Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In March 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: gcs: Do not set PTE_SHARED on GCS mappings if FEAT_LPA2 is enabled
When FEAT_LPA2 is enabled, bits 8-9 of the PTE replace the
shareability attribute with bits 50-51 of the output address. The
_PAGE_GCS{,_RO} definitions include the PTE_SHARED bits as 0b11 (this
matches the other _PAGE_* definitions) but using this macro directly
leads to the following panic when enabling GCS on a system/model with
LPA2:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffff1ffc32d8008
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 52-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000060f4d000
[fffff1ffc32d8008] pgd=100000006184b003, p4d=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 513 Comm: gcs_write_fault Tainted: G M 7.0.0-rc1 #1 PREEMPT
Tainted: [M]=MACHINE_CHECK
Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 2025.02-8+deb13u1 11/08/2025
pstate: 03402005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : zap_huge_pmd+0x168/0x468
lr : zap_huge_pmd+0x2c/0x468
sp : ffff800080beb660
x29: ffff800080beb660 x28: fff00000c2058180 x27: ffff800080beb898
x26: fff00000c2058180 x25: ffff800080beb820 x24: 00c800010b600f41
x23: ffffc1ffc30af1a8 x22: fff00000c2058180 x21: 0000ffff8dc00000
x20: fff00000c2bc6370 x19: ffff800080beb898 x18: ffff800080bebb60
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000007
x14: 000000000000000a x13: 0000aaaacbbbffff x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000ffff8ddfffff x10: 00000000000001fe x9 : 0000ffff8ddfffff
x8 : 0000ffff8de00000 x7 : 0000ffff8da00000 x6 : fff00000c2bc6370
x5 : 0000ffff8da00000 x4 : 000000010b600000 x3 : ffffc1ffc0000000
x2 : fff00000c2058180 x1 : fffff1ffc32d8000 x0 : 000000c00010b600
Call trace:
zap_huge_pmd+0x168/0x468 (P)
unmap_page_range+0xd70/0x1560
unmap_single_vma+0x48/0x80
unmap_vmas+0x90/0x180
unmap_region+0x88/0xe4
vms_complete_munmap_vmas+0xf8/0x1e0
do_vmi_align_munmap+0x158/0x180
do_vmi_munmap+0xac/0x160
__vm_munmap+0xb0/0x138
vm_munmap+0x14/0x20
gcs_free+0x70/0x80
mm_release+0x1c/0xc8
exit_mm_release+0x28/0x38
do_exit+0x190/0x8ec
do_group_exit+0x34/0x90
get_signal+0x794/0x858
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x11c/0x3e0
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x10c/0x17c
el0_da+0x8c/0x9c
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xd0/0xf0
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
Code: aa1603e2 d34cfc00 cb813001 8b011861 (f9400420)
Similarly to how the kernel handles protection_map[], use a
gcs_page_prot variable to store the protection bits and clear PTE_SHARED
if LPA2 is enabled.
Also remove the unused PAGE_GCS{,_RO} macros.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot()
The only caller of ioremap_prot() outside of the generic ioremap()
implementation is generic_access_phys(), which passes a 'pgprot_t' value
determined from the user mapping of the target 'pfn' being accessed by
the kernel. On arm64, the 'pgprot_t' contains all of the non-address
bits from the pte, including the permission controls, and so we end up
returning a new user mapping from ioremap_prot() which faults when
accessed from the kernel on systems with PAN:
| Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address ffff80008ea89000
| ...
| Call trace:
| __memcpy_fromio+0x80/0xf8
| generic_access_phys+0x20c/0x2b8
| __access_remote_vm+0x46c/0x5b8
| access_remote_vm+0x18/0x30
| environ_read+0x238/0x3e8
| vfs_read+0xe4/0x2b0
| ksys_read+0xcc/0x178
| __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x68
Extract only the memory type from the user 'pgprot_t' in ioremap_prot()
and assert that we're being passed a user mapping, to protect us against
any changes in future that may require additional handling. To avoid
falsely flagging users of ioremap(), provide our own ioremap() macro
which simply wraps __ioremap_prot().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: usb: f81604: correctly anchor the urb in the read bulk callback
When submitting an urb, that is using the anchor pattern, it needs to be
anchored before submitting it otherwise it could be leaked if
usb_kill_anchored_urbs() is called. This logic is correctly done
elsewhere in the driver, except in the read bulk callback so do that
here also.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Fix kernel stack leak in irdma_create_user_ah()
struct irdma_create_ah_resp { // 8 bytes, no padding
__u32 ah_id; // offset 0 - SET (uresp.ah_id = ah->sc_ah.ah_info.ah_idx)
__u8 rsvd[4]; // offset 4 - NEVER SET <- LEAK
};
rsvd[4]: 4 bytes of stack memory leaked unconditionally. Only ah_id is assigned before ib_respond_udata().
The reserved members of the structure were not zeroed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: cancel rfkill_block work in wiphy_unregister()
There is a use-after-free error in cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces found
by syzkaller:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces+0x213/0x220
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112a78d98 by task kworker/0:5/5326
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5326 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events cfg80211_rfkill_block_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0
print_report+0xcd/0x630
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces+0x213/0x220
cfg80211_rfkill_block_work+0x1e/0x30
process_one_work+0x9cf/0x1b70
worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10
kthread+0x3c5/0x780
ret_from_fork+0x56d/0x700
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
The problem arises due to the rfkill_block work is not cancelled when wiphy
is being unregistered. In order to fix the issue cancel the corresponding
work in wiphy_unregister().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: pinconf-generic: Fix memory leak in pinconf_generic_parse_dt_config()
In pinconf_generic_parse_dt_config(), if parse_dt_cfg() fails, it returns
directly. This bypasses the cleanup logic and results in a memory leak of
the cfg buffer.
Fix this by jumping to the out label on failure, ensuring kfree(cfg) is
called before returning.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/userq: Do not allow userspace to trivially triger kernel warnings
Userspace can either deliberately pass in the too small num_fences, or the
required number can legitimately grow between the two calls to the userq
wait ioctl. In both cases we do not want the emit the kernel warning
backtrace since nothing is wrong with the kernel and userspace will simply
get an errno reported back. So lets simply drop the WARN_ONs.
(cherry picked from commit 2c333ea579de6cc20ea7bc50e9595ef72863e65c)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: nci: free skb on nci_transceive early error paths
nci_transceive() takes ownership of the skb passed by the caller,
but the -EPROTO, -EINVAL, and -EBUSY error paths return without
freeing it.
Due to issues clearing NCI_DATA_EXCHANGE fixed by subsequent changes
the nci/nci_dev selftest hits the error path occasionally in NIPA,
and kmemleak detects leaks:
unreferenced object 0xff11000015ce6a40 (size 640):
comm "nci_dev", pid 3954, jiffies 4295441246
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
6b 6b 6b 6b 00 a4 00 0c 02 e1 03 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkk.......kkkkk
6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
backtrace (crc 7c40cc2a):
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x492/0x630
__alloc_skb+0x11e/0x5f0
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc6/0x8f0
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x326/0x3f0
nfc_alloc_send_skb+0x94/0x1d0
rawsock_sendmsg+0x162/0x4c0
do_syscall_64+0x117/0xfc0
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: avoid qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() vs dequeue race for lockless qdiscs
When shrinking the number of real tx queues,
netif_set_real_num_tx_queues() calls qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() to flush
qdiscs for queues which will no longer be used.
qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() currently serializes qdisc_reset() with
qdisc_lock(). However, for lockless qdiscs, the dequeue path is
serialized by qdisc_run_begin/end() using qdisc->seqlock instead, so
qdisc_reset() can run concurrently with __qdisc_run() and free skbs
while they are still being dequeued, leading to UAF.
This can easily be reproduced on e.g. virtio-net by imposing heavy
traffic while frequently changing the number of queue pairs:
iperf3 -ub0 -c $peer -t 0 &
while :; do
ethtool -L eth0 combined 1
ethtool -L eth0 combined 2
done
With KASAN enabled, this leads to reports like:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
...
__qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760
__dev_queue_xmit+0x248f/0x3550
ip_finish_output2+0xa42/0x2110
ip_output+0x1a7/0x410
ip_send_skb+0x2e6/0x480
udp_send_skb+0xb0a/0x1590
udp_sendmsg+0x13c9/0x1fc0
...
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1270 on cpu 5 at 44.558414s:
...
alloc_skb_with_frags+0x84/0x7c0
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x69a/0x830
__ip_append_data+0x1b86/0x48c0
ip_make_skb+0x1e8/0x2b0
udp_sendmsg+0x13a6/0x1fc0
...
Freed by task 1306 on cpu 3 at 44.558445s:
...
kmem_cache_free+0x117/0x5e0
pfifo_fast_reset+0x14d/0x580
qdisc_reset+0x9e/0x5f0
netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x303/0x840
virtnet_set_channels+0x1bf/0x260 [virtio_net]
ethnl_set_channels+0x684/0xae0
ethnl_default_set_doit+0x31a/0x890
...
Serialize qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() against the lockless dequeue path by
taking qdisc->seqlock for TCQ_F_NOLOCK qdiscs, matching the
serialization model already used by dev_reset_queue().
Additionally clear QDISC_STATE_NON_EMPTY after reset so the qdisc state
reflects an empty queue, avoiding needless re-scheduling.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libie: don't unroll if fwlog isn't supported
The libie_fwlog_deinit() function can be called during driver unload
even when firmware logging was never properly initialized. This led to call
trace:
[ 148.576156] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 148.576167] CPU: 80 UID: 0 PID: 12843 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.17.0-rc7next-queue-3oct-01915-g06d79d51cf51 #1 PREEMPT(full)
[ 148.576177] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10 Plus/ProLiant DL385 Gen10 Plus, BIOS A42 07/18/2020
[ 148.576182] RIP: 0010:__dev_printk+0x16/0x70
[ 148.576196] Code: 1f 44 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 55 41 54 49 89 d4 55 48 89 fd 53 48 85 f6 74 3c <4c> 8b 6e 50 48 89 f3 4d 85 ed 75 03 4c 8b 2e 48 89 df e8 f3 27 98
[ 148.576204] RSP: 0018:ffffd2fd7ea17a48 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 148.576211] RAX: ffffd2fd7ea17aa0 RBX: ffff8eb288ae2000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 148.576217] RDX: ffffd2fd7ea17a70 RSI: 00000000000000c8 RDI: ffffffffb68d3d88
[ 148.576222] RBP: ffffffffb68d3d88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 148.576227] R10: 00000000000000c8 R11: ffff8eb2b1a49400 R12: ffffd2fd7ea17a70
[ 148.576231] R13: ffff8eb3141fb000 R14: ffffffffc1215b48 R15: ffffffffc1215bd8
[ 148.576236] FS: 00007f5666ba6740(0000) GS:ffff8eb2472b9000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 148.576242] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 148.576247] CR2: 0000000000000118 CR3: 000000011ad17000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[ 148.576252] Call Trace:
[ 148.576258] <TASK>
[ 148.576269] _dev_warn+0x7c/0x96
[ 148.576290] libie_fwlog_deinit+0x112/0x117 [libie_fwlog]
[ 148.576303] ixgbe_remove+0x63/0x290 [ixgbe]
[ 148.576342] pci_device_remove+0x42/0xb0
[ 148.576354] device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200
[ 148.576365] driver_detach+0x48/0x90
[ 148.576372] bus_remove_driver+0x6d/0xf0
[ 148.576383] pci_unregister_driver+0x2e/0xb0
[ 148.576393] ixgbe_exit_module+0x1c/0xd50 [ixgbe]
[ 148.576430] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x1bc/0x2e0
[ 148.576446] do_syscall_64+0x7f/0x980
It can be reproduced by trying to unload ixgbe driver in recovery mode.
Fix that by checking if fwlog is supported before doing unroll.