Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In January 2025
IBM Sterling B2B Integrator 6.0.0.0 through 6.1.2.5 and 6.2.0.0 through 6.2.0.3 is vulnerable to cross-site request forgery which could allow an attacker to execute malicious and unauthorized actions transmitted from a user that the website trusts.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pktgen: Avoid out-of-bounds access in get_imix_entries
Passing a sufficient amount of imix entries leads to invalid access to the
pkt_dev->imix_entries array because of the incorrect boundary check.
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/core/pktgen.c:874:24
index 20 is out of range for type 'imix_pkt [20]'
CPU: 2 PID: 1210 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1 #121
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl lib/dump_stack.c:117
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds lib/ubsan.c:429
get_imix_entries net/core/pktgen.c:874
pktgen_if_write net/core/pktgen.c:1063
pde_write fs/proc/inode.c:334
proc_reg_write fs/proc/inode.c:346
vfs_write fs/read_write.c:593
ksys_write fs/read_write.c:644
do_syscall_64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
[ fp: allow to fill the array completely; minor changelog cleanup ]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: fix lockup on tx to unregistering netdev with carrier
Commit in a fixes tag attempted to fix the issue in the following
sequence of calls:
do_output
-> ovs_vport_send
-> dev_queue_xmit
-> __dev_queue_xmit
-> netdev_core_pick_tx
-> skb_tx_hash
When device is unregistering, the 'dev->real_num_tx_queues' goes to
zero and the 'while (unlikely(hash >= qcount))' loop inside the
'skb_tx_hash' becomes infinite, locking up the core forever.
But unfortunately, checking just the carrier status is not enough to
fix the issue, because some devices may still be in unregistering
state while reporting carrier status OK.
One example of such device is a net/dummy. It sets carrier ON
on start, but it doesn't implement .ndo_stop to set the carrier off.
And it makes sense, because dummy doesn't really have a carrier.
Therefore, while this device is unregistering, it's still easy to hit
the infinite loop in the skb_tx_hash() from the OVS datapath. There
might be other drivers that do the same, but dummy by itself is
important for the OVS ecosystem, because it is frequently used as a
packet sink for tcpdump while debugging OVS deployments. And when the
issue is hit, the only way to recover is to reboot.
Fix that by also checking if the device is running. The running
state is handled by the net core during unregistering, so it covers
unregistering case better, and we don't really need to send packets
to devices that are not running anyway.
While only checking the running state might be enough, the carrier
check is preserved. The running and the carrier states seem disjoined
throughout the code and different drivers. And other core functions
like __dev_direct_xmit() check both before attempting to transmit
a packet. So, it seems safer to check both flags in OVS as well.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: bnxt: always recalculate features after XDP clearing, fix null-deref
Recalculate features when XDP is detached.
Before:
# ip li set dev eth0 xdp obj xdp_dummy.bpf.o sec xdp
# ip li set dev eth0 xdp off
# ethtool -k eth0 | grep gro
rx-gro-hw: off [requested on]
After:
# ip li set dev eth0 xdp obj xdp_dummy.bpf.o sec xdp
# ip li set dev eth0 xdp off
# ethtool -k eth0 | grep gro
rx-gro-hw: on
The fact that HW-GRO doesn't get re-enabled automatically is just
a minor annoyance. The real issue is that the features will randomly
come back during another reconfiguration which just happens to invoke
netdev_update_features(). The driver doesn't handle reconfiguring
two things at a time very robustly.
Starting with commit 98ba1d931f61 ("bnxt_en: Fix RSS logic in
__bnxt_reserve_rings()") we only reconfigure the RSS hash table
if the "effective" number of Rx rings has changed. If HW-GRO is
enabled "effective" number of rings is 2x what user sees.
So if we are in the bad state, with HW-GRO re-enablement "pending"
after XDP off, and we lower the rings by / 2 - the HW-GRO rings
doing 2x and the ethtool -L doing / 2 may cancel each other out,
and the:
if (old_rx_rings != bp->hw_resc.resv_rx_rings &&
condition in __bnxt_reserve_rings() will be false.
The RSS map won't get updated, and we'll crash with:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000168
RIP: 0010:__bnxt_hwrm_vnic_set_rss+0x13a/0x1a0
bnxt_hwrm_vnic_rss_cfg_p5+0x47/0x180
__bnxt_setup_vnic_p5+0x58/0x110
bnxt_init_nic+0xb72/0xf50
__bnxt_open_nic+0x40d/0xab0
bnxt_open_nic+0x2b/0x60
ethtool_set_channels+0x18c/0x1d0
As we try to access a freed ring.
The issue is present since XDP support was added, really, but
prior to commit 98ba1d931f61 ("bnxt_en: Fix RSS logic in
__bnxt_reserve_rings()") it wasn't causing major issues.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix bpf_sk_select_reuseport() memory leak
As pointed out in the original comment, lookup in sockmap can return a TCP
ESTABLISHED socket. Such TCP socket may have had SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_EBPF
set before it was ESTABLISHED. In other words, a non-NULL sk_reuseport_cb
does not imply a non-refcounted socket.
Drop sk's reference in both error paths.
unreferenced object 0xffff888101911800 (size 2048):
comm "test_progs", pid 44109, jiffies 4297131437
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
80 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc 9336483b):
__kmalloc_noprof+0x3bf/0x560
__reuseport_alloc+0x1d/0x40
reuseport_alloc+0xca/0x150
reuseport_attach_prog+0x87/0x140
sk_reuseport_attach_bpf+0xc8/0x100
sk_setsockopt+0x1181/0x1990
do_sock_setsockopt+0x12b/0x160
__sys_setsockopt+0x7b/0xc0
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1b/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: discard packets if the transport changes
If the socket has been de-assigned or assigned to another transport,
we must discard any packets received because they are not expected
and would cause issues when we access vsk->transport.
A possible scenario is described by Hyunwoo Kim in the attached link,
where after a first connect() interrupted by a signal, and a second
connect() failed, we can find `vsk->transport` at NULL, leading to a
NULL pointer dereference.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/bpf: return early if transport is not assigned
Some of the core functions can only be called if the transport
has been assigned.
As Michal reported, a socket might have the transport at NULL,
for example after a failed connect(), causing the following trace:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a0
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 12faf8067 P4D 12faf8067 PUD 113670067 PMD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 1198 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2+
RIP: 0010:vsock_connectible_has_data+0x1f/0x40
Call Trace:
vsock_bpf_recvmsg+0xca/0x5e0
sock_recvmsg+0xb9/0xc0
__sys_recvfrom+0xb3/0x130
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
So we need to check the `vsk->transport` in vsock_bpf_recvmsg(),
especially for connected sockets (stream/seqpacket) as we already
do in __vsock_connectible_recvmsg().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
zram: fix potential UAF of zram table
If zram_meta_alloc failed early, it frees allocated zram->table without
setting it NULL. Which will potentially cause zram_meta_free to access
the table if user reset an failed and uninitialized device.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix merge preference rule failure condition
syzbot reported a lock held when returning to userspace[1]. This is
because if argc is less than 0 and the function returns directly, the held
inode lock is not released.
Fix this by store the error in ret and jump to done to clean up instead of
returning directly.
[dh: Modified Lizhi Xu's original patch to make it honour the error code
from afs_split_string()]
[1]
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-00209-g499551201b5f #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------
syz-executor133/5823 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by syz-executor133/5823:
#0: ffff888071cffc00 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:818 [inline]
#0: ffff888071cffc00 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}-{4:4}, at: afs_proc_addr_prefs_write+0x2bb/0x14e0 fs/afs/addr_prefs.c:388
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix double free of TCP_Server_Info::hostname
When shutting down the server in cifs_put_tcp_session(), cifsd thread
might be reconnecting to multiple DFS targets before it realizes it
should exit the loop, so @server->hostname can't be freed as long as
cifsd thread isn't done. Otherwise the following can happen:
RIP: 0010:__slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
Code: 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 4c 89 de 4c 89 cf 44 89 44 24 08 4c 89
1c 24 e8 fb cf 8e 00 44 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 1c 24 e9 5f fe ff ff <0f>
0b 41 f7 45 08 00 0d 21 00 0f 85 2d ff ff ff e9 1f ff ff ff 80
RSP: 0018:ffffb26180dbfd08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff8ea34728e510 RBX: ffff8ea34728e500 RCX: 0000000000800068
RDX: 0000000000800068 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ea340042400
RBP: ffffe112041ca380 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 6170732e31303000 R11: 70726f632e786563 R12: ffff8ea34728e500
R13: ffff8ea340042400 R14: ffff8ea34728e500 R15: 0000000000800068
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ea66fd80000(0000)
000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffc25376080 CR3: 000000012a2ba001 CR4:
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? __reconnect_target_unlocked+0x3e/0x160 [cifs]
? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
? die+0x2b/0x50
? do_trap+0xce/0x120
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? extract_hostname+0x5c/0xa0 [cifs]
? extract_hostname+0x5c/0xa0 [cifs]
? __kmalloc+0x4b/0x140
__reconnect_target_unlocked+0x3e/0x160 [cifs]
reconnect_dfs_server+0x145/0x430 [cifs]
cifs_handle_standard+0x1ad/0x1d0 [cifs]
cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x592/0x730 [cifs]
? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
kthread+0xdd/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
</TASK>