Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In February 2025
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix integer overflows on 32 bit systems
On 32bit systems the addition operations in ipc_msg_alloc() can
potentially overflow leading to memory corruption.
Add bounds checking using KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD to avoid overflow.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rose: lock the socket in rose_bind()
syzbot reported a soft lockup in rose_loopback_timer(),
with a repro calling bind() from multiple threads.
rose_bind() must lock the socket to avoid this issue.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: HWS, change error flow on matcher disconnect
Currently, when firmware failure occurs during matcher disconnect flow,
the error flow of the function reconnects the matcher back and returns
an error, which continues running the calling function and eventually
frees the matcher that is being disconnected.
This leads to a case where we have a freed matcher on the matchers list,
which in turn leads to use-after-free and eventual crash.
This patch fixes that by not trying to reconnect the matcher back when
some FW command fails during disconnect.
Note that we're dealing here with FW error. We can't overcome this
problem. This might lead to bad steering state (e.g. wrong connection
between matchers), and will also lead to resource leakage, as it is
the case with any other error handling during resource destruction.
However, the goal here is to allow the driver to continue and not crash
the machine with use-after-free error.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix use-after-free when attempting to join an aborted transaction
When we are trying to join the current transaction and if it's aborted,
we read its 'aborted' field after unlocking fs_info->trans_lock and
without holding any extra reference count on it. This means that a
concurrent task that is aborting the transaction may free the transaction
before we read its 'aborted' field, leading to a use-after-free.
Fix this by reading the 'aborted' field while holding fs_info->trans_lock
since any freeing task must first acquire that lock and set
fs_info->running_transaction to NULL before freeing the transaction.
This was reported by syzbot and Dmitry with the following stack traces
from KASAN:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in join_transaction+0xd9b/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:278
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888011839024 by task kworker/u4:9/1128
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1128 Comm: kworker/u4:9 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-syzkaller-00019-gc45323b7560e #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602
join_transaction+0xd9b/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:278
start_transaction+0xaf8/0x1670 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:697
flush_space+0x448/0xcf0 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:803
btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x159/0x510 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1321
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3236 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa66/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3317
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3398
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Allocated by task 5315:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x243/0x390 mm/slub.c:4329
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:901 [inline]
join_transaction+0x144/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:308
start_transaction+0xaf8/0x1670 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:697
btrfs_create_common+0x1b2/0x2e0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6572
lookup_open fs/namei.c:3649 [inline]
open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3748 [inline]
path_openat+0x1c03/0x3590 fs/namei.c:3984
do_filp_open+0x27f/0x4e0 fs/namei.c:4014
do_sys_openat2+0x13e/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1402
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1417 [inline]
__do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1495 [inline]
__se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1489 [inline]
__x64_sys_creat+0x123/0x170 fs/open.c:1489
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 5336:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:582
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2353 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4613 [inline]
kfree+0x196/0x430 mm/slub.c:4761
cleanup_transaction fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2063 [inline]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x2c97/0x3720 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2598
insert_balance_item+0x1284/0x20b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3757
btrfs_balance+0x992/
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFC: nci: Add bounds checking in nci_hci_create_pipe()
The "pipe" variable is a u8 which comes from the network. If it's more
than 127, then it results in memory corruption in the caller,
nci_hci_connect_gate().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix possible int overflows in nilfs_fiemap()
Since nilfs_bmap_lookup_contig() in nilfs_fiemap() calculates its result
by being prepared to go through potentially maxblocks == INT_MAX blocks,
the value in n may experience an overflow caused by left shift of blkbits.
While it is extremely unlikely to occur, play it safe and cast right hand
expression to wider type to mitigate the issue.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with static analysis
tool SVACE.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix memory leak in ceph_mds_auth_match()
We now free the temporary target path substring allocation on every
possible branch, instead of omitting the default branch. In some
cases, a memory leak occured, which could rapidly crash the system
(depending on how many file accesses were attempted).
This was detected in production because it caused a continuous memory
growth, eventually triggering kernel OOM and completely hard-locking
the kernel.
Relevant kmemleak stacktrace:
unreferenced object 0xffff888131e69900 (size 128):
comm "git", pid 66104, jiffies 4295435999
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
76 6f 6c 75 6d 65 73 2f 63 6f 6e 74 61 69 6e 65 volumes/containe
72 73 2f 67 69 74 65 61 2f 67 69 74 65 61 2f 67 rs/gitea/gitea/g
backtrace (crc 2f3bb450):
[<ffffffffaa68fb49>] __kmalloc_noprof+0x359/0x510
[<ffffffffc32bf1df>] ceph_mds_check_access+0x5bf/0x14e0 [ceph]
[<ffffffffc3235722>] ceph_open+0x312/0xd80 [ceph]
[<ffffffffaa7dd786>] do_dentry_open+0x456/0x1120
[<ffffffffaa7e3729>] vfs_open+0x79/0x360
[<ffffffffaa832875>] path_openat+0x1de5/0x4390
[<ffffffffaa834fcc>] do_filp_open+0x19c/0x3c0
[<ffffffffaa7e44a1>] do_sys_openat2+0x141/0x180
[<ffffffffaa7e4945>] __x64_sys_open+0xe5/0x1a0
[<ffffffffac2cc2f7>] do_syscall_64+0xb7/0x210
[<ffffffffac400130>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
It can be triggered by mouting a subdirectory of a CephFS filesystem,
and then trying to access files on this subdirectory with an auth token
using a path-scoped capability:
$ ceph auth get client.services
[client.services]
key = REDACTED
caps mds = "allow rw fsname=cephfs path=/volumes/"
caps mon = "allow r fsname=cephfs"
caps osd = "allow rw tag cephfs data=cephfs"
$ cat /proc/self/mounts
services@[REDACTED].cephfs=/volumes/containers /ceph/containers ceph rw,noatime,name=services,secret=<hidden>,ms_mode=prefer-crc,mount_timeout=300,acl,mon_addr=[REDACTED]:3300,recover_session=clean 0 0
$ seq 1 1000000 | xargs -P32 --replace={} touch /ceph/containers/file-{} && \
seq 1 1000000 | xargs -P32 --replace={} cat /ceph/containers/file-{}
[ idryomov: combine if statements, rename rc to path_matched and make
it a bool, formatting ]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Fix use-after free in init error and remove paths
devm_blk_crypto_profile_init() registers a cleanup handler to run when
the associated (platform-) device is being released. For UFS, the
crypto private data and pointers are stored as part of the ufs_hba's
data structure 'struct ufs_hba::crypto_profile'. This structure is
allocated as part of the underlying ufshcd and therefore Scsi_host
allocation.
During driver release or during error handling in ufshcd_pltfrm_init(),
this structure is released as part of ufshcd_dealloc_host() before the
(platform-) device associated with the crypto call above is released.
Once this device is released, the crypto cleanup code will run, using
the just-released 'struct ufs_hba::crypto_profile'. This causes a
use-after-free situation:
Call trace:
kfree+0x60/0x2d8 (P)
kvfree+0x44/0x60
blk_crypto_profile_destroy_callback+0x28/0x70
devm_action_release+0x1c/0x30
release_nodes+0x6c/0x108
devres_release_all+0x98/0x100
device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x70
really_probe+0x218/0x2d0
In other words, the initialisation code flow is:
platform-device probe
ufshcd_pltfrm_init()
ufshcd_alloc_host()
scsi_host_alloc()
allocation of struct ufs_hba
creation of scsi-host devices
devm_blk_crypto_profile_init()
devm registration of cleanup handler using platform-device
and during error handling of ufshcd_pltfrm_init() or during driver
removal:
ufshcd_dealloc_host()
scsi_host_put()
put_device(scsi-host)
release of struct ufs_hba
put_device(platform-device)
crypto cleanup handler
To fix this use-after free, change ufshcd_alloc_host() to register a
devres action to automatically cleanup the underlying SCSI device on
ufshcd destruction, without requiring explicit calls to
ufshcd_dealloc_host(). This way:
* the crypto profile and all other ufs_hba-owned resources are
destroyed before SCSI (as they've been registered after)
* a memleak is plugged in tc-dwc-g210-pci.c remove() as a
side-effect
* EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ufshcd_dealloc_host) can be removed fully as
it's not needed anymore
* no future drivers using ufshcd_alloc_host() could ever forget
adding the cleanup
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbnet: ipheth: fix DPE OoB read
Fix an out-of-bounds DPE read, limit the number of processed DPEs to
the amount that fits into the fixed-size NDP16 header.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbnet: ipheth: use static NDP16 location in URB
Original code allowed for the start of NDP16 to be anywhere within the
URB based on the `wNdpIndex` value in NTH16. Only the start position of
NDP16 was checked, so it was possible for even the fixed-length part
of NDP16 to extend past the end of URB, leading to an out-of-bounds
read.
On iOS devices, the NDP16 header always directly follows NTH16. Rely on
and check for this specific format.
This, along with NCM-specific minimal URB length check that already
exists, will ensure that the fixed-length part of NDP16 plus a set
amount of DPEs fit within the URB.
Note that this commit alone does not fully address the OoB read.
The limit on the amount of DPEs needs to be enforced separately.