Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In January 2025
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: sysctl: auth_enable: avoid using current->nsproxy
As mentioned in a previous commit of this series, using the 'net'
structure via 'current' is not recommended for different reasons:
- Inconsistency: getting info from the reader's/writer's netns vs only
from the opener's netns.
- current->nsproxy can be NULL in some cases, resulting in an 'Oops'
(null-ptr-deref), e.g. when the current task is exiting, as spotted by
syzbot [1] using acct(2).
The 'net' structure can be obtained from the table->data using
container_of().
Note that table->data could also be used directly, but that would
increase the size of this fix, while 'sctp.ctl_sock' still needs to be
retrieved from 'net' structure.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: sysctl: rto_min/max: avoid using current->nsproxy
As mentioned in a previous commit of this series, using the 'net'
structure via 'current' is not recommended for different reasons:
- Inconsistency: getting info from the reader's/writer's netns vs only
from the opener's netns.
- current->nsproxy can be NULL in some cases, resulting in an 'Oops'
(null-ptr-deref), e.g. when the current task is exiting, as spotted by
syzbot [1] using acct(2).
The 'net' structure can be obtained from the table->data using
container_of().
Note that table->data could also be used directly, as this is the only
member needed from the 'net' structure, but that would increase the size
of this fix, to use '*data' everywhere 'net->sctp.rto_min/max' is used.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: sysctl: cookie_hmac_alg: avoid using current->nsproxy
As mentioned in a previous commit of this series, using the 'net'
structure via 'current' is not recommended for different reasons:
- Inconsistency: getting info from the reader's/writer's netns vs only
from the opener's netns.
- current->nsproxy can be NULL in some cases, resulting in an 'Oops'
(null-ptr-deref), e.g. when the current task is exiting, as spotted by
syzbot [1] using acct(2).
The 'net' structure can be obtained from the table->data using
container_of().
Note that table->data could also be used directly, as this is the only
member needed from the 'net' structure, but that would increase the size
of this fix, to use '*data' everywhere 'net->sctp.sctp_hmac_alg' is
used.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: sysctl: blackhole timeout: avoid using current->nsproxy
As mentioned in the previous commit, using the 'net' structure via
'current' is not recommended for different reasons:
- Inconsistency: getting info from the reader's/writer's netns vs only
from the opener's netns.
- current->nsproxy can be NULL in some cases, resulting in an 'Oops'
(null-ptr-deref), e.g. when the current task is exiting, as spotted by
syzbot [1] using acct(2).
The 'pernet' structure can be obtained from the table->data using
container_of().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: sysctl: sched: avoid using current->nsproxy
Using the 'net' structure via 'current' is not recommended for different
reasons.
First, if the goal is to use it to read or write per-netns data, this is
inconsistent with how the "generic" sysctl entries are doing: directly
by only using pointers set to the table entry, e.g. table->data. Linked
to that, the per-netns data should always be obtained from the table
linked to the netns it had been created for, which may not coincide with
the reader's or writer's netns.
Another reason is that access to current->nsproxy->netns can oops if
attempted when current->nsproxy had been dropped when the current task
is exiting. This is what syzbot found, when using acct(2):
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5924 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00004-gccb98ccef0e5 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:proc_scheduler+0xc6/0x3c0 net/mptcp/ctrl.c:125
Code: 03 42 80 3c 38 00 0f 85 fe 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 08 09 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d 7c 24 28 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 02 00 00 4d 8b 7c 24 28 48 8d 84 24 c8 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc900034774e8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff9200068ee9e RCX: ffffc90003477620
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffffffff8b08f91e RDI: 0000000000000028
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffc90003477710 R09: 0000000000000040
R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 00000000726f7475 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffc90003477620 R14: ffffc90003477710 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fee3cd452d8 CR3: 000000007d116000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
proc_sys_call_handler+0x403/0x5d0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601
__kernel_write_iter+0x318/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:612
__kernel_write+0xf6/0x140 fs/read_write.c:632
do_acct_process+0xcb0/0x14a0 kernel/acct.c:539
acct_pin_kill+0x2d/0x100 kernel/acct.c:192
pin_kill+0x194/0x7c0 fs/fs_pin.c:44
mnt_pin_kill+0x61/0x1e0 fs/fs_pin.c:81
cleanup_mnt+0x3ac/0x450 fs/namespace.c:1366
task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:239
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:43 [inline]
do_exit+0xad8/0x2d70 kernel/exit.c:938
do_group_exit+0xd3/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1087
get_signal+0x2576/0x2610 kernel/signal.c:3017
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x90/0x7e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline]
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x150/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218
do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fee3cb87a6a
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7fee3cb87a40.
RSP: 002b:00007fffcccac688 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000037
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007fffcccac710 RCX: 00007fee3cb87a6a
RDX: 0000000000000041 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 00007fffcccac6ac R09: 00007fffcccacac7
R10: 00007fffcccac710 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fee3cd49500
R13: 00007fffcccac6ac R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fee3cd4b000
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:proc_scheduler+0xc6/0x3c0 net/mptcp/ctrl.c:125
Code: 03 42 80 3c 38 00 0f 85 fe 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 08 09 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Fix tlb invalidation when wedging
If GuC fails to load, the driver wedges, but in the process it tries to
do stuff that may not be initialized yet. This moves the
xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_init() to be done earlier: as its own doc says,
it's a software-only initialization and should had been named with the
_early() suffix.
Move it to be called by xe_gt_init_early(), so the locks and seqno are
initialized, avoiding a NULL ptr deref when wedging:
xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: load failed: status: Reset = 0, BootROM = 0x50, UKernel = 0x00, MIA = 0x00, Auth = 0x01
xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: firmware signature verification failed
xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* CRITICAL: Xe has declared device 0000:03:00.0 as wedged.
...
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 3908 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G U W 6.13.0-rc4-xe+ #3
Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN
Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-S ADP-S DDR5 UDIMM CRB, BIOS ADLSFWI1.R00.3275.A00.2207010640 07/01/2022
RIP: 0010:xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_reset+0x75/0x110 [xe]
This can be easily triggered by poking the GuC binary to force a
signature failure. There will still be an extra message,
xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: GuC mmio request 0x4100: no reply 0x4100
but that's better than a NULL ptr deref.
(cherry picked from commit 5001ef3af8f2c972d6fd9c5221a8457556f8bea6)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/cpuset: remove kernfs active break
A warning was found:
WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 3486953 at fs/kernfs/file.c:828
CPU: 10 PID: 3486953 Comm: rmdir Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
RIP: 0010:kernfs_should_drain_open_files+0x1a1/0x1b0
RSP: 0018:ffff8881107ef9e0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000080000002 RBX: ffff888154738c00 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888154738c04
RBP: ffff888154738c04 R08: ffffffffaf27fa15 R09: ffffed102a8e7180
R10: ffff888154738c07 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888154738c08
R13: ffff888750f8c000 R14: ffff888750f8c0e8 R15: ffff888154738ca0
FS: 00007f84cd0be740(0000) GS:ffff8887ddc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000555f9fbe00c8 CR3: 0000000153eec001 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
kernfs_drain+0x15e/0x2f0
__kernfs_remove+0x165/0x300
kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x7b/0xc0
cgroup_rm_file+0x154/0x1c0
cgroup_addrm_files+0x1c2/0x1f0
css_clear_dir+0x77/0x110
kill_css+0x4c/0x1b0
cgroup_destroy_locked+0x194/0x380
cgroup_rmdir+0x2a/0x140
It can be explained by:
rmdir echo 1 > cpuset.cpus
kernfs_fop_write_iter // active=0
cgroup_rm_file
kernfs_remove_by_name_ns kernfs_get_active // active=1
__kernfs_remove // active=0x80000002
kernfs_drain cpuset_write_resmask
wait_event
//waiting (active == 0x80000001)
kernfs_break_active_protection
// active = 0x80000001
// continue
kernfs_unbreak_active_protection
// active = 0x80000002
...
kernfs_should_drain_open_files
// warning occurs
kernfs_put_active
This warning is caused by 'kernfs_break_active_protection' when it is
writing to cpuset.cpus, and the cgroup is removed concurrently.
The commit 3a5a6d0c2b03 ("cpuset: don't nest cgroup_mutex inside
get_online_cpus()") made cpuset_hotplug_workfn asynchronous, This change
involves calling flush_work(), which can create a multiple processes
circular locking dependency that involve cgroup_mutex, potentially leading
to a deadlock. To avoid deadlock. the commit 76bb5ab8f6e3 ("cpuset: break
kernfs active protection in cpuset_write_resmask()") added
'kernfs_break_active_protection' in the cpuset_write_resmask. This could
lead to this warning.
After the commit 2125c0034c5d ("cgroup/cpuset: Make cpuset hotplug
processing synchronous"), the cpuset_write_resmask no longer needs to
wait the hotplug to finish, which means that concurrent hotplug and cpuset
operations are no longer possible. Therefore, the deadlock doesn't exist
anymore and it does not have to 'break active protection' now. To fix this
warning, just remove kernfs_break_active_protection operation in the
'cpuset_write_resmask'.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block, bfq: fix waker_bfqq UAF after bfq_split_bfqq()
Our syzkaller report a following UAF for v6.6:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfq_init_rq+0x175d/0x17a0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6958
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881b57147d8 by task fsstress/232726
CPU: 2 PID: 232726 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.6.0-g3629d1885222 #39
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x66/0x300 mm/kasan/report.c:364
print_report+0x3e/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:475
kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0 mm/kasan/report.c:588
hlist_add_head include/linux/list.h:1023 [inline]
bfq_init_rq+0x175d/0x17a0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6958
bfq_insert_request.isra.0+0xe8/0xa20 block/bfq-iosched.c:6271
bfq_insert_requests+0x27f/0x390 block/bfq-iosched.c:6323
blk_mq_insert_request+0x290/0x8f0 block/blk-mq.c:2660
blk_mq_submit_bio+0x1021/0x15e0 block/blk-mq.c:3143
__submit_bio+0xa0/0x6b0 block/blk-core.c:639
__submit_bio_noacct_mq block/blk-core.c:718 [inline]
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x5b7/0x810 block/blk-core.c:747
submit_bio_noacct+0xca0/0x1990 block/blk-core.c:847
__ext4_read_bh fs/ext4/super.c:205 [inline]
ext4_read_bh+0x15e/0x2e0 fs/ext4/super.c:230
__read_extent_tree_block+0x304/0x6f0 fs/ext4/extents.c:567
ext4_find_extent+0x479/0xd20 fs/ext4/extents.c:947
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x1a3/0x2680 fs/ext4/extents.c:4182
ext4_map_blocks+0x929/0x15a0 fs/ext4/inode.c:660
ext4_iomap_begin_report+0x298/0x480 fs/ext4/inode.c:3569
iomap_iter+0x3dd/0x1010 fs/iomap/iter.c:91
iomap_fiemap+0x1f4/0x360 fs/iomap/fiemap.c:80
ext4_fiemap+0x181/0x210 fs/ext4/extents.c:5051
ioctl_fiemap.isra.0+0x1b4/0x290 fs/ioctl.c:220
do_vfs_ioctl+0x31c/0x11a0 fs/ioctl.c:811
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:869 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xae/0x190 fs/ioctl.c:857
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x70/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2
Allocated by task 232719:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x87/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:328
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:188 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:768 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3492 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1b8/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3537
bfq_get_queue+0x215/0x1f00 block/bfq-iosched.c:5869
bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0x167/0x5f0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6776
bfq_init_rq+0x13a4/0x17a0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6938
bfq_insert_request.isra.0+0xe8/0xa20 block/bfq-iosched.c:6271
bfq_insert_requests+0x27f/0x390 block/bfq-iosched.c:6323
blk_mq_insert_request+0x290/0x8f0 block/blk-mq.c:2660
blk_mq_submit_bio+0x1021/0x15e0 block/blk-mq.c:3143
__submit_bio+0xa0/0x6b0 block/blk-core.c:639
__submit_bio_noacct_mq block/blk-core.c:718 [inline]
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x5b7/0x810 block/blk-core.c:747
submit_bio_noacct+0xca0/0x1990 block/blk-core.c:847
__ext4_read_bh fs/ext4/super.c:205 [inline]
ext4_read_bh_nowait+0x15a/0x240 fs/ext4/super.c:217
ext4_read_bh_lock+0xac/0xd0 fs/ext4/super.c:242
ext4_bread_batch+0x268/0x500 fs/ext4/inode.c:958
__ext4_find_entry+0x448/0x10f0 fs/ext4/namei.c:1671
ext4_lookup_entry fs/ext4/namei.c:1774 [inline]
ext4_lookup.part.0+0x359/0x6f0 fs/ext4/namei.c:1842
ext4_lookup+0x72/0x90 fs/ext4/namei.c:1839
__lookup_slow+0x257/0x480 fs/namei.c:1696
lookup_slow fs/namei.c:1713 [inline]
walk_component+0x454/0x5c0 fs/namei.c:2004
link_path_walk.part.0+0x773/0xda0 fs/namei.c:2331
link_path_walk fs/namei.c:3826 [inline]
path_openat+0x1b9/0x520 fs/namei.c:3826
do_filp_open+0x1b7/0x400 fs/namei.c:3857
do_sys_openat2+0x5dc/0x6e0 fs/open.c:1428
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x148/0x200 fs/open.c:1454
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_6
---truncated---
A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in Tenda AC15 15.13.07.13. This affects the function formSetDevNetName of the file /goform/SetDevNetName. The manipulation of the argument mac leads to stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
A vulnerability was found in ZZCMS 2023. It has been rated as critical. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /index.php. The manipulation of the argument id leads to sql injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.