Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In April 2025
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/erdma: Prevent use-after-free in erdma_accept_newconn()
After the erdma_cep_put(new_cep) being called, new_cep will be freed,
and the following dereference will cause a UAF problem. Fix this issue.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Don't expose hw_counters outside of init net namespace
Commit 467f432a521a ("RDMA/core: Split port and device counter sysfs
attributes") accidentally almost exposed hw counters to non-init net
namespaces. It didn't expose them fully, as an attempt to read any of
those counters leads to a crash like this one:
[42021.807566] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
[42021.814463] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[42021.819549] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[42021.824636] PGD 0 P4D 0
[42021.827145] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[42021.830598] CPU: 82 PID: 2843922 Comm: switchto-defaul Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S W I XXX
[42021.841697] Hardware name: XXX
[42021.849619] RIP: 0010:hw_stat_device_show+0x1e/0x40 [ib_core]
[42021.855362] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 d0 4c 8b 5e 20 48 8b 8f b8 04 00 00 48 81 c7 f0 fa ff ff <48> 8b 41 28 48 29 ce 48 83 c6 d0 48 c1 ee 04 69 d6 ab aa aa aa 48
[42021.873931] RSP: 0018:ffff97fe90f03da0 EFLAGS: 00010287
[42021.879108] RAX: ffff9406988a8c60 RBX: ffff940e1072d438 RCX: 0000000000000000
[42021.886169] RDX: ffff94085f1aa000 RSI: ffff93c6cbbdbcb0 RDI: ffff940c7517aef0
[42021.893230] RBP: ffff97fe90f03e70 R08: ffff94085f1aa000 R09: 0000000000000000
[42021.900294] R10: ffff94085f1aa000 R11: ffffffffc0775680 R12: ffffffff87ca2530
[42021.907355] R13: ffff940651602840 R14: ffff93c6cbbdbcb0 R15: ffff94085f1aa000
[42021.914418] FS: 00007fda1a3b9700(0000) GS:ffff94453fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[42021.922423] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[42021.928130] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 00000042dcfb8003 CR4: 00000000003726f0
[42021.935194] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[42021.942257] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[42021.949324] Call Trace:
[42021.951756] <TASK>
[42021.953842] [<ffffffff86c58674>] ? show_regs+0x64/0x70
[42021.959030] [<ffffffff86c58468>] ? __die+0x78/0xc0
[42021.963874] [<ffffffff86c9ef75>] ? page_fault_oops+0x2b5/0x3b0
[42021.969749] [<ffffffff87674b92>] ? exc_page_fault+0x1a2/0x3c0
[42021.975549] [<ffffffff87801326>] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[42021.981517] [<ffffffffc0775680>] ? __pfx_show_hw_stats+0x10/0x10 [ib_core]
[42021.988482] [<ffffffffc077564e>] ? hw_stat_device_show+0x1e/0x40 [ib_core]
[42021.995438] [<ffffffff86ac7f8e>] dev_attr_show+0x1e/0x50
[42022.000803] [<ffffffff86a3eeb1>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x81/0xe0
[42022.006508] [<ffffffff86a11134>] seq_read_iter+0xf4/0x410
[42022.011954] [<ffffffff869f4b2e>] vfs_read+0x16e/0x2f0
[42022.017058] [<ffffffff869f50ee>] ksys_read+0x6e/0xe0
[42022.022073] [<ffffffff8766f1ca>] do_syscall_64+0x6a/0xa0
[42022.027441] [<ffffffff8780013b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2
The problem can be reproduced using the following steps:
ip netns add foo
ip netns exec foo bash
cat /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/hw_counters/*
The panic occurs because of casting the device pointer into an
ib_device pointer using container_of() in hw_stat_device_show() is
wrong and leads to a memory corruption.
However the real problem is that hw counters should never been exposed
outside of the non-init net namespace.
Fix this by saving the index of the corresponding attribute group
(it might be 1 or 2 depending on the presence of driver-specific
attributes) and zeroing the pointer to hw_counters group for compat
devices during the initialization.
With this fix applied hw_counters are not available in a non-init
net namespace:
find /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/ -name hw_counters
/sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/ports/1/hw_counters
/sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/ports/2/hw_counters
/sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/hw_counters
ip netns add foo
ip netns exec foo bash
find /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/ -name hw_counters
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mm/pat: Fix VM_PAT handling when fork() fails in copy_page_range()
If track_pfn_copy() fails, we already added the dst VMA to the maple
tree. As fork() fails, we'll cleanup the maple tree, and stumble over
the dst VMA for which we neither performed any reservation nor copied
any page tables.
Consequently untrack_pfn() will see VM_PAT and try obtaining the
PAT information from the page table -- which fails because the page
table was not copied.
The easiest fix would be to simply clear the VM_PAT flag of the dst VMA
if track_pfn_copy() fails. However, the whole thing is about "simply"
clearing the VM_PAT flag is shaky as well: if we passed track_pfn_copy()
and performed a reservation, but copying the page tables fails, we'll
simply clear the VM_PAT flag, not properly undoing the reservation ...
which is also wrong.
So let's fix it properly: set the VM_PAT flag only if the reservation
succeeded (leaving it clear initially), and undo the reservation if
anything goes wrong while copying the page tables: clearing the VM_PAT
flag after undoing the reservation.
Note that any copied page table entries will get zapped when the VMA will
get removed later, after copy_page_range() succeeded; as VM_PAT is not set
then, we won't try cleaning VM_PAT up once more and untrack_pfn() will be
happy. Note that leaving these page tables in place without a reservation
is not a problem, as we are aborting fork(); this process will never run.
A reproducer can trigger this usually at the first try:
https://gitlab.com/davidhildenbrand/scratchspace/-/raw/main/reproducers/pat_fork.c
WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 11650 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:983 get_pat_info+0xf6/0x110
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 11650 Comm: repro3 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5+ #92
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:get_pat_info+0xf6/0x110
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
...
untrack_pfn+0x52/0x110
unmap_single_vma+0xa6/0xe0
unmap_vmas+0x105/0x1f0
exit_mmap+0xf6/0x460
__mmput+0x4b/0x120
copy_process+0x1bf6/0x2aa0
kernel_clone+0xab/0x440
__do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
Likely this case was missed in:
d155df53f310 ("x86/mm/pat: clear VM_PAT if copy_p4d_range failed")
... and instead of undoing the reservation we simply cleared the VM_PAT flag.
Keep the documentation of these functions in include/linux/pgtable.h,
one place is more than sufficient -- we should clean that up for the other
functions like track_pfn_remap/untrack_pfn separately.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix page_size variable overflow
Change all variables storing mlx5_umem_mkc_find_best_pgsz() result to
unsigned long to support values larger than 31 and avoid overflow.
For example: If we try to register 4GB of memory that is contiguous in
physical memory, the driver will optimize the page_size and try to use
an mkey with 4GB entity size. The 'unsigned int' page_size variable will
overflow to '0' and we'll hit the WARN_ON() in alloc_cacheable_mr().
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1203 at drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c:1124 alloc_cacheable_mr+0x22/0x580 [mlx5_ib]
Modules linked in: mlx5_ib mlx5_core bonding ip6_gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 ip_gre gre rdma_rxe rdma_ucm ib_uverbs ib_ipoib ib_umad rpcrdma ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm fuse ib_core [last unloaded: mlx5_core]
CPU: 2 UID: 70878 PID: 1203 Comm: rdma_resource_l Tainted: G W 6.14.0-rc4-dirty #43
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:alloc_cacheable_mr+0x22/0x580 [mlx5_ib]
Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 52 53 48 83 ec 30 f6 46 28 04 4c 8b 77 08 75 21 <0f> 0b 49 c7 c2 ea ff ff ff 48 8d 65 d0 4c 89 d0 5b 41 5a 41 5c 41
RSP: 0018:ffffc900006ffac8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000004c0d0d0 RBX: ffff888217a22000 RCX: 0000000000100001
RDX: 00007fb7ac480000 RSI: ffff8882037b1240 RDI: ffff8882046f0600
RBP: ffffc900006ffb28 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000007e0 R11: ffffea0008011d40 R12: ffff8882037b1240
R13: ffff8882046f0600 R14: ffff888217a22000 R15: ffffc900006ffe00
FS: 00007fb7ed013340(0000) GS:ffff88885fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fb7ed1d8000 CR3: 00000001fd8f6006 CR4: 0000000000772eb0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x81/0x130
? alloc_cacheable_mr+0x22/0x580 [mlx5_ib]
? report_bug+0xfc/0x1e0
? handle_bug+0x55/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? alloc_cacheable_mr+0x22/0x580 [mlx5_ib]
create_real_mr+0x54/0x150 [mlx5_ib]
ib_uverbs_reg_mr+0x17f/0x2a0 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0xca/0x140 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_run_method+0x6d0/0x780 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx_ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0x10/0x10 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x19b/0x360 [ib_uverbs]
? walk_system_ram_range+0x79/0xd0
? ___pte_offset_map+0x1b/0x110
? __pte_offset_map_lock+0x80/0x100
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xac/0x110 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x94/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x50/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7fb7ecf0737b
Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 7d 2a 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffdbe03ecc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffdbe03edb8 RCX: 00007fb7ecf0737b
RDX: 00007ffdbe03eda0 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffdbe03ed80 R08: 00007fb7ecc84010 R09: 00007ffdbe03eed4
R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdbe03eed4
R13: 000000000000000c R14: 000000000000000c R15: 00007fb7ecc84150
</TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: Fix NULL dereference in SR-IOV VF creation error path
Clean up when virtfn setup fails to prevent NULL pointer dereference
during device removal. The kernel oops below occurred due to incorrect
error handling flow when pci_setup_device() fails.
Add pci_iov_scan_device(), which handles virtfn allocation and setup and
cleans up if pci_setup_device() fails, so pci_iov_add_virtfn() doesn't need
to call pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device(). This prevents accessing
partially initialized virtfn devices during removal.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000d0
RIP: 0010:device_del+0x3d/0x3d0
Call Trace:
pci_remove_bus_device+0x7c/0x100
pci_iov_add_virtfn+0xfa/0x200
sriov_enable+0x208/0x420
mlx5_core_sriov_configure+0x6a/0x160 [mlx5_core]
sriov_numvfs_store+0xae/0x1a0
[bhelgaas: commit log, return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) directly]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: avoid NPD when ASIC does not support DMUB
ctx->dmub_srv will de NULL if the ASIC does not support DMUB, which is
tested in dm_dmub_sw_init.
However, it will be dereferenced in dmub_hw_lock_mgr_cmd if
should_use_dmub_lock returns true.
This has been the case since dmub support has been added for PSR1.
Fix this by checking for dmub_srv in should_use_dmub_lock.
[ 37.440832] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058
[ 37.447808] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 37.452959] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 37.458112] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 37.460662] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 37.465553] CPU: 2 UID: 1000 PID: 1745 Comm: DrmThread Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1-00003-gd62e938120f0 #23 99720e1cb1e0fc4773b8513150932a07de3c6e88
[ 37.478324] Hardware name: Google Morphius/Morphius, BIOS Google_Morphius.13434.858.0 10/26/2023
[ 37.487103] RIP: 0010:dmub_hw_lock_mgr_cmd+0x77/0xb0
[ 37.492074] Code: 44 24 0e 00 00 00 00 48 c7 04 24 45 00 00 0c 40 88 74 24 0d 0f b6 02 88 44 24 0c 8b 01 89 44 24 08 85 f6 75 05 c6 44 24 0e 01 <48> 8b 7f 58 48 89 e6 ba 01 00 00 00 e8 08 3c 2a 00 65 48 8b 04 5
[ 37.510822] RSP: 0018:ffff969442853300 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 37.516052] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff92db03000000 RCX: ffff969442853358
[ 37.523185] RDX: ffff969442853368 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 37.530322] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00000000000004a7 R09: 00000000000004a5
[ 37.537453] R10: 0000000000000476 R11: 0000000000000062 R12: ffff92db0ade8000
[ 37.544589] R13: ffff92da01180ae0 R14: ffff92da011802a8 R15: ffff92db03000000
[ 37.551725] FS: 0000784a9cdfc6c0(0000) GS:ffff92db2af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 37.559814] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 37.565562] CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 0000000112b1c000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
[ 37.572697] Call Trace:
[ 37.575152] <TASK>
[ 37.577258] ? __die_body+0x66/0xb0
[ 37.580756] ? page_fault_oops+0x3e7/0x4a0
[ 37.584861] ? exc_page_fault+0x3e/0xe0
[ 37.588706] ? exc_page_fault+0x5c/0xe0
[ 37.592550] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 37.596742] ? dmub_hw_lock_mgr_cmd+0x77/0xb0
[ 37.601107] dcn10_cursor_lock+0x1e1/0x240
[ 37.605211] program_cursor_attributes+0x81/0x190
[ 37.609923] commit_planes_for_stream+0x998/0x1ef0
[ 37.614722] update_planes_and_stream_v2+0x41e/0x5c0
[ 37.619703] dc_update_planes_and_stream+0x78/0x140
[ 37.624588] amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail+0x4362/0x49f0
[ 37.629832] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 37.633847] ? mark_held_locks+0x6d/0xd0
[ 37.637774] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50
[ 37.642135] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 37.646148] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x95/0x150
[ 37.650510] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 37.654522] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2f/0x50
[ 37.658883] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 37.662897] ? wait_for_common+0x186/0x1c0
[ 37.666998] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 37.671009] ? drm_crtc_next_vblank_start+0xc3/0x170
[ 37.675983] commit_tail+0xf5/0x1c0
[ 37.679478] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x2a2/0x2b0
[ 37.684186] drm_atomic_commit+0xd6/0x100
[ 37.688199] ? __cfi___drm_printfn_info+0x10/0x10
[ 37.692911] drm_atomic_helper_update_plane+0xe5/0x130
[ 37.698054] drm_mode_cursor_common+0x501/0x670
[ 37.702600] ? __cfi_drm_mode_cursor_ioctl+0x10/0x10
[ 37.707572] drm_mode_cursor_ioctl+0x48/0x70
[ 37.711851] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xf2/0x150
[ 37.715781] drm_ioctl+0x363/0x590
[ 37.719189] ? __cfi_drm_mode_cursor_ioctl+0x10/0x10
[ 37.724165] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x41/0x80
[ 37.728013] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xd0
[ 37.731685] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x100
[ 37.735355] ? vma_end_read+0x12/0xe0
[ 37.739024] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 37.743041] ? find_held_lock+0x47/0xf0
[ 37.746884] ? vma_end_read+0x12/0xe0
[ 37.750552] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/perf: Fix ref-counting on the PMU 'vpa_pmu'
Commit 176cda0619b6 ("powerpc/perf: Add perf interface to expose vpa
counters") introduced 'vpa_pmu' to expose Book3s-HV nested APIv2 provided
L1<->L2 context switch latency counters to L1 user-space via
perf-events. However the newly introduced PMU named 'vpa_pmu' doesn't
assign ownership of the PMU to the module 'vpa_pmu'. Consequently the
module 'vpa_pmu' can be unloaded while one of the perf-events are still
active, which can lead to kernel oops and panic of the form below on a
Pseries-LPAR:
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000058
<snip>
NIP [c000000000506cb8] event_sched_out+0x40/0x258
LR [c00000000050e8a4] __perf_remove_from_context+0x7c/0x2b0
Call Trace:
[c00000025fc3fc30] [c00000025f8457a8] 0xc00000025f8457a8 (unreliable)
[c00000025fc3fc80] [fffffffffffffee0] 0xfffffffffffffee0
[c00000025fc3fcd0] [c000000000501e70] event_function+0xa8/0x120
<snip>
Kernel panic - not syncing: Aiee, killing interrupt handler!
Fix this by adding the module ownership to 'vpa_pmu' so that the module
'vpa_pmu' is ref-counted and prevented from being unloaded when perf-events
are initialized.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: brcmstb: Fix error path after a call to regulator_bulk_get()
If the regulator_bulk_get() returns an error and no regulators
are created, we need to set their number to zero.
If we don't do this and the PCIe link up fails, a call to the
regulator_bulk_free() will result in a kernel panic.
While at it, print the error value, as we cannot return an error
upwards as the kernel will WARN() on an error from add_bus().
[kwilczynski: commit log, use comma in the message to match style with
other similar messages]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/gem: Fix error code msm_parse_deps()
The SUBMIT_ERROR() macro turns the error code negative. This extra '-'
operation turns it back to positive EINVAL again. The error code is
passed to ERR_PTR() and since positive values are not an IS_ERR() it
eventually will lead to an oops. Delete the '-'.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/637625/
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: vchiq_arm: Fix possible NPR of keep-alive thread
In case vchiq_platform_conn_state_changed() is never called or fails before
driver removal, ka_thread won't be a valid pointer to a task_struct. So
do the necessary checks before calling kthread_stop to avoid a crash.