Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In June 2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix netif state handling
mlx5e_suspend cleans resources only if netif_device_present() returns
true. However, mlx5e_resume changes the state of netif, via
mlx5e_nic_enable, only if reg_state == NETREG_REGISTERED.
In the below case, the above leads to NULL-ptr Oops[1] and memory
leaks:
mlx5e_probe
_mlx5e_resume
mlx5e_attach_netdev
mlx5e_nic_enable <-- netdev not reg, not calling netif_device_attach()
register_netdev <-- failed for some reason.
ERROR_FLOW:
_mlx5e_suspend <-- netif_device_present return false, resources aren't freed :(
Hence, clean resources in this case as well.
[1]
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP
CPU: 2 PID: 9345 Comm: test-ovs-ct-gen Not tainted 6.5.0_for_upstream_min_debug_2023_09_05_16_01 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:0x0
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at0xffffffffffffffd6.
RSP: 0018:ffff888178aaf758 EFLAGS: 00010246
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x20/0x60
? page_fault_oops+0x14c/0x3c0
? exc_page_fault+0x75/0x140
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
notifier_call_chain+0x35/0xb0
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x3d/0x60
mlx5_blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x22/0x30 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_core_uplink_netdev_event_replay+0x3e/0x60 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_mdev_netdev_track+0x53/0x60 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5_ib_roce_init+0xc3/0x340 [mlx5_ib]
__mlx5_ib_add+0x34/0xd0 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5r_probe+0xe1/0x210 [mlx5_ib]
? auxiliary_match_id+0x6a/0x90
auxiliary_bus_probe+0x38/0x80
? driver_sysfs_add+0x51/0x80
really_probe+0xc9/0x3e0
? driver_probe_device+0x90/0x90
__driver_probe_device+0x80/0x160
driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
__device_attach_driver+0x7d/0x100
bus_for_each_drv+0x80/0xd0
__device_attach+0xbc/0x1f0
bus_probe_device+0x86/0xa0
device_add+0x637/0x840
__auxiliary_device_add+0x3b/0xa0
add_adev+0xc9/0x140 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked+0x22a/0x310 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_register_device+0x53/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_init_one_devl_locked+0x5c4/0x9c0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_init_one+0x3b/0x60 [mlx5_core]
probe_one+0x44c/0x730 [mlx5_core]
local_pci_probe+0x3e/0x90
pci_device_probe+0xbf/0x210
? kernfs_create_link+0x5d/0xa0
? sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x60/0xc0
really_probe+0xc9/0x3e0
? driver_probe_device+0x90/0x90
__driver_probe_device+0x80/0x160
driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
__device_attach_driver+0x7d/0x100
bus_for_each_drv+0x80/0xd0
__device_attach+0xbc/0x1f0
pci_bus_add_device+0x54/0x80
pci_iov_add_virtfn+0x2e6/0x320
sriov_enable+0x208/0x420
mlx5_core_sriov_configure+0x9e/0x200 [mlx5_core]
sriov_numvfs_store+0xae/0x1a0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1a0
vfs_write+0x291/0x3c0
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: connac: check for null before dereferencing
The wcid can be NULL. It should be checked for validity before
dereferencing it to avoid crash.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drivers/virt/acrn: fix PFNMAP PTE checks in acrn_vm_ram_map()
Patch series "mm: follow_pte() improvements and acrn follow_pte() fixes".
Patch #1 fixes a bunch of issues I spotted in the acrn driver. It
compiles, that's all I know. I'll appreciate some review and testing from
acrn folks.
Patch #2+#3 improve follow_pte(), passing a VMA instead of the MM, adding
more sanity checks, and improving the documentation. Gave it a quick test
on x86-64 using VM_PAT that ends up using follow_pte().
This patch (of 3):
We currently miss handling various cases, resulting in a dangerous
follow_pte() (previously follow_pfn()) usage.
(1) We're not checking PTE write permissions.
Maybe we should simply always require pte_write() like we do for
pin_user_pages_fast(FOLL_WRITE)? Hard to tell, so let's check for
ACRN_MEM_ACCESS_WRITE for now.
(2) We're not rejecting refcounted pages.
As we are not using MMU notifiers, messing with refcounted pages is
dangerous and can result in use-after-free. Let's make sure to reject them.
(3) We are only looking at the first PTE of a bigger range.
We only lookup a single PTE, but memmap->len may span a larger area.
Let's loop over all involved PTEs and make sure the PFN range is
actually contiguous. Reject everything else: it couldn't have worked
either way, and rather made use access PFNs we shouldn't be accessing.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: i2c: et8ek8: Don't strip remove function when driver is builtin
Using __exit for the remove function results in the remove callback
being discarded with CONFIG_VIDEO_ET8EK8=y. When such a device gets
unbound (e.g. using sysfs or hotplug), the driver is just removed
without the cleanup being performed. This results in resource leaks. Fix
it by compiling in the remove callback unconditionally.
This also fixes a W=1 modpost warning:
WARNING: modpost: drivers/media/i2c/et8ek8/et8ek8: section mismatch in reference: et8ek8_i2c_driver+0x10 (section: .data) -> et8ek8_remove (section: .exit.text)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netrom: fix possible dead-lock in nr_rt_ioctl()
syzbot loves netrom, and found a possible deadlock in nr_rt_ioctl [1]
Make sure we always acquire nr_node_list_lock before nr_node_lock(nr_node)
[1]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor350/5129 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]
ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]
ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline]
ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}:
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178
spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
nr_remove_node net/netrom/nr_route.c:299 [inline]
nr_del_node+0x4b4/0x820 net/netrom/nr_route.c:355
nr_rt_ioctl+0xa95/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:683
sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
__lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178
spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]
nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]
nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697
sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(nr_node_list_lock);
lock(&nr_node->node_lock);
lock(nr_node_list_lock);
lock(&nr_node->node_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor350/5129:
#0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8f70
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/hns: Modify the print level of CQE error
Too much print may lead to a panic in kernel. Change ibdev_err() to
ibdev_err_ratelimited(), and change the printing level of cqe dump
to debug level.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/hns: Fix deadlock on SRQ async events.
xa_lock for SRQ table may be required in AEQ. Use xa_store_irq()/
xa_erase_irq() to avoid deadlock.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/mediatek: Init `ddp_comp` with devm_kcalloc()
In the case where `conn_routes` is true we allocate an extra slot in
the `ddp_comp` array but mtk_drm_crtc_create() never seemed to
initialize it in the test case I ran. For me, this caused a later
crash when we looped through the array in mtk_drm_crtc_mode_valid().
This showed up for me when I booted with `slub_debug=FZPUA` which
poisons the memory initially. Without `slub_debug` I couldn't
reproduce, presumably because the later code handles the value being
NULL and in most cases (not guaranteed in all cases) the memory the
allocator returned started out as 0.
It really doesn't hurt to initialize the array with devm_kcalloc()
since the array is small and the overhead of initting a handful of
elements to 0 is small. In general initting memory to zero is a safer
practice and usually it's suggested to only use the non-initting alloc
functions if you really need to.
Let's switch the function to use an allocation function that zeros the
memory. For me, this avoids the crash.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: micrel: Fix receiving the timestamp in the frame for lan8841
The blamed commit started to use the ptp workqueue to get the second
part of the timestamp. And when the port was set down, then this
workqueue is stopped. But if the config option NETWORK_PHY_TIMESTAMPING
is not enabled, then the ptp_clock is not initialized so then it would
crash when it would try to access the delayed work.
So then basically by setting up and then down the port, it would crash.
The fix consists in checking if the ptp_clock is initialized and only
then cancel the delayed work.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: move the EST lock to struct stmmac_priv
Reinitialize the whole EST structure would also reset the mutex
lock which is embedded in the EST structure, and then trigger
the following warning. To address this, move the lock to struct
stmmac_priv. We also need to reacquire the mutex lock when doing
this initialization.
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 505 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 505 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-00053-g0106679839f7-dirty #29
Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT)
pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
lr : __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
sp : ffffffc0864e3570
x29: ffffffc0864e3570 x28: ffffffc0817bdc78 x27: 0000000000000003
x26: ffffff80c54f1808 x25: ffffff80c9164080 x24: ffffffc080d723ac
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffc083bc3000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
x17: ffffffc08117b080 x16: 0000000000000002 x15: ffffff80d2d40000
x14: 00000000000002da x13: ffffff80d2d404b8 x12: ffffffc082b5a5c8
x11: ffffffc082bca680 x10: ffffffc082bb2640 x9 : ffffffc082bb2698
x8 : 0000000000017fe8 x7 : c0000000ffffefff x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffffff8178fe0d48 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000027
x2 : ffffff8178fe0d50 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
__mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
mutex_lock_nested+0x28/0x34
tc_setup_taprio+0x118/0x68c
stmmac_setup_tc+0x50/0xf0
taprio_change+0x868/0xc9c