945] ? free_extent_buffer+0x13/0x20 [btrfs]
[75721.853960] ? btrfs_release_path+0x4b/0x190 [btrfs]
[75721.861429] btrfs_csum_file_blocks+0x85c/0x1500 [btrfs]
[75721.869313] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x16/0x80
[75721.876085] ? lock_release+0x552/0xf80
[75721.881957] ? btrfs_del_csums+0x8c0/0x8c0 [btrfs]
[75721.888886] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[75721.895152] ? do_raw_read_unlock+0x44/0x80
[75721.901323] ? _raw_write_lock_irq+0x60/0x80
[75721.907983] ? btrfs_global_root+0xb9/0xe0 [btrfs]
[75721.915166] ? btrfs_csum_root+0x12b/0x180 [btrfs]
[75721.921918] ? btrfs_get_global_root+0x820/0x820 [btrfs]
[75721.929166] ? _raw_write_unlock+0x23/0x40
[75721.935116] ? unpin_extent_cache+0x1e3/0x390 [btrfs]
[75721.942041] btrfs_finish_ordered_io.isra.0+0xa0c/0x1dc0 [btrfs]
[75721.949906] ? try_to_wake_up+0x30/0x14a0
[75721.955700] ? btrfs_unlink_subvol+0xda0/0xda0 [btrfs]
[75721.962661] ? rcu
---truncated---