Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In May 2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: turn folio_test_hugetlb into a PageType
The current folio_test_hugetlb() can be fooled by a concurrent folio split
into returning true for a folio which has never belonged to hugetlbfs.
This can't happen if the caller holds a refcount on it, but we have a few
places (memory-failure, compaction, procfs) which do not and should not
take a speculative reference.
Since hugetlb pages do not use individual page mapcounts (they are always
fully mapped and use the entire_mapcount field to record the number of
mappings), the PageType field is available now that page_mapcount()
ignores the value in this field.
In compaction and with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM enabled, the current implementation
can result in an oops, as reported by Luis. This happens since 9c5ccf2db04b
("mm: remove HUGETLB_PAGE_DTOR") effectively added some VM_BUG_ON() checks
in the PageHuge() testing path.
[willy@infradead.org: update vmcoreinfo]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: qcom: uefisecapp: Fix memory related IO errors and crashes
It turns out that while the QSEECOM APP_SEND command has specific fields
for request and response buffers, uefisecapp expects them both to be in
a single memory region. Failure to adhere to this has (so far) resulted
in either no response being written to the response buffer (causing an
EIO to be emitted down the line), the SCM call to fail with EINVAL
(i.e., directly from TZ/firmware), or the device to be hard-reset.
While this issue can be triggered deterministically, in the current form
it seems to happen rather sporadically (which is why it has gone
unnoticed during earlier testing). This is likely due to the two
kzalloc() calls (for request and response) being directly after each
other. Which means that those likely return consecutive regions most of
the time, especially when not much else is going on in the system.
Fix this by allocating a single memory region for both request and
response buffers, properly aligning both structs inside it. This
unfortunately also means that the qcom_scm_qseecom_app_send() interface
needs to be restructured, as it should no longer map the DMA regions
separately. Therefore, move the responsibility of DMA allocation (or
mapping) to the caller.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: CPPC: Use access_width over bit_width for system memory accesses
To align with ACPI 6.3+, since bit_width can be any 8-bit value, it
cannot be depended on to be always on a clean 8b boundary. This was
uncovered on the Cobalt 100 platform.
SError Interrupt on CPU26, code 0xbe000011 -- SError
CPU: 26 PID: 1510 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.15.2.1-13 #1
Hardware name: MICROSOFT CORPORATION, BIOS MICROSOFT CORPORATION
pstate: 62400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : cppc_get_perf_caps+0xec/0x410
lr : cppc_get_perf_caps+0xe8/0x410
sp : ffff8000155ab730
x29: ffff8000155ab730 x28: ffff0080139d0038 x27: ffff0080139d0078
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0080139d0058 x24: 00000000ffffffff
x23: ffff0080139d0298 x22: ffff0080139d0278 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: ffff00802b251910 x19: ffff0080139d0000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffdc7e111bad04 x15: ffff00802b251008
x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: ffff013f1fd63300 x12: 0000000000000006
x11: ffffdc7e128f4420 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffdc7e111badec
x8 : ffff00802b251980 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff0080139d0028
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff0080139d0018 x3 : 00000000ffffffff
x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : ffff8000155ab7a0 x0 : 0000000000000000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt
CPU: 26 PID: 1510 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted
5.15.2.1-13 #1
Hardware name: MICROSOFT CORPORATION, BIOS MICROSOFT CORPORATION
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1e0
show_stack+0x24/0x30
dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8
dump_stack+0x18/0x34
panic+0x16c/0x384
add_taint+0x0/0xc0
arm64_serror_panic+0x7c/0x90
arm64_is_fatal_ras_serror+0x34/0xa4
do_serror+0x50/0x6c
el1h_64_error_handler+0x40/0x74
el1h_64_error+0x7c/0x80
cppc_get_perf_caps+0xec/0x410
cppc_cpufreq_cpu_init+0x74/0x400 [cppc_cpufreq]
cpufreq_online+0x2dc/0xa30
cpufreq_add_dev+0xc0/0xd4
subsys_interface_register+0x134/0x14c
cpufreq_register_driver+0x1b0/0x354
cppc_cpufreq_init+0x1a8/0x1000 [cppc_cpufreq]
do_one_initcall+0x50/0x250
do_init_module+0x60/0x27c
load_module+0x2300/0x2570
__do_sys_finit_module+0xa8/0x114
__arm64_sys_finit_module+0x2c/0x3c
invoke_syscall+0x78/0x100
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x180/0x1a0
do_el0_svc+0x84/0xa0
el0_svc+0x2c/0xc0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x12c
el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
Instead, use access_width to determine the size and use the offset and
width to shift and mask the bits to read/write out. Make sure to add a
check for system memory since pcc redefines the access_width to
subspace id.
If access_width is not set, then fall back to using bit_width.
[ rjw: Subject and changelog edits, comment adjustments ]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpu: Re-enable CPU mitigations by default for !X86 architectures
Rename x86's to CPU_MITIGATIONS, define it in generic code, and force it
on for all architectures exception x86. A recent commit to turn
mitigations off by default if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n kinda sorta
missed that "cpu_mitigations" is completely generic, whereas
SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is x86-specific.
Rename x86's SPECULATIVE_MITIGATIONS instead of keeping both and have it
select CPU_MITIGATIONS, as having two configs for the same thing is
unnecessary and confusing. This will also allow x86 to use the knob to
manage mitigations that aren't strictly related to speculative
execution.
Use another Kconfig to communicate to common code that CPU_MITIGATIONS
is already defined instead of having x86's menu depend on the common
CPU_MITIGATIONS. This allows keeping a single point of contact for all
of x86's mitigations, and it's not clear that other architectures *want*
to allow disabling mitigations at compile-time.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: i2c-hid: remove I2C_HID_READ_PENDING flag to prevent lock-up
The flag I2C_HID_READ_PENDING is used to serialize I2C operations.
However, this is not necessary, because I2C core already has its own
locking for that.
More importantly, this flag can cause a lock-up: if the flag is set in
i2c_hid_xfer() and an interrupt happens, the interrupt handler
(i2c_hid_irq) will check this flag and return immediately without doing
anything, then the interrupt handler will be invoked again in an
infinite loop.
Since interrupt handler is an RT task, it takes over the CPU and the
flag-clearing task never gets scheduled, thus we have a lock-up.
Delete this unnecessary flag.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Fix possible memory leak in bnxt_rdma_aux_device_init()
If ulp = kzalloc() fails, the allocated edev will leak because it is
not properly assigned and the cleanup path will not be able to free it.
Fix it by assigning it properly immediately after allocation.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
geneve: fix header validation in geneve[6]_xmit_skb
syzbot is able to trigger an uninit-value in geneve_xmit() [1]
Problem : While most ip tunnel helpers (like ip_tunnel_get_dsfield())
uses skb_protocol(skb, true), pskb_inet_may_pull() is only using
skb->protocol.
If anything else than ETH_P_IPV6 or ETH_P_IP is found in skb->protocol,
pskb_inet_may_pull() does nothing at all.
If a vlan tag was provided by the caller (af_packet in the syzbot case),
the network header might not point to the correct location, and skb
linear part could be smaller than expected.
Add skb_vlan_inet_prepare() to perform a complete mac validation.
Use this in geneve for the moment, I suspect we need to adopt this
more broadly.
v4 - Jakub reported v3 broke l2_tos_ttl_inherit.sh selftest
- Only call __vlan_get_protocol() for vlan types.
v2,v3 - Addressed Sabrina comments on v1 and v2
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:910 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_xmit+0x302d/0x5420 drivers/net/geneve.c:1030
geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:910 [inline]
geneve_xmit+0x302d/0x5420 drivers/net/geneve.c:1030
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4917 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3531 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa20 net/core/dev.c:3547
__dev_queue_xmit+0x348d/0x52c0 net/core/dev.c:4335
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3091 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x8bb0/0x9ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745
__sys_sendto+0x685/0x830 net/socket.c:2191
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2199
do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3804 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3845 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x613/0xc50 mm/slub.c:3888
kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:577
__alloc_skb+0x35b/0x7a0 net/core/skbuff.c:668
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1318 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbf0 net/core/skbuff.c:6504
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa81/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2795
packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2930 [inline]
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3024 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x722d/0x9ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745
__sys_sendto+0x685/0x830 net/socket.c:2191
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2199
do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
CPU: 0 PID: 5033 Comm: syz-executor346 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1-syzkaller-00005-g928a87efa423 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: fix q->blkg_list corruption during disk rebind
Multiple gendisk instances can allocated/added for single request queue
in case of disk rebind. blkg may still stay in q->blkg_list when calling
blkcg_init_disk() for rebind, then q->blkg_list becomes corrupted.
Fix the list corruption issue by:
- add blkg_init_queue() to initialize q->blkg_list & q->blkcg_mutex only
- move calling blkg_init_queue() into blk_alloc_queue()
The list corruption should be started since commit f1c006f1c685 ("blk-cgroup:
synchronize pd_free_fn() from blkg_free_workfn() and blkcg_deactivate_policy()")
which delays removing blkg from q->blkg_list into blkg_free_workfn().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: Fix transmit scheduler resource leak
Inorder to support shaping and scheduling, Upon class creation
Netdev driver allocates trasmit schedulers.
The previous patch which added support for Round robin scheduling has
a bug due to which driver is not freeing transmit schedulers post
class deletion.
This patch fixes the same.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: validate user input for XDP_{UMEM|COMPLETION}_FILL_RING
syzbot reported an illegal copy in xsk_setsockopt() [1]
Make sure to validate setsockopt() @optlen parameter.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888028c6cde3 by task syz-executor.0/7549
CPU: 0 PID: 7549 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420
do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
RIP: 0033:0x7fb40587de69
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fb40665a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb4059abf80 RCX: 00007fb40587de69
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 000000000000011b RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007fb4058ca47a R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020001980 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fb4059abf80 R15: 00007fff57ee4d08
</TASK>
Allocated by task 7549:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3966 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x233/0x4a0 mm/slub.c:3979
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:632 [inline]
__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd2f/0x1040 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869
do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888028c6cde0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 1 bytes to the right of
allocated 2-byte region [ffff888028c6cde0, ffff888028c6cde2)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0000a31b00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888028c6c9c0 pfn:0x28c6c
anon flags: 0xfff00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 00fff00000000800 ffff888014c41280 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
raw: ffff888028c6c9c0 0000000080800057 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x112cc0(GFP_USER|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 6648, tgid 6644 (syz-executor.0), ts 133906047828, free_ts 133859922223
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:
---truncated---