Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In February 2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: Fix gluebi NULL pointer dereference caused by ftl notifier
If both ftl.ko and gluebi.ko are loaded, the notifier of ftl
triggers NULL pointer dereference when trying to access
‘gluebi->desc’ in gluebi_read().
ubi_gluebi_init
ubi_register_volume_notifier
ubi_enumerate_volumes
ubi_notify_all
gluebi_notify nb->notifier_call()
gluebi_create
mtd_device_register
mtd_device_parse_register
add_mtd_device
blktrans_notify_add not->add()
ftl_add_mtd tr->add_mtd()
scan_header
mtd_read
mtd_read_oob
mtd_read_oob_std
gluebi_read mtd->read()
gluebi->desc - NULL
Detailed reproduction information available at the Link [1],
In the normal case, obtain gluebi->desc in the gluebi_get_device(),
and access gluebi->desc in the gluebi_read(). However,
gluebi_get_device() is not executed in advance in the
ftl_add_mtd() process, which leads to NULL pointer dereference.
The solution for the gluebi module is to run jffs2 on the UBI
volume without considering working with ftl or mtdblock [2].
Therefore, this problem can be avoided by preventing gluebi from
creating the mtdblock device after creating mtd partition of the
type MTD_UBIVOLUME.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix NULL pointer dereference issue in upi_fill_topology()
Get logical socket id instead of physical id in discover_upi_topology()
to avoid out-of-bound access on 'upi = &type->topology[nid][idx];' line
that leads to NULL pointer dereference in upi_fill_topology()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/pseries/memhp: Fix access beyond end of drmem array
dlpar_memory_remove_by_index() may access beyond the bounds of the
drmem lmb array when the LMB lookup fails to match an entry with the
given DRC index. When the search fails, the cursor is left pointing to
&drmem_info->lmbs[drmem_info->n_lmbs], which is one element past the
last valid entry in the array. The debug message at the end of the
function then dereferences this pointer:
pr_debug("Failed to hot-remove memory at %llx\n",
lmb->base_addr);
This was found by inspection and confirmed with KASAN:
pseries-hotplug-mem: Attempting to hot-remove LMB, drc index 1234
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dlpar_memory+0x298/0x1658
Read of size 8 at addr c000000364e97fd0 by task bash/949
dump_stack_lvl+0xa4/0xfc (unreliable)
print_report+0x214/0x63c
kasan_report+0x140/0x2e0
__asan_load8+0xa8/0xe0
dlpar_memory+0x298/0x1658
handle_dlpar_errorlog+0x130/0x1d0
dlpar_store+0x18c/0x3e0
kobj_attr_store+0x68/0xa0
sysfs_kf_write+0xc4/0x110
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x390
vfs_write+0x2d4/0x4e0
ksys_write+0xac/0x1a0
system_call_exception+0x268/0x530
system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
Allocated by task 1:
kasan_save_stack+0x48/0x80
kasan_set_track+0x34/0x50
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x34/0x50
__kasan_kmalloc+0xd0/0x120
__kmalloc+0x8c/0x320
kmalloc_array.constprop.0+0x48/0x5c
drmem_init+0x2a0/0x41c
do_one_initcall+0xe0/0x5c0
kernel_init_freeable+0x4ec/0x5a0
kernel_init+0x30/0x1e0
ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c
The buggy address belongs to the object at c000000364e80000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128k of size 131072
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 98256-byte region [c000000364e80000, c000000364e97fd0)
==================================================================
pseries-hotplug-mem: Failed to hot-remove memory at 0
Log failed lookups with a separate message and dereference the
cursor only when it points to a valid entry.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix accesses to uninit stack slots
Privileged programs are supposed to be able to read uninitialized stack
memory (ever since 6715df8d5) but, before this patch, these accesses
were permitted inconsistently. In particular, accesses were permitted
above state->allocated_stack, but not below it. In other words, if the
stack was already "large enough", the access was permitted, but
otherwise the access was rejected instead of being allowed to "grow the
stack". This undesired rejection was happening in two places:
- in check_stack_slot_within_bounds()
- in check_stack_range_initialized()
This patch arranges for these accesses to be permitted. A bunch of tests
that were relying on the old rejection had to change; all of them were
changed to add also run unprivileged, in which case the old behavior
persists. One tests couldn't be updated - global_func16 - because it
can't run unprivileged for other reasons.
This patch also fixes the tracking of the stack size for variable-offset
reads. This second fix is bundled in the same commit as the first one
because they're inter-related. Before this patch, writes to the stack
using registers containing a variable offset (as opposed to registers
with fixed, known values) were not properly contributing to the
function's needed stack size. As a result, it was possible for a program
to verify, but then to attempt to read out-of-bounds data at runtime
because a too small stack had been allocated for it.
Each function tracks the size of the stack it needs in
bpf_subprog_info.stack_depth, which is maintained by
update_stack_depth(). For regular memory accesses, check_mem_access()
was calling update_state_depth() but it was passing in only the fixed
part of the offset register, ignoring the variable offset. This was
incorrect; the minimum possible value of that register should be used
instead.
This tracking is now fixed by centralizing the tracking of stack size in
grow_stack_state(), and by lifting the calls to grow_stack_state() to
check_stack_access_within_bounds() as suggested by Andrii. The code is
now simpler and more convincingly tracks the correct maximum stack size.
check_stack_range_initialized() can now rely on enough stack having been
allocated for the access; this helps with the fix for the first issue.
A few tests were changed to also check the stack depth computation. The
one that fails without this patch is verifier_var_off:stack_write_priv_vs_unpriv.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mlxsw: spectrum_acl_tcam: Fix stack corruption
When tc filters are first added to a net device, the corresponding local
port gets bound to an ACL group in the device. The group contains a list
of ACLs. In turn, each ACL points to a different TCAM region where the
filters are stored. During forwarding, the ACLs are sequentially
evaluated until a match is found.
One reason to place filters in different regions is when they are added
with decreasing priorities and in an alternating order so that two
consecutive filters can never fit in the same region because of their
key usage.
In Spectrum-2 and newer ASICs the firmware started to report that the
maximum number of ACLs in a group is more than 16, but the layout of the
register that configures ACL groups (PAGT) was not updated to account
for that. It is therefore possible to hit stack corruption [1] in the
rare case where more than 16 ACLs in a group are required.
Fix by limiting the maximum ACL group size to the minimum between what
the firmware reports and the maximum ACLs that fit in the PAGT register.
Add a test case to make sure the machine does not crash when this
condition is hit.
[1]
Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_group_update+0x116/0x120
[...]
dump_stack_lvl+0x36/0x50
panic+0x305/0x330
__stack_chk_fail+0x15/0x20
mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_group_update+0x116/0x120
mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_group_region_attach+0x69/0x110
mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_get+0x492/0xa20
mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_ventry_add+0x25/0xe0
mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_add+0x47/0x240
mlxsw_sp_flower_replace+0x1a9/0x1d0
tc_setup_cb_add+0xdc/0x1c0
fl_hw_replace_filter+0x146/0x1f0
fl_change+0xc17/0x1360
tc_new_tfilter+0x472/0xb90
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x313/0x3b0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x58/0x100
netlink_unicast+0x244/0x390
netlink_sendmsg+0x1e4/0x440
____sys_sendmsg+0x164/0x260
___sys_sendmsg+0x9a/0xe0
__sys_sendmsg+0x7a/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: netdevsim: don't try to destroy PHC on VFs
PHC gets initialized in nsim_init_netdevsim(), which
is only called if (nsim_dev_port_is_pf()).
Create a counterpart of nsim_init_netdevsim() and
move the mock_phc_destroy() there.
This fixes a crash trying to destroy netdevsim with
VFs instantiated, as caught by running the devlink.sh test:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000b8
RIP: 0010:mock_phc_destroy+0xd/0x30
Call Trace:
<TASK>
nsim_destroy+0x4a/0x70 [netdevsim]
__nsim_dev_port_del+0x47/0x70 [netdevsim]
nsim_dev_reload_destroy+0x105/0x120 [netdevsim]
nsim_drv_remove+0x2f/0xb0 [netdevsim]
device_release_driver_internal+0x1a1/0x210
bus_remove_device+0xd5/0x120
device_del+0x159/0x490
device_unregister+0x12/0x30
del_device_store+0x11a/0x1a0 [netdevsim]
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x130/0x1d0
vfs_write+0x30b/0x4b0
ksys_write+0x69/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x1e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: BPF: Prevent out-of-bounds memory access
The test_tag test triggers an unhandled page fault:
# ./test_tag
[ 130.640218] CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80001b898004, era == 9000000003137f7c, ra == 9000000003139e70
[ 130.640501] Oops[#3]:
[ 130.640553] CPU: 0 PID: 1326 Comm: test_tag Tainted: G D O 6.7.0-rc4-loong-devel-gb62ab1a397cf #47 61985c1d94084daa2432f771daa45b56b10d8d2a
[ 130.640764] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
[ 130.640874] pc 9000000003137f7c ra 9000000003139e70 tp 9000000104cb4000 sp 9000000104cb7a40
[ 130.641001] a0 ffff80001b894000 a1 ffff80001b897ff8 a2 000000006ba210be a3 0000000000000000
[ 130.641128] a4 000000006ba210be a5 00000000000000f1 a6 00000000000000b3 a7 0000000000000000
[ 130.641256] t0 0000000000000000 t1 00000000000007f6 t2 0000000000000000 t3 9000000004091b70
[ 130.641387] t4 000000006ba210be t5 0000000000000004 t6 fffffffffffffff0 t7 90000000040913e0
[ 130.641512] t8 0000000000000005 u0 0000000000000dc0 s9 0000000000000009 s0 9000000104cb7ae0
[ 130.641641] s1 00000000000007f6 s2 0000000000000009 s3 0000000000000095 s4 0000000000000000
[ 130.641771] s5 ffff80001b894000 s6 ffff80001b897fb0 s7 9000000004090c50 s8 0000000000000000
[ 130.641900] ra: 9000000003139e70 build_body+0x1fcc/0x4988
[ 130.642007] ERA: 9000000003137f7c build_body+0xd8/0x4988
[ 130.642112] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
[ 130.642261] PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE)
[ 130.642353] EUEN: 00000003 (+FPE +SXE -ASXE -BTE)
[ 130.642458] ECFG: 00071c1c (LIE=2-4,10-12 VS=7)
[ 130.642554] ESTAT: 00010000 [PIL] (IS= ECode=1 EsubCode=0)
[ 130.642658] BADV: ffff80001b898004
[ 130.642719] PRID: 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A5000)
[ 130.642815] Modules linked in: [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(O)]
[ 130.642924] Process test_tag (pid: 1326, threadinfo=00000000f7f4015f, task=000000006499f9fd)
[ 130.643062] Stack : 0000000000000000 9000000003380724 0000000000000000 0000000104cb7be8
[ 130.643213] 0000000000000000 25af8d9b6e600558 9000000106250ea0 9000000104cb7ae0
[ 130.643378] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000104cb7be8 90000000049f6000
[ 130.643538] 0000000000000090 9000000106250ea0 ffff80001b894000 ffff80001b894000
[ 130.643685] 00007ffffb917790 900000000313ca94 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 130.643831] ffff80001b894000 0000000000000ff7 0000000000000000 9000000100468000
[ 130.643983] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000040 25af8d9b6e600558
[ 130.644131] 0000000000000bb7 ffff80001b894048 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 130.644276] 9000000104cb7be8 90000000049f6000 0000000000000090 9000000104cb7bdc
[ 130.644423] ffff80001b894000 0000000000000000 00007ffffb917790 90000000032acfb0
[ 130.644572] ...
[ 130.644629] Call Trace:
[ 130.644641] [<9000000003137f7c>] build_body+0xd8/0x4988
[ 130.644785] [<900000000313ca94>] bpf_int_jit_compile+0x228/0x4ec
[ 130.644891] [<90000000032acfb0>] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x158/0x1b0
[ 130.645003] [<90000000032b3504>] bpf_prog_load+0x760/0xb44
[ 130.645089] [<90000000032b6744>] __sys_bpf+0xbb8/0x2588
[ 130.645175] [<90000000032b8388>] sys_bpf+0x20/0x2c
[ 130.645259] [<9000000003f6ab38>] do_syscall+0x7c/0x94
[ 130.645369] [<9000000003121c5c>] handle_syscall+0xbc/0x158
[ 130.645507]
[ 130.645539] Code: 380839f6 380831f9 28412bae <24000ca6> 004081ad 0014cb50 004083e8 02bff34c 58008e91
[ 130.645729]
[ 130.646418] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
On my machine, which has CONFIG_PAGE_SIZE_16KB=y, the test failed at
loading a BPF prog with 2039 instructions:
prog = (struct bpf_prog *)ffff80001b894000
insn = (struct bpf_insn *)(prog->insnsi)fff
---truncated---
cmseasy V7.7.7.9 has an arbitrary file deletion vulnerability in lib/admin/template_admin.php.
Hertzbeat is a real-time monitoring system. In `CalculateAlarm.java`, `AviatorEvaluator` is used to directly execute the expression function, and no security policy is configured, resulting in AviatorScript (which can execute any static method by default) script injection. Version 1.4.1 fixes this vulnerability.
Hertzbeat is a real-time monitoring system. At the interface of `/define/yml`, SnakeYAML is used as a parser to parse yml content, but no security configuration is used, resulting in a YAML deserialization vulnerability. Version 1.4.1 fixes this vulnerability.